1、中文 5300 字， 2750 单词， 14900 英文字符 出处： Ebenstein A. Son preference and access to social insurance: evidence from Chinas rural pension program.J. Population and Development Review, 2010, 36(1):47-70. Son Preference and Access to Social Insurance: Evidence from Chinas Rural Pension Program AVRAHAM EBENSTE
2、IN, STEVEN LEUNG IN 1979 the Chinese government instituted the one-child policy in an attempt to slow the growth of Chinas population. Communist party ofcials, fearing that rapid population growth would inhibit economic growth and modernization, initiated coercive and restrictive measures to limit f
3、ertility (White 2006). While the policy restricted births for both rural and urban residents, the primary intent was to reduce births among rural peasants, who accounted for over two-thirds of the countrys population. Although fertility in China, continuing its 1970s decline, fell from 2.96 births p
4、er woman in 1981 to (by some estimates) as low as 1.5 births in 2007, one consequence of fertility restriction was a rapid rise in the portion of births that were male. Sex-selective induced abortion became common in the countryside (Zeng et al. 1993; Chu 2001), and the sharpest increases in this pr
5、actice were observed in areas with the strictest policy enforcement (Ebenstein 2010). Patterns of births indicate that parents in rural China are reluctant to complete their childbearing without having at least one son. The persistence of son preference in spite of Chinas modernization is at rst sur
6、prising, but many scholars point to economic conditions in rural China that make sons valuable to parents. While son preference is in part a religious or cultural value that is unexplained by economic incentives, a large component is the economic value sons provide to parents. This manifests itself through three primary channels. First, sons are arguably more valuable as farmers than are daughters, as they provide higher labor income to parents (Qian 2008).1 Second, because all land in
