外文翻译----网络团购中的不确定性需求细分

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1、中文 3600 字 ，1.1万英文字符，2012单词 毕业论文（设计） 外文翻译  题   目：      网络团购的发展现状与问题探究           一、外文原文  标题： Segmenting uncertain demand in group-buying auctions 原文： Demand uncertainty is a key factor in a sellers decision-making process for products sold through

2、 online auctions. We explore demand uncertainty in group-buying auctions in terms of the extent of low-valuation demand and high-valuation demand. We focus on the analysis of a monopolistic group-buying retailer that sells products to consumers who express different product valuations. We also exami

3、ne the performance of a group-buying seller who faces competitive posted-price sellers in a market for the sale of the same products, under similar assumptions about uncertain demand. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for both of these seller-side competition structures, we a

4、re able to characterize the groupbuying auction bidders dominant strategies. We obtained a number of interesting findings. Group-buying is likely to be more effective in settings where there is larger low-valuation demand than high-valuation demand. The structure of demand matters. This finding has

5、relevance to the marketplace for new cameras, next-generation microprocessors and computers, and other high-valuation goods, which are unlikely to be as effectively sold in group-buying markets. We obtained additional results for the case of continuous demand, and find that there is a basis for the

6、seller to improve revenues via effective group-buying auction price curve design. Keywords: Consumer behavior, bidding strategy, demand uncertainty, economic analysis, electronic markets, group-buying auctions, market mechanism, posted-price mechanism, simulation, uncertainty risk.     &nb

7、sp;The development of advanced IT makes it possible to use novel business models to handle business problems in new and innovative ways. With the growth of the Internet, a number of new electronic auction mechanisms have emerged, and auctions are generally known to create higher expected seller reve

8、nue than posted-prices when the cost of running an auction is minimal or costless (Wang 1993). Some of the new mechanisms we have seen include the online Yankee and Dutch auctions, and the “name-yourown-price” and “buy-it-now” mechanisms. An example is eBays Dutch auction for the sale of multiple it

9、ems of the same description. Another of these new electronic market mechanisms that we have observed is the group-buying auction, a homogeneous multi-unit auction (Mitchell 2002, Li et al. 2004).Internet-based sellers and digital intermediaries have adopted this market mechanism on sites such as Let

10、sBuyI () and eWinW (). These sites offer transaction-making mechanisms that are different from traditional auctions. In traditional auctions, bidders compete against one another to be the winner.In group-buying auctions, however, bidders have an incentive to aggregate their bids so that the seller o

11、r digital intermediary offers a lower price at which they all can buy the desired goods (Horn et al. 2000). McCabe et al. (1991) have explored multi-unit Vickrey auctions in experimental research, however, they did not consider the possibility of stochastic bidder arrival or demand uncertainty. &nbs

12、p;  This paper is the first to examine the impacts of demand uncertainty on the performance on online group-buying auctions. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for a monopolist seller and a competitive seller, we are able to characterize the group-buying auction bidders s

13、ymmetric and dominant strategies. We find that group-buying is likely to be more effective in settings where there is larger low-valuation demand than high-valuation demand. Thus, the structure of demand at different level of willingness-to-pay by consumers matters. This has relevance to the marketp

14、lace for new cameras, next-generation microprocessors and computers, and other high-valuation goods. We obtained additional results for the case of continuous demand valuations, and found that there is a basis for the seller to improve revenues based on the effective design of the group-buying aucti

15、on price curve design. THEORY     The model for the group-buying auction mechanism with uncertain bidder arrival that we will develop spans three streams of literature: demand uncertainty, consumer behavior and related mechanism design issues； auction economics and mechanism design theory；

16、 and current theoretical knowledge about the operation of group-buying auctions from the IS and electronic commerce literature. Demand Uncertainty, Consumer Behavior and Mechanism Design    Demand uncertainties typically are composed of consumer demand environment uncertainty (or uncertain

17、ty about the aggregate level of consumer demand) and randomness of demand in the marketplace (reflected in brief temporal changes and demand shocks that are not expected to persist). Consumer uncertainty about demand in the marketplace can occur based on the valuation of products, and whether consum

18、ers are willing to pay higher or lower prices. It may also occur on the basis of demand levels, especially the number of the consumers in the market. Finally, there are temporal considerations, which involve whether a consumer wishes to buy now, or whether they may be sampling quality and pricing wi

19、th the intention of buying later. We distinguish between different demand level environments. In addition, it is possible that these consumer demand environments may co-exist, as is often the case when firms make strategies for price discrimination. This prompts a seller to consider setting more tha

20、n one price level, as we often see in real-world retailing, as well as group-buying auctions.     Dana (2001) pointed out that when a monopoly seller faces uncertainty about the consumer demand environment, it usually will not be in his best interest to set uniform prices for all consumers

21、. The author studied a scenario in which there were more buyers associated with high demand and fewer buyers associated with low demand. In the authors proposed price mechanism, the seller sets a price curve instead of a single price, so as to be able to offer different prices depending on the diffe

22、rent demand conditions that appear to obtain in the marketplace. It may be useful in such settings to employ an automated pricesearching mechanism, which is demonstrated to be more robust to the uncertain demand than a uniform price mechanism will, relative to expected profits. Unlike Danas (2001) work though, we will study settings in which there are fewer buyers who exhibit demand at higher prices and more buyers who