外文翻译 - 福利国家私有化-作为政治行动者的非营利性社区组织（节选）

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1、943 单词， 5400 英文字符， 1680 汉字 出 处 ： Marwell N P. Privatizing the Welfare State: Nonprofit Community-Based Organizations as Political ActorsJ. American Sociological Review, 2004, 69(2):265-291. Privatizing the Welfare State: Nonprofit Community-Based Organizations as Political Actors Nicole P. Marwell C

2、olumbia University This paper examines a form of state social provision that has been neglected by current sociological theory: publicly funded supportive services. Federal policies of privatization and devolution, embraced since the Reagan years, have made private, nonprofit organizations the prima

3、ry deliverers of these services. Public supportive services are distributed via competitive state- and local-level allocative processes that send government contracts to specific nonprofit community-based organizations (CBOs), which in turn serve specific neighborhoods and individuals. I describe a

4、model by which CBOs generate greater contract revenues by adding electoral politics to their more traditional roles of providing services and building communities. This model produces a new kind of CBO: the machine politics CBO. By reciprocally distributing services to residents and binding resident

5、s to the organization, machine politics CBOs create reliable voting constituencies for local elected officials. These officials trade these constituencies at higher levels of the governmental system and steer government human service contracts to favored CBOs. Through this process, nonprofit CBOs ca

6、n influence the allocation of service-based social provision in cities and therefore impact individuals ability to access these services. sociological research on public social provi- sion generally is built upon studies of income transfers from governments to individ- uals. This research has provid

7、ed valuable infor- mation about how income transfer policies are established, why particular categories of people are made eligible, how levels of cash benefits Direct correspondence to Nicole P. Marwell, Department of Sociology, Columbia University, 323M Fayerweather, MC 2551, New York, NY 10027 (n

8、pm8columbia.edu). This research was support- ed by the National Community Development Policy Analysis Network, the Nonprofit Sector Research Fund of The Aspen Institute (Grant Number 96-2- NSRF-07), and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (Agreement No. H- 21140SG). Some of

9、 the research also was conduct- ed as part of the Second Generation in Metropolitan New York Project. I thank Florencia Torche, Kelly Moore, Sudhir Venkatesh, Robert C. Smith, and the ASR editors and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. are set, and why eligibility and generosit

10、y change over time. Cross-national research has tested theories about why different nations make different policy choices in these areas and what the outcomes are for their citizens (Amenta 1993； Bradley et al. 2003； Esping-Andersen1990； Heclo 1974； Hicks and Misra 1993； Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1

11、993； Korpi 1983； Moller et al. 2003； Orloff and Skocpol 1984； Pierson 1995； Stephens 1979). Work focused on the United States has considered the question of why cash benefits are so low and restricted compared with other industrialized democracies (Amenta 1998； Hicks and Swank 1983； Piven and Clowar

12、d 1971； Quadagno 1994； Skocpol 1992； Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988) and has examined state-level policy differences in eli- gibility and benefits (Cauthen and Amenta 1996； Lurie 2001； Meyers, Gornick, and Peck 2002； Soule and Zylan 1997； Zylan and Soule 2000). However, there is one sector of the we

13、lfare state that is rarely examined in the current social provision literature but that is actually much more important in the lives of poor people especially the urban poor than appears at first glance: state funding of supportive direct serv- ices. Recent research by Garfinkel et al. (forth- comin

14、g) shows that more than 20 percent of U.S. federal social provision dollars currently are spent on such services,1 yet this dimension of the social benefit package rarely is considered in welfare state studies (e.g., Bradley et al. 2003:199).2 In aggregate population terms, income support is the mos

15、t important determi- nant of individual well-being (Bradley et al. 2003； Moller et al. 2003). If we are interested in the welfare of our poorest citizens, however, we must consider the direct services component of the social benefit package as well. Research repeatedly has demonstrated that only a s

16、mall proportion of all state income transfers go to the poor (e.g., Ellwood 1988； Katz 1996). In con- trast, state-funded direct services go primarily to the poor.3 These two distributional facts argue that services may well be as important as income transfers to poor peoples well-being (see also Me

