外文翻译--战略、业绩评价体系与业绩——对中国上市公司的研究

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1、中文 2160 字， 1200 单词 原文 Strategy, performance-measurement systems, and performance: A study of Chinese firms Material Source: The International Journal of Accounting 44 (2009) 256278 Author: Damon M. Fleming, Chee W. Chow, Gongmeng Chen Abstract Numerous studies in developed Western countries have sho

2、wn that firms strategic choices are responsive to attributes of their external environment. In turn, performance-measurement systems are used to support strategy implementation, which then affect firm performance. However, institutional factors may limit the extent to which these linkages exist in t

3、he transitional Chinese economy. We analyze survey and publicly available data for 104 listed Chinese manufacturing firms and find that, despite a number of identifiable impediments, these firms strategic emphasis on growth is responsive to the competition and uncertainty that they face. In the case

4、 of uncertainty, the relationship goes in the opposite direction to that found in Western firms. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese firms with greater emphasis on growth also tend to make greater use of balanced/integrated performance measurement systems, and, in turn, they perform at a higher

5、 level. 1. Introduction Numerous studies have shown that firms make strategic choices often in response to their external environment. Firms also use performance-measurement systems (PMSs) to support strategy implementation that increases their performance. This literature, however, is largely focus

6、ed on firms from the more developedWestern economies (see Chenhall, 2003, 2007 forreviews). Whether or not these relationships hold true for Chinese firms has not yet beenempiricallytested.We believe that such an investigation is warranted, in part, because Chinahas become one of the worlds largest

7、export and import countries (OECD, 2005； Roberts &Engardis, 2006), and in part because its transitional economy has certain attributes which might suppress a managers motivation and/or ability to respond to his/her firms challenges and opportunities. With the expanding global presence of Chinese 2 f

8、irms, an increased understanding of the strategic nature and performance effects of their current management practices might help investors, creditors, joint-venture partners, suppliers, and competitors in assessing their relationships with Chinese firms. These findings can also be of use to Chinese

9、 firms as they plan improvements. We obtained data for this study from multiple sources (surveys and actual financial reports) for 104 exchange-listed Chinese manufacturing firms. We then used path analysis to examine simultaneously the extent to which these firms strategic emphasis on growth is a f

10、unction of the competition and uncertainty in their environment, the relation between their emphasis on growth and the use of balanced/integrated PMSs, and how their PMSs affect performance. For the sample firms, we find that the emphasis on growth increases (decreases) with the perceived competitio

11、n (uncertainty) in the business environment. Notably, the relationship with uncertainty goes in the opposite direction to that found in Western settings. The a higher use of balanced/integrated PMSs, and that the PMSs have a significant, positive link with firm performance. These findings suggest th

12、at despite the many institutional impediments that we identify, Chinese firms are responding to the opportunities and challenges in their business environment, though not always in the same way as their Western counterparts. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an

13、overview of Chinas institutional characteristics and then develops three hypotheses based primarily on the extant (Western) literature. Section 3 explains how we collected data, and Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the findings and their implications.

14、 China had a command economy up to the end of the 1970s, wherein business enterprises were merely units for implementing government plans and had very little autonomy (Expert Group, 1995). Although privatization was adopted as official policy in 1978, the Chinese government chose to “grow out” of ce

15、ntral planning gradually, rather than following the Russian approach of dramatic policy shifts (Peng, 2003). As a result, the Chinese government has maintained a central role in guiding the economic transition (Luo, 2005), and many of the policies and institutions supporting this change (e.g., estab

16、lishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, termination of financial support for most state-owned enterprises) did not come into being until the 1990s (Chow, Duh, & Xiao, 2007).Since then, the continued opening of markets and the ascendancy of private ownership have brought about an expan

17、sion in both management autonomy and the demand for “scientific management” systems to 3 improve efficiency and effectiveness (Chow et al., 2007). Despite these developments, Chinese firms still face several identifiable obstacles in responding to the environment and/or emulating the management prac

18、tices of the more developed Western countries. Peng (2003) suggests that Scotts (1995) fundamental and related institutional “pillars” can be used to describe the institutional challenges facing Chinas business enterprises. One such pillar is regulative, and focuses on the formal rules, systems, and

19、 enforcement mechanisms sanctioned by the government (e.g., the legal infrastructure and takeover markets). Studies of the developed economies indicate that internal and external disciplining mechanisms like these help outsiders monitor and discipline management. In the case of China, Allen, Qian, a

20、nd Qian (2005) and Pistor and Xu (2005) have found that its laws and institutions, including investor protection systems, corporate governance, and accounting standards, are far less developed than in the more advanced economies. These weaknesses could reduce managers incentives to respond to their

21、firms challenges and opportunities. Further dampening effects may come from the governments continued activism via direct interventions, the promulgation of regulations, and the espousal of political ideology, especially because government entities in China often have objectives that deviate from pr

22、ofitability, such as maintaining social order and effecting wealth redistribution (Liu, 2006； Tang, Xi, Chen, & Wang, 2006). Another of Scotts (1995) suggested pillars relates to the beliefs and values that are imposed on, or internalized by, the people in the institutional environment. During the c

23、entralization era, people often were appointed to managerial positions for reasons other than ability, and enterprises operated under so-called “soft budget constraints” (Kornai, 1980) whereby the government would automatically write off debts and provide operating funds, and firms were essentially

24、evaluated based on their outputs, not profitability. A legacy of this recent era is a shortage of managers with experience in decision making (Wang & Zhang, 2000), and recent evidence suggests that this problem continues to plague Chinese companies (Lane &Pollner, 2008). As a result, many Chinese fi

25、rms still may have high-level appointees who either do not appreciate the potential benefits from modern management practices, or resist their implementation to protect their own turf or influence (Xu& Wang, 1999； Yang, Chen, Su, Liu, & Liu, 2001). There also may be remnants of the “iron rice bowl”

26、mentality among the rank-and-file employees, who may resist management initiatives that threaten the “Chinese way of doing things” (OConnor 4 et al., 2004). Finally, Chinas national culture has distinct differences from that of many Western countries (Chow, Deng, & Ho, 2000； Hofstede, 1984), and the

27、se differences may cause Chinese managers and workers to prefer management practices that differ from those of their foreign counterparts (Chow, Shields, &Wu, 1999；Merchant, Chow, &Wu, 1995). For example, being authoritative is not a typical or well-received behavior of executives in the West, but i

28、n China it is viewed as a legitimate way to behave given the Chinese tradition of respect for hierarchy (Fu &Tsui, 2003). Yet another example is Chinese managers preference for security in the face of uncertainty (Tan &Litschert, 1994), while their contemporaries in the West tend to adopt more aggressive strategies in such circumstances.