现行企业会计准则下盈余管理分析研究外文翻译

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1、 -1 中文 2300 字 外文翻译之一 A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting Author： Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen Nationality： America Derivation: Accounting Horizons Vol.13 No.4 365-383 INTRODUCTION In this paper we review the academic evidence on earnings mana

2、gement. The primary purpose of this review is to summarize the implications of scholarly evidence on earnings management to help accounting standard setters and regulators assess the pervasiveness of earnings management and the overall integrity of financial reporting. This review is also aimed at i

3、dentifying fruitful areas for future academic research on earnings management. Standard setters define the accounting language that management uses to communicate with the firms external stakeholders.1 By creating a framework that independent auditors and the SEC can enforce, accounting standards ca

4、n provide a relatively low-cost and credible means for corporate managers to report information on their firmsperformance to external capital providers and other stakeholders.2 Ideally, financial reporting therefore helps the best-performing firms in the economy to distinguish themselves from poor p

5、erformers and facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders. If financial reports are to convey managers information on their firms performance, standards must permit managers to exercise judgment in financial reporting. Managers can then use their knowledge abo

6、ut the business and its opportunities to select reporting methods, estimates, and disclosures that match the firms business economics, potentially increasing the value of accounting as a form of communication. However, because auditing is imperfect, managements use of judgment also creates opportuni

7、ties for “earnings management,” in which managers choose reporting methods and estimates that do not accurately reflect their firms underlying economics. The Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, recently expressed concerns over earnings management and its effect on resource allocation. He noted that

8、management abuses of “big bath” restructuring charges, premature revenue recognition, “cookie jar” reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D are threatening the credibility of financial reporting. To address these concerns, the SEC is examining new disclosure requirements and has formed a

9、n -2 earnings management task force to crack down on firms that manage earnings. The SEC also expects to require more firms to restate Reported earnings and will step up enforcement of disclosure requirements. A number of recent studies, however, sharpen the focus of their tests to examine earnings

10、management using specific accruals, such as bank loan loss provisions, claim loss reserves for property-casualty insurers, and deferred tax valuation allowances. There is evidence that banks use loan loss provisions and insurers use claim loss reserves to manage earnings, particularly to meet regula

11、tory requirements. There is little evidence that firms manage earnings using deferred tax valuation allowances. Much of the evidence on the capital market consequences of earnings management shows that investors are not “fooled” by earnings management and that financial statements provide useful inf

12、ormation to investors. Current earnings, which reflect management reporting judgment, have been widely found to be value-relevant and are typically better predictors of future cash flow performance than are current cash flows. Answers to the above questions are difficult to infer from current studie

13、s for a number of reasons. First, most academic studies attempt to document earnings management, but do not provide evidence on its extent and scope. Consequently, existing evidence does not help standard setters to assess whether current standards are largely effective in facilitating communication

14、 with investors, or whether they encourage widespread earnings management. Second, most studies have examined unexpected accruals for evidence of earnings management. While this research provides a useful summary index of earnings management, it does not show which standards are effective in facilit

15、ating communication between managers and investors and which are ineffective. The studies that examine the effects of earnings management on the capital markets leave a number of unanswered questions for future research. First, as noted above, how pervasive is earnings management for capital market

16、reasons, both among the firms sampled and for the population of firms? Second, what is the magnitude of any earnings management? Third, what specific accruals do firms (other than banks and insurers) use to manage earnings? Fourth, why do some firms appear to manage earnings whereas others with simi

17、lar incentives do not? Finally, under what conditions do market participants detect and, therefore, react to earnings management, and under what conditions do they fail to detect earnings management? For example, do required disclosures that make the use of accounting judgment more transparent help

18、to mitigate the impact of earnings management on resource allocation? In summary, the earnings management studies strongly suggest that regulatory considerations induce firms to manage earnings. There is limited -3 evidence on whether this behavior is widespread or rare, however, and very little evi

19、dence on the effect on regulators or investors. 盈余管理文献回顾及其对标准设置的启示 作者： Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen 国籍： 美国 选自： 会计天涯 Vol.13 No.4 365-383 介绍 : 本文我们回顾一些关于盈余管理的相关学术的研究，本文回顾的主要目的是为了总括学者们以及会计标准的设定者和管理者评估盈余管理的普 遍性以及对于财务报表的完整性，本文献同时志于对盈余管理的未来学术研究提供有用的鉴戒。 标准制定者们对会计语言定义成与公司的外部股东进行交流沟通的管理用途， 1 通过创造出一种框架，使

20、得独立审计师以及 SEC 能够加强准则标准，而同时提供相对低成本和可信赖的方式供外部资本供应者和其他的股东。 2 理想化来说，财务报告相应地能够帮助经营最好的企业在经济上把它们与经营不好的企业区分开来，而同时使得股东能够做好更好的资源配置和相应的投资决策。 如果财务报告是为了表达管理者对企业的经营业绩的信息，那么准则必须应该允许管理者们能够 在财务报表中行使判断能力。管理者因而能够使用自我的知识来对业务和对适合企业的经济情况的报告方法，估计，披露方式的选择，从而潜在地提高了会计作为一种沟通手段的价值。然而，由于审计的不完善，判断能力作为一种管理手段同样也产生了盈余管理的机会，管理者们通过选择会

21、计方法以及会计假设，从而并不准确地反映他们公司的真实经济情况。 美国证券监督管理委员会的主席， Arthur Levitt，最近发表了一项对盈余管理以及其对资源分配的影响的顾虑。他表示，“大洗澡”来重构费用作为管理手段的任意使用，收入的提前确认，“小金库”的 设置以及在产品研发费用的冲销，这些都正在威胁着财务报告的可行度。为了处理这些问题，美国证券监督管理委员会正在研究一些披露的条件并已经形成处理那些进行盈余管理的公司的盈余管理工作小组。此外，该组织同时希望更多的企业能够进行整治房地产的收入，并加强对披露的各个要求的执行。 然而，最近大量的研究也加强了关于通过使用特定的加息的盈余管理的关注，包括利用银行贷款的损失供应，对资产保险人损失准备金的计提，以及递延税款的价值补贴。