2013年股权激励外文翻译（节选）

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1、2600 英文单词， 15500 英文字符 ，中文 4450 字 文献出处： Vlittis A , Charitou M . The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigationJ. Research in International Business & Finance, 2013, 27(1):80-91. The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigation Adamos Vl

2、ittis, Melita Charitou Abstract Conference calls have become increasingly common in recent years, yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of conference calls on executive compensation. In this study, we examine the effect of voluntary disclosures on equity incentives. We hypothes

3、ize that voluntary disclosures, as measured by conference calls, affect executive compensation contracts. Using a dataset of 6263 rm-year observations from both conference call and non- conference call rms, our results are consistent with the argument that the board of directors substitutes voluntar

4、y disclosures for more costly corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively, in rms where CEOs have less equity incentives, the owners demand more voluntary disclosures. The results of this study should be of great importance to executives and capital market participants internationally, such as in

5、vestors and analysts, since we provide evidence that conference calls affect incentive based compensation contracts, which were shown in prior studies to be value relevant. Keywords: Conference; calls Voluntary; disclosures; Executive compensation; Capital markets 1. Introduction Over the past two d

6、ecades equity incentives via stock-based compensation have become a very important feature of the contracting environment between shareholders and executives (Core et al., 2003). The fundamental reason for the use of stock-based compensation is to align the interests of shareholders and managers by tying executive wealth to stock performance (Frydman and Sacks, 2010; Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Because executive effort is unobservable, compensation risk is imposed on executives