1、 南 京 财 经 大 学 本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译 题 目： 中美贸易摩擦问题研究 学生姓名： 俞力 学 号： 2024708546 院 （系）： 经济学院 专 业： 经济学基地班 指导教师 苏华山 2012 年 5 月 11 日 原文： Major U.S.-China Trade Issues Material Source: International Journal of Business and Management Author: William J. Lawrence and Weidong Sun Chinas economic reforms and rapid econ
2、omic growth, along with the effects of globalization, have caused the economies of the United States and China to become increasingly integrated Although growing U.S.-China economic ties are considered by most analysts to be mutually beneficial overall, tensions have risen over a number of Chinese e
3、conomic and trade policies that many U.S. critics charge are protectionist, economically distortive, and damaging to U.S. economic interests. These include Chinas resistance to adopting a market-based currency； its mixed record on implementing its obligations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), i
4、ncluding its failure to provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR)； and its use of industrial policies, including discriminatory government procurement policies, to promote and protect various Chinese domestic industries. Some Members have argued that, given the high rate
5、 of U.S. unemployment, Chinas “unfair” economic and trade policies can no longer be tolerated, and have urged the Obama Administration to more aggressively use the trade tools at its disposal to challenge such policies whenever possible, such as U.S. trade remedy laws and the WTOs dispute resolution
6、 mechanism. A 2011 survey by the American Chamber of Commerce of its members in China illustrates Chinas opportunities and challenges for U.S. firms. It reported that 78% of those surveyed said that they made a profit in China in 2010, and 85% said they would boost investment in their Chinese operat
7、ions in 2010. However, 35% of respondents stated that it has become more difficult to obtain businesses licenses in recent years and 25% said that Chinas indigenous innovation policies (discussed below) were hurting their businesses. Chinas Currency Policy Unlike most advanced economies (such as the
8、 United States), China does not maintain a market based floating exchange rate. Between 1994 and July 2005, China pegged its currency, the renminbi (RMB) or yuan, to the U.S. dollar at about 8.28 yuan to the dollar. In July 2005, China appreciated the RMB to the dollar by 2.1% and moved to a “manage
9、d float,” based on a basket of major foreign currencies, including the U.S. dollar. In order to maintain a target rate of exchange with the dollar (and other currencies), the Chinese government has maintained restrictions and controls over capital transactions and has made large-scale purchases of U
10、.S. dollars (and dollar assets). According to the Bank of China, from July 2005 to July 2009, the dollar-yuan exchange rate went from 8.27 to 6.83 yuan per dollar, an appreciation of 21.1%. However, once the effects of the global financial crisis became apparent, the Chinese government halted its ap
11、preciation of the RMB and subsequently kept the yuan/dollar exchange rate relatively constant at 6.83 from July 2009 to June 2010 in order to help limit the impact of the sharp decline in global demand for Chinese products. Many U.S. policymakers, labor groups, and business representatives of import
12、-sensitive industries have charged that, despite minor reforms, the Chinese government continues to manipulate its currency in order to keep the value of its currency artificially low against the dollar (with estimates of undervaluation ranging from 15% to 50%). They claim that this policy constitut
13、es a de facto subsidy for Chinese exports to the United States, and acts as a de fac to tariff on Chinese imported U.S. goods. They complain that this policy has particularly hurt several U.S. manufacturing sectors that are forced to compete against low-cost Chinese products, and has led to the loss
14、 of hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs. Critics further charge that Chinas currency policy has been a major factor in the size and growth of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some Members of Congress contend that, given the current high rate of unemployment in the United States, Chinese “currency m
15、anipulation” can no longer be tolerated. Chinas Obligations in the World Trade Organization Negotiations for Chinas accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor organization, the WTO, began in 1986 and took over 15 years to complete. During the WTO negotiations, C
16、hinese officials insisted that China was a developing country and should be allowed to enter under fairly lenient terms. The United States insisted that China could enter the WTO only if it substantially liberalized its trade regime. In the end, a compromise was reached that required China to make i
17、mmediate and extensive reductions in various trade and investment barriers, while allowing it to maintain some level of protection (or a transitional period of protection) for certain sensitive sectors. Chinas WTO membership was formally approved at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, on
18、November 10, 2001. On November 11, 2001, China notified the WTO that it had formally ratified the WTO agreements, and on December 11, 2001, it formally joined the WTO. Violations of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Lack of effective and consistent protection in China of IPR has been cited by U.S. f
19、irms as one of the most significant problems they face in doing business in China. Although China has improved significantly its IPR protection regime over the past few years by beefing up its IPR laws and conducting periodic focused campaigns (such as raids) against major IPR infringers, U.S. indus
20、tries complain that piracy rates in China remain unacceptably high. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) estimates that U.S. intellectual property-intensive firms that conducted business in China lost $48.2 billion in sales, royalties, and license fees in 2009 because of IPR violations in
21、 China. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) estimated that business software piracy in China alone cost U.S. firms $3.4 billion in lost trade in 2009. The Business Software Alliance (BSA) estimates the commercial value of illegally used software in China in 2009 was $7.6 billion,
22、 a $900 million increase over 2008 levels. Critics of Chinas IPR regime note that, even when the Chinese government enforces its IPR laws, the resulting fines, seizures, and other punishments are often not significant enough to act as an effective deterrence against piracy. The U.S. Customs and Bord
23、er Protection reported that China accounted for 66% of pirated goods seized by the agency in FY2010 (based on domestic value). Piracy also has a number of negative effects on Chinas economy. China and U.S. Trade Remedy Laws When China entered the WTO in 2001, it agreed to allow the United States to continue to treat it as a non-market economy for 12 years (codified in U.S. law under Sections 421of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended) for the purpose of U.S. safeguards.This provision enables the United
