外文翻译--股权结构与公司绩效 以印度为例

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1、中文 4200 字， 2650 单词， 14800 英文字符 出处： Srivastava A. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from IndiaJ. International Journal of Humanities & Social Science, 2011, 7(3):209233. 原文 Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from India Author: AmanSrivastava Abstract Ownersh

2、ip structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firms equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm perform

3、ance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. This paper is a moderate attempt to address the relationship of ownership structure of the firm and its performance. It investigate

4、s whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. The 98 most actively listed companies on BSE 100 indices of Bombay Stock Exchange of India, which constitute the bulk of trading, were chosen to constitute the sample of the study as of end of

5、 2009-10. The findings indicate the presence of highly concentrated ownership structure in the Indian market. The results of the regression analyses indicate that the dispersed ownership percentage influences certain dimensions of accounting performance indicators (i.e. ROA and ROE) but not stock ma

6、rket performance indicators (i.e. P/E and P/BV ratios), which indicate that there might be other factors (economic, political, contextual) affecting firms performance other than ownership structure. Keywords: Ownership structure, corporate performance, corporate governance, India 1. Introduction Own

7、ership structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firms equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm per

8、formance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. Though the modern organization emphasizes the divorce of management and ownership； in practice, the interests of group managing

9、 the company can differ from the interests of those that supply the capital to the firm. Corporate governance literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the ownership structure of corporations. Shareholders of publicly held corporations are so numerous and small that they are unable to effe

10、ctively control the decisions of the management team, and thus cannot be assured that the management team represents their interests. Many solutions to this problem have been advanced, as stated previously i.e. the disciplining effect of the takeover market, the positive incentive effects of the man

11、agement shareholding stake and the benefits of large monitoring shareholders. A different problem, however, arises in firms with large controlling shareholders. Since a large controlling shareholder has both the incentives and the power to control the management teams actions, managements misbehavio

12、r is a second order problem when such a large shareholder exists. Instead, the main problem becomes controlling the large shareholders abuse of minority shareholders. In other words, holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to elect and control a majority of

13、 the directors and to determine the outcome of shareholders votes on other matters, have tremendous power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, the type of owners as well as the distribution of ownership stakes will undoubtedly have an impact on the performance of firm

14、s. Most of the empirical literature studying the link between corporate governance and firm performance usually concentrates on a particular aspect of governance, such as board of directors, shareholders activism, compensation, anti-takeover provisions, investor protection etc. This paper is a moder

15、ate attempt to examine the relationship of ownership structure and performance of firms in India. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses on the literature review, where both theoretical and empirical studies on previous works are looked into. It also incorporates the corp

16、orate governance mechanism in India. In section 3, the methodology of this study is considered. Empirical results and discussions are made in section 4, while section 5 concludes the study. 2. Literature Review The firms equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated b

17、y researchers for decades； however, most of the studies in this context are conducted outside of India. The study failed to document any relevant study on the topic in Indian context. Fama and Jensen (1983 a & b) addresses the agency problems and they explained that a major source of cost to shareho

18、lders is the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Even in developed countries, these agency problems continue to be sources of large costs to shareholders1.Demstez and Lehn (1985) argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm specific, and that market

19、competition would derive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns should yield insignificant results. Morck. (1988) by taking percentage of shares held by the board of directors of the c

20、ompany as a measure of ownership concentration and holding both Tobins Q and accounting profit as performance measure of 500 Fortune companies and using piece-wise linear regression, found a positive relation between Tobins Q and board ownership ranging from 0% to 5%, a negative relation for board o

21、wnership ranging from 5% to 25%, and again a positive relation for the said ownership above 25%. It is argued that the separation of ownership from control for a corporate firm creates an agency problem that results in conflicts between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).The inter

22、ests of other investors can generally be protected through contractual arrangements between the company and concerned stakeholders, leaving shareholders as the residual claimants whose interests can adequately be protected only through the institutions of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1

23、997). Loderer and Martin (1997) took shareholding by the insiders (i.e., directors ownership) as a measure of ownership. Taking the said measure as endogenous variable and Tobins Q as performance measure, they found (through simultaneous equation model) that ownership does not predict performance, b

24、ut performance is a negative predictor of ownership. Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen (1997) examine the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in the largest companies from 12 European nations. According to their findings the positive marginal effect of ownership ties to fin

25、ancial institutions is stronger in the market-based British system than in continental Europe. Cho (1998) found that firm performance affects ownership structure (signifying percentage of shares held by directors), but not vice versa. Jrgen Weigand (2000) documented that (1) the presence of large sh

26、areholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, and (2) the high degree of ownership concentration seems to be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held German corporations. Their results also imply ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively.Their empiric

27、al evidence suggests that representation of owners on the board of executive directors does not make a difference. Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer (2001) stated with a sample of 637 Japanese firms and confirmed the equilibrium mechanism behind Demstez-Lehn. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) investigated

28、the relation between the ownership structure and the performance (average Tobins Q for five years-1976-80) of the corporations if ownership is made multidimensional and also treated it as an endogenous variable. By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stage Least Squares (2 SLS) regression mod

29、el, they found no significant systematic relation between the ownership structure and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of Australian listed companies. Her OLS results suggest that ownership of shares by the to

30、p management is significant in explaining the performance measured by accounting rate of return, but not significant ifperformance is measured by Tobins Q. However, when ownership is treated as endogenous, the same is not dependent upon any of the performance measures. Lins (2002) investigates wheth

31、er management ownership structures and large non-management block holders are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets .He finds that large non-management control rights block holdings (having more control rights) are positively related to firm value measured by T

32、obins Q. Michael L Lemmon and Karl V Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the regions financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling share

33、holders to expropriate minority investors. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders. Using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, BeniLauterbach and EfratTolkowsky (2004) find that Tobins Q is

34、maximized when control group vote reaches 67%. This evidence is strong when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered endogenous. ChristophKaserer and Benjamin Moldenhauer (2005) address the question whether there is any empirical relationship between corporate perfo

35、rmance and insider ownership. Using a data set of 245 Germen firms for the year 2003 they find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance, as measured by stock price performance as well as by Tobins Q, and insider ownership. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) tri

36、ed the model of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for 175 Greek firms for the year 2000 and found that higher firm profitability requires less diffused ownership structure He also provides evidence that large non management block holders can mitigate the valuation discounts associated with the expected

37、agency problem. 3. Data and Methodology The study aims to explore the disciplinary effect of the market in a context with concentrated ownership structure and weak investor protection. The paper aims to explore if there are dominant certain types of owners of actively listed and traded companies on

38、Indian Stock Exchanges. Further, it investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. It shows that there might be other reasons that have affected the performance of the listed companies of BSE 100, other than ownership structure. The data set consists of detailed trading and financial information and indicators about the 98