互联网金融外文翻译--P2P网络借贷信用风险与贷款绩效评估（节选）

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1、2300 单词， 1.2 万英文字符 ，中文 3600 汉字  出处： Emekter R, Tu Y, Jirasakuldech B, et al. Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lendingJ. Applied Economics, 2015, 47(1):54-70. 原文   Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending Riza E

2、mekter, Yanbin Tu, Benjamas Jirasakuldech & Min Lu Introduction With the advent of Web 2.0, it has become easy to create online markets and virtual communities with convenient accessibility and strong collaboration. One of the emerging Web 2.0 applications is the online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lendin

3、g marketplaces, where both lenders and borrowers can virtually meet for loan transactions. Such marketplaces provide a platform service of introducing borrowers to lenders, which can offer some advantages for both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers can get micro loans directly from lenders, and might

4、pay lower rates than commercial credit alternatives. On the other hand, lenders can earn higher rates of return compared to any other type of lending such as corporate bonds, bank deposits or certificate of deposits.  One of the problems in online P2P lending is information asymmetry between th

5、e borrower and the lender. That is, the lender does not know the borrowers credibility as well as the borrower does. Such information asymmetry might result in adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Theoretically, some of these problems can be alleviated by re

6、gular monitoring, but this approach poses a challenge in the online environment because the borrowers and the buyers do not physically meet. Fostering and enhancing the lenders trust in the borrower can also be implemented to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In the traditional bank-lending markets, banks can use collateral, certified accounts, regular reporting, and even presence of the board of directors to enhance the trust in the borrower. However, such mechanisms are difficult to impl