17、yers and Garcia forthcoming). Three key differences distinguish income transfers from direct services in terms of the relationship between the state and citizens. First, income transfers come directly to citizens as cash payments from the state. In contrast, direct services often are mediated by a t

18、hird party: a private, nonprofit organization (NPO). In the United States, NPOs currently deliver the major- ity of state-funded direct services to citizens (Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1986； Katz 1996；Salamon 1995； Smith and Lipsky 1993).4 Second, income transfers usually are entitle- ments, which mean

19、s citizens need not compete to receive them； anyone who meets the statuto- ry eligibility criteria can obtain state income support, regardless of the total cost to the state (Weaver 1985).5 Direct services, on the other hand, are supported by discretionary government spending, which is subject to re

20、gular appropri- ations by Congress and state and local legisla- tures (Posner and Wrightson 1996； Weaver 1985). This means that demand for services can easily exceed supply, and there is competition among service providers for funding alloca- tions and among individual service recipients for access

21、to limited services (DeHoog 1984； Edin and Lein 1998； Fabricant and Fisher 2002； Kramer 1982； Savas 2002； Smith and Lipsky 1993). Finally, income transfers and direct serv- ices differ in the product delivered. Income transfers come in cash, which is fungible. However, direct services can vary great

22、ly in their quality and effectiveness, depending on the skills and practices of the service providers (e.g., Breaux et al. 2002； Chaskin 2001； Fabricant and Fisher 2002； Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001； Smith and Lipsky 1993； Stein 1990). 福利国家私有化： 作为政治行动者的非营利性社区组织 尼克 马维尔 哥伦比亚大学 本文探讨的是一直被当今社会学理论所忽视了

23、的国家社会供给的一种形式：政府资助的支援服务。私有化和权力下放的联邦政策，自里根时 代起就被接受，私人、非盈利性组织成为这些服务的主要提供者。公共支持服务是通过国家级或者地方级竞争性的配置过程进行分配的，将政府合同发送到特定的非营利性社区组织（ COBs），进而服务于特定的社区和个人。我所建立的模式是通过在构建社区提供服务的更为传统的角色中加入选举政策，从而使社区组织产生更多的合同收入。这种模式产生了一种新型的社区组织 机器政治社区组织。通过相互分发服务给居民和有约束力的居民组织，该机械政治社区组织为当地民选官员创建可靠的选区投票。这些官员在上级政府系统交易，从而避免政府会因为人性化的服务 合

24、同青睐社区组织。在此过程中，非营利性社区组织可以影响各个城市以服务为基础的社会供给的分配，从而影响个人受到服务的能力。 对公共社会供给的社会学研究一般是建立在从政府到个人收入转移的研究基础上。这项研究提供了如何进行收入转移政策建立的有效信息，为什么人的特定类别要被认定资格，现金收益的水平如何设置，以及为什么随着时间的推移资格会发生改变。关于在这些领域不同国家做出不同政策选择的原因以及对于本国公民来说所获成果的理论，跨国研究已经进行了测试（阿曼达 1993；布莱德雷等 2003；艾斯平 - 安德森 1990；赫克 洛 1974；希克斯和米斯拉 1993；胡贝尔，拉金和斯蒂芬斯 1993 年；科皮

25、 1983；穆勒等人 2003；奥尔洛夫和斯科普 1984；皮尔逊 1995；斯蒂芬斯 1979）。工作重点是美国已经在考虑为什么现金收益如此之低的问题以及与其他工业化民主国家相比自身的限制在哪里（阿曼达 1998；希克斯和斯旺克 1983 年；派文 和克罗沃德 1971 年； 库达格诺 1994；斯科普 1992；维尔，奥尔洛夫和斯科普 1988 年），并研究资格和福利的国家级政策差异（考森和阿曼达 1996 年；劳瑞2001；迈尔斯，戈尼克和派克 2002 年；索尔和兹兰 1997 年； 兹兰和苏尔 2000）。 然而，在福利国家中有一个部门在当前的公共社会供给文献中很少被研究，但事实上这一部门对于贫困人口，特别是城市贫困人口来说远比乍看之下重要得多，那就是：支持性直