外文翻译---中小企业融资在欧洲：介绍和概述

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1、安徽工程大学毕业设计（论文） - 21 - 附录 C 引用的 外文文献及 其 译文 SME Financing in Europe: Introduction and Overview Introducing the topic of SME finance and summarising the main findings of the contributions to this edition of the EIB Papers, this overview stresses the importance of relationship banking for the supply of

2、SME credit； points out the differences and similarities in the capital structure of firms across size classes and across Europe； observes that while there is little evidence of widespread SME credit rationing, financial market imperfections may nevertheless curb SME growth； and highlights that the c

3、hanges in Europes financial landscape - including bank consolidation and Basel II - promise to foster SME finance. 1. Introduction Some of the changes in Europes financial landscape should work in favour of SME finance. Firstly, new information and communication technologies contribute, at a lower c

4、ost, to reducing information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, thereby making SME lending more attractive (see, among others, Frame et al. 2001). Secondly, partly due to progress in information technology, new banking methods are being developed and implemented. For instance, banks adopt ne

5、w portfolio credit risk models that allow them to allocate and price their resources more effectively.Moreover, the use of credit risk transfer mechanisms (such as the securitarisation of SME loans) is spreading, allowing banks to focus on comparative-advantage activities, notably credit risk assess

6、ment, loan origination, and credit risk monitoring - all activities crucial for the provision of finance to SMEs. Thirdly, equity capital is becoming increasingly available to SMEs through the development of (secondary) capital markets and venture capital finance. Fourthly, the second banking direct

7、ive of the EU aims at boosting competition between banks, thereby improving the terms and conditions of bank finance, including those supplied to SMEs. Other features of Europes financial landscape have raised concerns about a possible deterioration of conditions for SME finance. Firstly, consolidat

8、ion in national banking markets has reduced the number of banks and has in many EU countries, especially in the smaller ones, increased the market share of the top-five largest institutions . This may be detrimental to SME lending since there is evidence that large banks devote a lesser proportion o

9、f their assets to small business loans in comparison to small, often regional banks.1 Secondly, there is evidence (Davis, this volume) that capital markets and institutional investors are gaining ground over banks. Institutional investors are in competition with banks when collecting savings in the

10、economy, but they tend to lend less to SMEs than banks do. Thirdly, a new capital adequacy framework for banks (Basel II) is in the making. The thrust of Basel II is to better align capital charges and, by extension, interest rates on loans with underlying credit risks. As SME lending is often perce

11、ived, rightly or wrongly, as particularly risky, many observers - in particular SMEs themselves - have been vocal in warning against a (further) deterioration of SME finance. 任毅敏：社会转型期民企融资渠道探究 - 22 - why financing of SMEs tends to be more challenging than financing of large firms. Reflecting these c

12、hallenges, small businesses often have no other choice than to rely on bank relationships for their external financing while large firms may turn to banks as well as capital markets. We will also elaborate on the benefits and costs of relationship banking and briefly consider the impact of bank comp

13、etition on relationship banking. In Section 3, we discuss the capital structure of the average European firm across different size classes and review similar results for Italy, Germany, and France. In Section 4, we evaluate whether SMEs in Europe suffer from credit constraints and whether financial

14、market imperfections hamper the growth of companies. Section 5 begins with a brief empirical description of relationship banking in the three countries covered here and continues with an evaluation of the impact of bank consolidation on relationship banking in France. 2. Capital structure of the ave

15、rage firm across size classes In analysing the capital structure of firms, Wagenvoort distinguishes five different size classes: very small, small, medium-sized, large, and very large firms. To motivate this analysis, one needs to bear in mind that a possible lack of external financing for small bus

16、inesses could show up on the liability side of their balance sheet. Looking over a long period and at Europe as a whole, the ratio of equity to total liabilities is broadly similar across size classes and, therefore, leverage is more or less the same for a typical SME and a typical large firm. The r

17、atio of financial debt to total liabilities, which mainly contains bank loans in the case of SMEs,3 is also roughly equal across size classes. However, Wagenvoort also shows that there are striking differences in the capital structure of the average SME across EU countries. The three country studies

