外文翻译--外商直接投资模式的解释：基于土耳其汽车产业的分析

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1、中文 3265 字 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： Understanding patterns of FDI: the case of Turkey and its auto industry 出 处： European Business Journal, 15 (2), 2003, pages 61-69 作 者： M. John Foster Ipek Alkan. Ipek 原 文： Patterns of FDI for Turkey: actuality and expectation The starting point arguably for any aspirant de

2、veloping economy in its search for inward foreign investment FDI from the perspective of the investors is the general upswing in aggregate global FDI trends from source economies, which occurs for a variety of well-rehearsed reasons, see e.g. Porter (1990), Buckley (1992) and Dunning (1993). These r

3、easons include: market extension (perhaps because the home market is near saturation)； accessing scarce primary products (primarily oil and minerals)； production efficiency strategies benefiting from location-specific cost advantages in sink economies； and more or less complex mixtures of these and

4、other factors. For developing economies, the question they may reasonably ask is: Can we get a share of this inflow of capital? Table 1 summarises global patterns of FDI in recent years. It shows a 238% increase in aggregate FDI over the period 1994 to 1999. This comprised a 338% increase in FDI int

5、o developed countries and a 98% rise in the inflows to developing economies. In short, while there has been significant growth in developing economies, for the developed economies the growth has been much more dramatic. Even China, the much vaunted star of foreign investment, has only performed stea

6、dily when benchmarked against global aggregates. The table shows, using Vietnam as a benchmark, that Turkey has not done very well in aggregate terms when compared with newer emerging economies over the past decade. This simple aggregate pattern is further elaborated by considering the FDI per capit

7、a figures shown in Table 2. This clearly suggests that Turkey is missing out in that its per capita performance over the decade shown has been flat while the picture has been one of sharp growth within the other developing economies. The comparison with Vietnam is very stark； Vietnam is a country wh

8、ich had to re-launch its economy from a very low base after the US removed its block on US companies investment, instituted immediately after its withdrawal from the Vietnam War in 1975. Indeed the flat performance of the 1990s at a time of aggregate global increase is even more notable when compare

9、d with the 1980s. Data for that period show that the liberalisation-oriented change in regime of the period did indeed produce a positive increase albeit from a low base. Hence the fairly modest average performance around the change of decade (see Table 1) nevertheless marked a five-fold increase on

10、 the first couple of years. A corner was turned, so to speak, but was not followed by the expected acceleration. At an aggregate level, the ratio FDIt/GDPt,， where t is the year or period chosen, is sometimes used as an indicator of how well a country is doing in attracting FDI. Is a country getting

11、 its share? The unreliability of source data can be a problem but the ratio is likely to be fairly robust certainly to an order of magnitude. Based on data from the UN Statistical Yearbook (UN, 2001) and the data in Table 1, in 1999, Turkeys ratio was 0.4, compared with Thailand 5.5, Vietnam 5.8, Ch

12、ina 3.8, UK 5.7, and US 3.1. These data suggest that Turkey failed to perform it clearly did not get a relative share, whether compared with developed or comparable developing countries. Until recently, manufacturing was very important within the pattern of FDI into Turkey, and the biggest subsector

13、 therein was the auto and transport parts industry. Hence the auto industry might be expected to be a particular target for FDI. But actual realised FDI in that sector has been muted in absolute if not internal, comparative terms, as we explain in more detail in the next section: why? We have alread

14、y stated that Turkeys aggregate FDI performance has been weaker than might be expected based on simple benchmarking around the size of the countrys population and GDP. An examination of some of the key elements of the countrys business environment would tend to suggest that the expectation might wel

15、l be for a stronger performance than that found. First of all there is its favourable geographical position. Turkey sits at the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. As such, it: abuts the EU via its current most easterly element, Greece (and has its customs union with the EU), has borders with oil

16、 rich Iran and Iraq and moregenerally can be seen as well placed to serve the growing Middle East market, and has immediate access to a number of ex-Comecon economies either via direct land borders or by sea via Black Sea ports it controls the Bosphorus, which is the gateway to the Black Sea. Three

17、more positive factors can be readily identified, all of which might be thought to be sources of comparative advantage: 1. competitive labour rates, certainly compared with EU rates, if not with those of other developing economies in other regions (e.g. the benchmark used before, Vietnam)； 2. a well-

18、developed infrastructure, in the west of the country at least, which is also the industrialized area； and 3. a large privatisation programme, over the past decade. We conclude this section by noting the major sources of FDI into Turkey. Recently the main sources have been: France, Germany, US, Nethe

19、rlands, Switzerland, UK, Italy and Japan, see e.g. Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000, Table 1). In other words the EU and the US lead such inward investment as is occurring, not for example its oil-rich Arab neighbours. The auto sector within the Turkish economy At the time of the research in

20、2001, there were 15 auto-makers in Turkey (TAMs), of which 10 have at least some element of FDI. The pattern of production and imports is shown in Table 3. It shows a growing share of the Turkish market for auto units being taken by imports even as the market itself grew. The industry is the third l

21、argest industrial segment in the economy and employs 500 000 people. Vehicle ownership rates currently are around 62 per thousand persons, compared with a global average of 82 per thousand, indicating high potential demand if the economy can grow generally. However, there are major perceived impediments to auto sales, as we discuss in the next section. These include low