服务业领域对外商直接投资的开放：鉴于国际的比较分析【外文翻译】

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1、 PDF外文：http:/ 本科毕业论文外文翻译  外文题目： Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An International               Comparative Analysis                                    

2、       出     处：                 The World Economy                           作     者：                 Stephen S. Golub &n

3、bsp;                             原    文：  Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An International Comparative Analysis Stephen S. Golub Abstract   National policies towards FDI typically feature mea

4、sures aimed at both attracting and discouraging in ows. Policies to attract FDI such as tax breaks, favourable regulatory treatment and subsidies of various sorts are usually focused on manufacturing. Policies towards services are far more ambivalent. Laws and regulatory practices frequently discrim

5、inate against foreign investors in services such as public utilities (electricity distribution and telecommunications in particular), transport (notably air and maritime transport), nancial services, and even construction and wholesale/retail distribution.  1. Introduction   As in the case

6、 of manufacturing, countries benet from FDI in services through employment creation, capital accumulation, transfer of technology, improved service and increased competition. Moreover, liberalisation of FDI in services can contribute to manufacturing productivity by increasing availability of qualit

7、y of production-related services (Arnold et al., 2006, 2007； Gould et al., 2007). Critics argue that FDI can also impose economic costs such as displacement of local rms and reduced competition. Infant entrepreneurship arguments can be adduced in favour of discrimination against foreign  2 inve

8、stors. Service sectors are also typically subject to economic or prudential regulation, because of tendencies towards natural monopoly or other market failures, although such market failures do not in themselves provide a clear-cut rationale for discrimination between local and foreign investors. Th

9、e main reasons for limiting foreign ownership in services are non-economic, relating to national security or economic nationalism. Industries such as telecommunications, banking, transportation and electricity provision are often viewed by host countries as strategic or sensitive. Services are there

10、fore generally subject to far more stringent restrictions than manufacturing and even natural resources (Hotelman, 1995). The cross-border provision of services, unlike goods, often can only be delivered through commercial presence. setting up of foreign operations, rather than international trade i

11、n the item itself. It is therefore to be expected that FDI plays a prominent role in the globalization of the service sector, fostered in part by partial opening of service industries to FDI. Formal international agreements on FDI and on trade in services have been far less extensive than on interna

12、tional trade in goods, although various global negotiations and regional free-trade agreements often cover some aspects of international investment in services, notably the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provisions on commercial presence. To the extent that it has occurred, opening to

13、 FDI in services has primarily been unilateral.  FDI in services has been increasing rapidly, raising the stakes in the debates about policies. In 2005, services constituted the majority of inward FDI stocks, at almost two-thirds for developed countries, and about 50 per cent for developing cou

14、ntries, up considerably from 1990. Within services, nance, trade and business services are the three largest categories, but transport, communications and electricity have also been increasing rapidly. It should be noted, however, that the share of services in total FDI remains smaller than the shar

15、e of services in world GDP, reecting in part the fact that FDI in services remain relatively restricted.   2. Methodology This section explains how measures of policies discriminating between foreign and  3 domestic investors are computed. There are several issues involved in computing the

16、 restriction scores. A classication of various types of restrictions, a choice of industries and a system of weighting are needed.  Restrictions can be separated into those affecting market entry and those affecting post-entry operations. The former is emphasized here, given the predominance an

17、d importance of policies restricting entry. Post-entry national treatment is much more widely accepted and institutionalized than the right of establishment (UNCTAD, 2003, Ch. 5). Restrictions of entry can take the form of limitations on foreign ownership and screening requirements. Ownership restri

18、ctions specify permissible maximum foreign equity participation, ranging from a complete ban on foreign holdings to allowing 100 per cent foreign ownership. Usually, ownership limitations are applicable to a particular industry. Screening requirements, on the other hand, often apply to all sectors.

19、Screening can vary widely in its stringency, from routine mastication and automatic approval to a national interest test where the foreign investor has to make a case for entry rather than the government having to justify denying entry. Post-entry operational discrimination against foreign-owned rms

20、 is more diverse. In the service sector, the main such restrictions are stipulations regarding the nationality and citizenship of managers or board members, limits to temporary entry of expatriate personnel, and other nationality requirements for staff. Given that restrictions are often septic to a

21、particular industry, a high level of disaggregation is necessary. The sectors included are those which are most commonly involved in FDI and services trade and subject to restrictions. Social services such as education and health were not included in this analysis. As noted above, the focus is on de

22、partures from national treatment rather than regulatory barriers hampering market access for both domestic and foreign rms. An exception is made for government monopoly or near-monopoly, however, as government monopoly is in effect a ban on FDI. Industries reserved for the government are scored as t

23、hough ownership is banned. Where government ownership was determined to be greater than 50 per cent, a partial ownership restriction was imputed. There is no comprehensive source of information on national FDI policies. The data used here pull together and harmonies the data from Golub (2003) and Koyama and Golub (2006) for developed countries and UNCTAD (2006) for developing countries. These studies