反倾销和竞争法外文翻译（节选）

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1、2180 单词， 3327 汉字 ， 11400 英文字符 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： Anti-dumping And Competition Law 出 处： The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis 2005, Part III pp68-72 作 者： P. J. Lloyd 英文 1.The Problems of Anti-Dumping Action in the WTO It has often been observed that anti-dumping actions h

2、ave risen rapidly in number since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The WTO (and before it the GATT) Committee on Antidumping produces semi-annual reports which give data on the number of anti-dumping investigations and measures adopted by members of the organisation. Until the mid-1

3、980s only the United States, Australia, New Zealand and countries that are now members of the EU took anti-dumping action regularly. In 1990 only nine members were reported as taking anti-dumping action during the year. The WTO reported that 27 members had taken anti-dumping actions in the six-month

4、 period January 1-June 30, 2002.1 The main new users have been Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, India and Korea. More countries are introducing legislation providing for anti-dumping duties, though there is no obligation for them to do so under WTO rules. These include developing and transition economi

5、es such as China.2 As of October 5, 2002, 75 countries had reported to the WTO that they had legislation providing for anti-dumping action.3 Thus anti-dumping action is becoming a standard tool of international trade policy. As important as the frequency of action is the magnitude of the implicit ta

6、riffs resulting from the action. There is no systematic data on this aspect. Messerlin and Reed calculated that the protective dumping margins in the United States and EU are on average two to three times higher than the rates of regular tariffs.4 Blonigen and Prusa report that the average dumping m

7、argin in the United States over the past decade has been sixty per cent.5 Calculations of dumping duty rates in Australia provide similar results； for a sample of goods subject to antidumping duties in 1994 the unweighted average antidumping duty was 35 per cent whereas the unweighted average tariff

8、 on the same goods was only seven per cent.6 Action may take the form of a price undertaking as well as the imposition of a duty. This has an effect on the consumer/buyer that is the same as that resulting from an antidumping duty, but unlike an antidumping duty, a price undertaking also raises the

9、landed price. Exporters or importers may raise the price before a dumping examination. I know of no empirical study in any country of the magnitude of price increases due to price undertakings. Prusa7 estimates that about 25 per cent of the cases investigated in the United States by the Department o

10、f Commerce are withdrawn, often after an agreement to restrict the quantities exported, that is, they induce voluntary export restraints. Because of these voluntary price and quantity responses, the statistics of antidumping actions substantially understate the impact of laws. But the problem is not

11、 merely that anti-dumping actions are becoming a major restraint on trade. There is concern with other characteristics of anti-dumping actions. First, the only conditions that must be satised relate to proof of dumping and injury and, therefore,actions can be taken unilaterally even when the substan

12、tive rates of duty are bound at a zero rate. Consequently, they breach the reciprocity involved in past tariff negotiations. Second, again because of the nature of the proof of dumping and injury required under the rules, anti-dumping action discriminates among countries of origin of imports of the

13、goods concerned.8 In particular, anti-dumping action is taken predominantly by the industrialized countries and the imports that bear the duties are predominantly sourced from developing countries. Hence, it has become another of the issues that divide the developed and the developing countries in t

14、he WTO. Third, though this characteristic is not evident from the trade statistics alone, conduct that is actionable when the seller is outside a country is not actionable when the same conduct occurs but the seller is a domestic supplier. This is discriminatory in another way and obviously leads to

15、 economic inefciencies. Fourth, anti-dumping actions have become a major source of conict among the members of the WTO. The imprecision of the present rules has led to an increasing number of complaints under the Dispute Settlement Procedures in recent years.9 Altogether, these features mean that an

16、ti-dumping action has become a major problem for the organisation. There are some recent surveys of aspects of anti-dumping actions. The data is surveyed comprehensively by Miranda, Torres and Ruiz10. James calculates the national intensities of use (that is, the country share of denitive measures r

17、elative to the country share of imports) and the asymmetries of actions taken against and by individual member countries.11 The former provides a normalized measure of the frequency of use and the latter shows how a country is affected both as a user and as a subject of other countries actions. Blon

18、igen and Prusa survey the literature on anti-dumping, separating the pre- investigation, investigation and post-investigation phases of the process.12 This paper reexamines dumping from the point of view of a form of business conduct that might be subject to competition law. This point of view is re

19、latively new but it is causing a fundamental rethinking of the economics of anti-dumping actions. Part II briey reviews the history of GATT and WTO law on dumping. Part III considers the central question of whether dumping should be addressed by fair trading laws or by competition law. Part IV consi

20、ders reform proposals that are based on the competition law view of dumping. The conclusions are summarized in Part V. 2. A Brief History of Anti-Dumping Action in the GATT/WTO Dumping entered the set of international trade policies subject to GATT regulation from the outset in 1947. Article VI differs from other Articles in GATT in that it is concerned with unfair trade whereas the other articles are concerned with trade restrictions as an aspect of the objective of efciency in the world economy. Dumping (and subsidization which is also covered by the Article) was perceived as