1、此文档是毕业设计外文翻译成品（ 含英文原文+中文翻译） ，无需调整复杂的格 式！下载之后直接可用，方便快捷！本文价格不贵,也就几十块钱！一辈子也就 一次的事！ 外文标题：Stock-based Incentives: Design and Implications for Firm Performance 外文作者：Marc Ste en Rapp,Philipp Schaller,Michael Wol 文献出处: SSRN Electronic Journal May 2018 (如觉得年份太老，可改为 近 2 年，毕竟很多毕业生都这样做) 英文 5640 单词，35360 字符(字符就是
2、印刷符)，中文 9187 汉字。 （如果字数多 了，可自行删减，大多数学校都是要求选取外文的一部分内容进行翻译的。 ） Stock-based Incentives: Design and Implications for Firm Performance Abstract: We examine performance implications of stock-based incentive programs. While agency theory makes a strong case for stock-based incentives, empirical evidence of
3、the effect on firm performance so far is mixed. Using a novel hand-collected data-set of German Prime Standard firms, we also find that on average stock-based long-term incentives do not improve firm performance. However, when we take a closer look at the design of the incentive structures, we find
4、that ill-designed programs go along with poor post performance, while ambitious programs boosts firm performance. We confirm these findings by using different performance measures, addressing endogenity concerns, and controlling for various governance mechanisms like ownership and board structures, as well as other design dimensions of the stock-based incentive plans. Keywords: Incentives; management compensation; stock-based compensation; corporate governance 1Introduction In this pape
