博弈分析实施反倾销价格承诺协议纠纷外文翻译

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1、中文 3210 字 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： Game Analysis of Implementing Price Undertaking Agreements in Anti-dumping Disputes 出 处： Journal of Donghua University, 2008 , (1): 65-68 作 者： Xi Jun-fang , Cang Ping , Zhong Gen-yuan 原文： Game Analysis of Implementing Price Undertaking Agreements in Anti-dumping Disputes X

2、i Jun-fang , Cang Ping , Zhong Gen-yuan Abstract The Price Undertaking Agreement is one of the strategies a company accused of dumping often adopts in dealing with anti-dumping disputes Using static game analysis ， this paper compares the impact that anti-dumping duties and price undertaking agreeme

3、nts may have on an importing countrys social welfare and an accused companys market performance We conclude that ， compared with anti-dumping duties， price undertakings improve the importing countrys social welfare and reduce the accused companys market share in the import country We also note that，

4、 in addition to the financial benefit， price undertakings can prevent escalation of trade disputes in international trade negotiations Key words： anti-dumping； price undertaking； anti-dumping duty Introduction A price undertaking is a commitment in international trade to raise prices or to stop expo

5、rting goods at a price the importing country considers to be a dumping price Such an agreement， when accepted by the importing country， typically terminates any anti-dumping (AD) investigation and exempts the investigated dumping products from temporary or permanent AD duties Price undertakings may

6、be initiated by the exporting firm or by the importing country Typically， an undertakings specified increase in price does not entirely eliminate the exporting companys price advantage； rather， it is set at a level to eliminate a perceived dumping margin According to the WTO Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreem

7、ent and worldwide AD laws， exporting firms can come to agreements with importing countries by raising exporting prices or by ceasing exports at prices the importing country considers to be dumping WTO data show that， among the 2 160 AD cases filed by WTO members from 1995 to 2002， 1 258 were settled

8、 with AD duties or price undertakings， with price undertaking cases representing 41 76% of all the settlements Therefore, China and Chinese companies will more effectively deal with future trade disputes when they understand the history and effect of price undertakings, specifically the relative eff

9、ects of price undertakings and AD duties on importing and exporting countries Zanardis study demonstrated a big difference in implementing price undertakings among countries or regions with many AD case Between 1981 and 2001, in EEC and South Korea, 41% of ECC and 40% of S Korean AD disputes were se

10、ttled with price undertakings, while only 5% of U S cases were Stegemann and Palmeter compare the theory and filing process of the commitment of price undertakings with that of imposing AD duties In regards to the growing trade disputes against China， Du introduced and analyzed the basic concepts， a

11、ctual effects and specific operations of price undertakings， and concluded that price undertakings could be widely implemented in Chinese AD cases as an alternative strategy Yu and Ding analyzed the pros and cons of price undertakings vs AD duties, and suggested China-specific options However， these

12、 studies have neither quantitatively compared the impact of price undertaking commitments with that of AD duties, nor have they used economic principles to suggest decision-making mechanisms for importing and exporting countries considering price undertakings or AD duties In this paper， we use stati

13、c game analysis to compare the effects of price undertakings vs AD duties on both country and firm welfares We conclude with a decision-making mechanism for choosing solutions to trade disputes 1 Modeling In order to make the analysis simple, we assume two countries， named home and foreign respectiv

14、ely， in each of which there is only one firm who produces homogenous products Both the home firm and the foreign firm compete in quantity in their domestic market with complete information, in order to maximize their profits Thus, these two firms become duopoly in a complete information market We su

15、ppose the marginal costs of the home firm and the foreign firm as c and c respectively which are constant； the quantity of the sales in their domestic markets as x and y， respectively； price in home and foreign market as Pd and Pf ，respectively Meanwhile ， we assume a linear demand function of the i

16、mporting-country (home) market as p=abQ , in which p and Q denote the price and total quantity in the home market； a and b are positive constants， a is the highest price consumers are willing to pay, b is the slope of the demand curve We also assume home country products can not be sold in the forei

17、gn market In other words， the foreign firm dominates the foreign market ( this assumption simplifies the analysis and does not affect the results )， with the supply quantity y We also assume a linear demand function in the foreign market as p=a-bQ， in which p and Q denote the price and total quantit

18、y in the foreign market ； a and b are positive constants Dumping is defined as the practice that the exporter in one country or region sells goods at a price lower than either the price in its domestic market or the production cost, in order to defeat to competitors and capture the market， which mus

19、t cause material injury to a competing industry in the importing country It means if PfPd ， the home country can file AD petitions If dumping is finally convicted， there are two solutions： (a) the home country imposes AD duty on the foreign firm which is equivalent to the dumping margin； (b) the for

20、eign firm implements price undertakings to raise the exporting price so as to counteract the dumping margin In the following parts， we will analyze the two solutions based on the above assumptions and compare welfare effects under the two different solutions 1 1 Imposing anti-dumping duties We assume that home and foreign firms simultaneously decide their output in