中国对外投资的历史情形和现今趋势外文翻译

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1、 1 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： Historic and Emergent Trends in Chinese Outward Direct Investment 出 处： Management International Review, MIR48(2008)6 作 者： Peter J. Buckley, Adam R, Cross, Hui Xin, HinrichVoss 原 文 ： Historic and Emergent Trends in Chinese Outward Direct Investment Entry Mode Literature on the int

2、ernationalisation of developing country MNEs suggests that minority IJVs are the preferred mode of market entry (Wells 1983, Yeung 1994). One reason is that such rms seldom possess the level of proprietary technology and rm -specic know-how to necessitate internalisation via majority or full ownersh

3、ip (Buckley/Casson 1976, Dunning 1993). This is also evident in the early years of Chinese ODI development: project level SAFE data reveal that, in the early 1990s, around 70 percent of overseas projects of Chinese rms took the IJV form (see Table 5). Zhan (1995) also reports that Chinese rms tended

4、 to opt for majority equity shareholdings in overseas projects, typically in the range of 40 to 70 percent equity participation, especially in natural resource-oriented and manufacturing-related projects. A number of explanations can be envisaged. From a governmental perspective, the formal investme

5、nt approval process generally required Chinese MNEs to adopt the IJV entry mode. The Chinese authorities had become familiar with the economic gains associated with the promotion of inward FDI in the form of IJVs, the promotion of which was a cornerstone of Chinas Open Door policy. The JV form was s

6、een as a vehicle for promoting the inow of foreign-owned technology, management know-how and other skills to China. The authorities were also now adept and comfortable with at administering foreign invested enterprises in China. It is likely that equivalent advantages were sought when Chinese enterp

7、rises invested 2 abroad. Familiar cost and risk-minimising features of IJVs will also have been important to the investment approval agencies (Zhan 1995, Taylor 2002, Wang 2002). From an enterprise perspective, inefcient domestic capital markets and budget constraints meant that many Chinese enterpr

8、ises, including state-owned ones, often found it difcult to obtain sufcient funds to purchase overseas assets outright, compelling them to opt for the IJV alternative. The JV form also allowed Chinese MNEs to exercise a degree of control over local operations whilst avoiding outright ownership and t

9、he concomitant exposure to political and commercial risk. Chinese enterprises could tap foreign partner contributions, such as improved access to market intelligence, knowledge of the local operating environment, opportunities for reputation riding and better access to local distribution channels th

10、rough the IJV (Taylor 2002). When established with other ethnically-Chinese enterprises (in Hong Kong and elsewhere), the JV form also allowed relational assets to be optimised, reducing perceived risks and costs associated with psychic distance, especially for smaller and less experienced Chinese i

11、nvestors (Zhan 1995). Mutual trust would also have been easier to establish. Thus, we see both institutional and rm-specic factors inuencing the choice of IJV by Chinese rms at this time. From the mid-1990s onwards, however, SAFE data at individual project level reveal that wholly-owned FDI projects

12、 have increasingly substituted for jointly-owned ones in the international expansion of Chinese enterprise, with 61 percent of overseas afliates in approved projects taking this form in 2001 compared to 30 percent in 1991. We note that this contrasts somewhat with the ndings of Taylor (2002), who re

13、ports much greater use of IJVs in the recent internationalisation of Chinese rms, especially in manufacturing related activity. A number of reasons explain the more frequent use of the wholly-owned entry mode in recent years. First, more frequent approval of wholly Chinese-owned projects reects grow

14、ing condence among the regulating authorities that managers of state owned Chinese MNEs have become sufciently experienced and skilled to take control of, and co-ordinate effectively, the activities of geographically-dispersed afliates. It is also a reection, at least in part, of the strategic impor

15、tance placed on particular projects by the Chinese authorities. Theory asserts that, by internalising markets, the internationalising rm 3 is able to reduce its dependency on independent intermediaries； militate against the threat of technology and know-how leakage； reduce the risk of opportunistic

16、behaviour by alliance partners and allow for full appropriation of returns on investment (Buckley/Casson 1976). Both the investment approval agencies and enterprises will have found such advantages attractive, despite the costs and risks associated with full ownership. Second, greater use of wholly-

17、owned afliates may reect improved availability of investment funds. Government initiatives under the go global (Zou chuqu) policy have released capital to state-owned rms (often at below market rates) in the form of loans and improved access to hard currencies, to help them nance the outright purcha

18、se of foreign assets (Antkiewicz/Whalley 2006). Many Chinese enterprises are also now skilled at raising investment funds on international capital markets, especially in Hong Kong (Buckley et al. 2007, Chan 1995). Thus, many Chinese rms are no longer obligated to reduce investment cost by undertakin

19、g an IJV. Third, the growth in international market entry by acquisition will have led Chinese enterprises to establish more wholly-owned subsidiaries in foreign markets rather than jointly-owned projects. The standard theoretical model of “Asian ODI” suggests that China is not unusual among Asian c

20、ountries in using wholly owned subsidiaries more frequently over time (Pang/Komaran 1985, Euh/Min 1986, Yeung 1994). However, caution should be exercised in assuming that this mirrors improvements in the managerial capacity and competitiveness of Chinese MNEs: greater deployment of majority and whol

21、ly-owned foreign operations may also be more a function of the governments desire to retain effective control of state assets abroad and a growing condence in its ability to do so than of purely rm-specic or market-related considerations Motives for Chinese Outward FDI In this section, we relate his

22、toric and emergent trends in aggregate Chinese ODI data identied above to changes in the motivations driving the internationalisation of Chinese MNEs. Dunning (1993) identies four basic motivations that provide the impetus for foreign-owned production and are discussed below: namely, natural-resource seeking, market-seeking, efciency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives.