2012年外文翻译--私人控制权与盈余管理：来自内部控制公司的证据（节选）

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1、3100 英文单词， 1.8 万英文字符 ，中文 5700 字 文献出处： Gopalan R, Jayaraman S. Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled FirmsJ. Journal of Accounting Research, 2012, 50(1):117157. Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled Firms RADHAK

2、RISHNAN GOPALAN AND SUDARSHAN JAYARAMAN ABSTRACT We examine earnings management practices of insider controlled firms across 22 countries to shed light on the link between consumption of private benefits and earnings management. Insider controlled firms are associated with more earnings management t

3、han noninsider controlled firms in weak investor protection countries. Consistent with the private benefits motive, insider controlled firms with greater divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights are associated with more earnings management in these countries. Growth opportunities atten

4、uate the association between insider control and earnings management even in weak investor protection countries. We also find some weak evidence that insider controlled firms are associated with less earnings management in strong investor protection countries. Overall, our results highlight a strong

5、 link between private benefits consumption and earnings management. 1. Introduction Understanding the determinants of firm disclosure practices is of fundamental importance. In an influential study, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003 advance the link between insiders incentives to consume private control

6、 benefits and financial reporting practices. In support, they show that firms in countries with poor investor protectionwhere insiders have a greater ability to consume private control benefitsare associated with more earnings management (i.e., less informative financial statements). Although an important first step, it is difficult to form definitive conclusions from a country-level design because a number of determinants of firm disclosures covary with the level of investor protection