金融专业外文翻译------自上而下预算效益的实证证据

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1、本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 原文： Empirical Evidence of the Benefits of Top-down Budgeting The empirical studies of the relationship between institutions and fiscal performance provide support for the assumption that a top-down process is associated with lower deficits and debts. In his pioneering study of bud

2、get procedures of 12 EU-member countries, von Hagen(1992) tests the hypothesis that a top-down process in the preparatory phase of the budget, and a top-down decision-making order in parliamentary approval is more conducive to fiscal discipline than bottom-up procedures. These two aspects are includ

3、ed in structural indices characterizing the budget process, which are found to have a significant relationship with deficit and debt levels. De Haan and Sturm (1994) extend the study to control for the composition and stability of government, and confirm that certain budget institutions, including t

4、op-down budgeting, are correlated with a more robust fiscal position. Woo (2003) akes a similar approach and constructs an index that broadly corresponds to a top-down budget preparation process. When expanding von Hagens study to include nine East Asian countries, Woo confirms a strong relationship

5、 between these institutional arrangements and fiscal outcomes. Concentrating on Central and Eastern European countries, Gleich (2003) includes indices for the top-down character of both the preparation of the draft budget and the parliamentary approval process. He concludes that the positive impact

6、of more stringent budget institutions on deficit and debt hold for these countries as well. Yloutinen (2004), also studying Central and Eastern European countries, includes criteria on the decision making sequence in budget preparation and the order of the approval procedure in parliament, thus conf

7、irming earlier results. Against these studies stands Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) who construct an index of the procedural fragmentation of the budget process, broadly corresponding to a top-down and a bottom-up preparation process. Although they demonstrate that a lower level of fragmentation (i.

8、e., a more top-down oriented process) is associated with a lower deficit, lower expenditure and lower revenue, the relationship is found to be weak. While supportive of the hypothesis that top-down budgeting is conducive to aggregate fiscal discipline, there are some limitations to these studies, ho

9、wever. First, the studies construct composite indices, consisting of several institutional aspects, and test their relationship with fiscal performance to arrive at these results. It is, therefore, not possible to separate out the contribution of the top-down procedure. Second, as discussed above, i

10、t is in practice a matter of interpretation of defining a budget process as being predominantly top-down or bottom up. The dividing line may be drawn differently by different studies. Third, these studies have to rely on formal institutions, while the budget process in reality may well be governed b

11、y a multitude of informal practices. Ehrhart et al. (2006) take a different approach when testing the impact that the sequence of decisions have on the outcome of a budget process. In a series of controlled laboratory trials, they demonstrate that the size of the budget is indeed affected by changin

12、g from a bottom-up to a top-down decision-making procedure, but that there is no general tendency for a top down procedure to produce a smaller budget. Strictly speaking, the objective of the budget process is to avoid excessive deficits and ensure a sustainable fiscal position, rather than minimize

13、 spending levels. The result is, therefore, neither an argument for, nor an argument against, top-down budgeting. However, a second result of the study is that complexity is costly, and that an increase of the number of spending dimensions (i.e., more budget items) and less information, require more

14、 voting rounds to reach an equilibrium. As argued above, with a budget consisting of a large number of appropriations, a process where information gathering has an opportunity cost, and where there is a set deadline for submitting and passing the budget, a top-down approach has a higher chance of le

15、ading to a fiscally sustainable budget. A top-down approach to the preparation of the budget requires procedures for establishing the aggregate expenditure level and the sectoral allocation of the budget. It also changes the focus and dynamics of the negotiations between the ministry of finance and

16、line ministries. A stylized characterization of the budget process is valuable for analyzing factors that are relevant for how government finances evolve over time. The use of such abstractions of reality should not lose sight of the fact that budgets are shaped in a highly political environment, wh

17、ere there is often pressure to deviate from what is optimal from a collective point of view. Therefore, when designing the institutional framework it becomes necessary to find a pragmatic balance between a theoretically stringent model and pragmatic compromises needed for the framework to survive. A

18、 central feature of the budget process is that decisions are the result of negotiations between numerous players the president, prime minister, the minister of finance, individual line ministers, agency executives, civil servants, and parliamentarians and that the balance of fiscal authority has an

19、impact on the outcome. Any alteration of the existing order will be acceptable only if a players loss of influence in one area is compensated by increased influence in some other area. Strengthening the top-down character of the budget process which, to a large extent, is intended to address a fragm

20、entation of fiscal powers and the suboptimal collective equilibria this generates has to take into account the redistribution of roles and responsibilities. From the point of view of the ministry of finance or in parliament, the finance or budget committee influence over the details of the budget is

21、 relinquished in return for greater power over aggregate parameters. From the perspective of the line ministries or the sectoral committees a top-down process introduces rigidities and constraints on total expenditure and sectoral allocations, which reduces the scope for expanding sector interests.

22、This may only be acceptable if countervailed by increased flexibility within the respective sector, and if the reform is credible in the sense that the new procedure is binding for all ministries. The single most important decision for the government is to determine the size of government. In a top-down process, this issue is formalized by setting a limit on total expenditure at the very early stage of budget preparation. As discussed by Ljungman