18、 confirm this result. Guiso shows that the financial debt of small Italian firms in proportion to their total assets is substantially lower than for large Italian firms. Guiso carefully explains that this difference is because many small firms do not have any loans outstanding at financial instituti

19、ons. Indeed, conditional on having financial debt, the financial debt ratio and the maturity structure of financial debt are broadly similar across size classes. In sharp contrast with the Italian case, Hommel and Schneider find that the Mittelstand (i.e. German small and medium-sized enterprises) i

20、s much more indebted than large German firms. Two- thirds of German firms operate with an equity ratio lower than 20 percent, and 41 percent of German firms report equity ratios below 10 percent. This compares to a European average equity ratio of around one-third (see Wagenvoort). Dietsch finds a s

21、imilar equity ratio for French companies regardless of their size. Overall, while the average European, French, and Italian SME does not appear to be undercapitalised, German SMEs are. Wagenvoort also analyses how firms capital structure changes over time. He finds that the dynamics of the financial

22、 debt ratio are very different for the average firm in the small and medium size classes in comparison to the average firm in the large and very large size classes. More specifically, SMEs appear to be less flexible than larger firms in adjusting the structure of their balance sheets to changing gro

23、wth opportunities. In particular, the financial debt ratio increases (falls) at a slower rate in growing (shrinking) small firms than in growing (shrinking) large 安徽工程大学毕业设计（论文） - 23 - firms. Our interpretation of this result is that small firms have less flexibility in adjusting financial debt in r

24、esponse to changing growth conditions. 3. Finance constraints Is this lack of flexibility due to credit rationing? The three country case studies draw a firm conclusion: SME credit rationing is not a widespread phenomenon in Italy, France, and Germany. Guiso builds a model that can explain why some

25、small firms carry financial debt whereas others do not. The empirical results show that those firms without bank loans are often the ones that finance a relatively high proportion of their assets with equity. Guiso argues that a negative relationship between the equity ratio and the probability of c

26、arrying financial debt stands in sharp conflict with the rationing hypothesis since a credit rationed firm is unlikely to substitute equity for financial debt. The absence of financial debt on the balance sheet of many Italian firms is thus mainly because they do not want to borrow, not because lend

27、ers do not want to lend. However, Guiso finds that when credit constraints are binding, size and lack of equity seem to play a key role. So, credit rationing happens more often with smaller firms than with larger firms. Dietsch observes that, except for very small French firms with an annual turnove

28、r of less than EUR 2 million, French SMEs do not increase bank borrowing when their credit status improves. In contrast with small and medium-sized firms, very small firms with a solid credit standing do raise more loans than their peers of equal size but lower credit standing. In light of this, Die

29、tsch concludes that credit rationing is only relevant for very small firms with unfavourable credit ratings, and he shows that relatively few firms in France have these characteristics. Hommel and Schneider argue that the virtual standstill of credit growth in Germany in 2002 can mainly be attribute

30、d to the current cyclical downturn of the German economy. Whether, in addition, the Mittelstand suffers from structural adverse supply-side effects remains to be determined. However, given the large equity gap in German companies, lack of equity is the main finance constraint and additional debt doe

31、s not seem to be the optimal way forward in Germany. A few qualifying remarks are worth making. One needs to bear in mind that the Stiglitz and Weiss definition of credit constraints implies that a firm is only considered to be rationed if lenders reject the demand for loans although the borrower is

32、 willing to pay the going interest rate (and to meet other conditions) on equivalent loans made to others borrowers of the same quality. In other words, according to this definition a firm is not considered credit rationed if it does not want to borrow at the requested interest rate even when the co

33、nditions imposed by the bank are too demanding relative to the true creditworthiness of the borrower. In this respect it is worthwhile observing that interest rates on bank loans are in general substantially higher for SMEs than for large firms.4 Both the empirical findings of Dietsch and Wagenvoort

34、 suggest that from a portfolio credit risk viewpoint this may not be justified. It is true that on an individual basis smaller firms are riskier than larger firms because the expected default probability is negatively related to firm size. Banks in general use this argument to defend a higher risk premium on small business loans. But a portfolio of loans to small firms is not necessarily riskier than a portfolio of loans to large companies. Dietsch finds that default correlations are lower within the group of SMEs than within the group of