1、Law and Fact in Patent Litigation: Form versus Function* 法律和事实在专利诉讼中是形式还是功能 Thomas G. Field, Jr. Introduction Recently, the Supreme Court sent Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp. back to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). It remanded with explicit directions that the lower court conside
2、r the extent to which Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) governs appellate review of nonobviousness determinations. 介绍： 最近，最高法院驳回了 丹尼森 Mfg.诉泛达公司的案件至联邦巡回法院（ CAFC）。 它的驳回带有鲜明的特征 ，即在 考虑了 美国联邦民法 第 52 页中所规定的 审查基层法院上诉的非显而易见的程度后才发回重审。 On remand, the CAFC should attempt to relate the issue to the scope of review for othe
3、r issues that arise in patent appeals. Neither the narrow nor the broad problem has ever received the attention it deserves particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental law/fact dichotomy. 在发回重审时 ， 联邦巡回法院应该尝试在专利上诉时联系它的 复审 范围 。 但是 无论是狭义还是广义的问题 都没有得到它应有的重视 特别是基本的法律 / 事实二分法上的观点。 It is by no mean
4、s certain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate for questions of fact under “clearly erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standards. This paper
5、 argues that, if the courts are inclined to persist in more intense review of nonobviousness, two other matters need to be considered: First, whether more liberal review should be extended to all questions concerning patent validity, and, second, whether such review should be conducted under a “cons
6、titutional fact” doctrine. 这绝不是说专利的非显而易见性 裁定应作为法律问题 来 对待。然而， 现在有充分证据说明 法院 将更严格地审查这些带有明显错误或者充足证据这么一个层次的审判结果 。本文 讨论的是 ，如果法院都倾向于 对 专利的 非显而易见性 坚持更 严格 的审查， 则 另外两个问题需要考虑：第一， 审查 是否应当扩大到所有涉及专利的有效性 审查 ，而且，第二，审查 是否应根据“宪制上的事实”原则 来 进行。 The former would address apparent inconsistencies in the current law, and th
7、e latter would allow appellate courts an expanded role (function) without unduly confusing terminology (form). 前者将解决现行法律明显不一致，而后者则允许上诉法院的一个更大的作用（功能 ） ，而不会 出现 过度混乱的专业术语 （形式 ）。 The Law/Fact Dichotomy 法律 /事实二分理论 The most directly relevant precedent governing appellate review of patent litigation is cry
8、ptic. Quoted in the per curiam decision that remands Dennison, It consists of one sentence from the Courts decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.: “While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, . the 103 condition. lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.” 最直接相关的专利诉讼的先例中的上诉审查是比
9、较模糊的。引述一则依法院决定将 Dennison 案发回重审的案例，法院对 Graham v. John Deere Co.的决定中的有这么一句话：“虽然专利的有效性问题最终都是法律问题， . 第 103 项条件 .随后又询问了几个基本的事实。” However, what that sentence means is unclear； Graham indicated neither reasons nor authority for denominating questions of patent validity, in general, or nonobviousness, speci
10、fically, as ones of “law” (as contrasted with “fact”). As shown below, without an analysis of those matters, it is very difficult to determine either whether validity issues other than nonobviousness should be treated as ones of “law” or, in any case, what sort of treatment should be afforded. It is
11、 hoped that, following the remand of Dennison, some progress will be made toward resolving those important problems. 不过，这句话的意思是什么不清楚， Graham 表示命名这些专利权的有效性问题既没有原因也没有权威，在一般情况下，非显而易性具体而言是作为“法律”（作为对比的“事实”）的。如下所示，没有对这些事项的分析，它是很难确定专利是否有效的问题比专利的非显而易见性的问题更应被视为“法律”或在任何情况下应该提供的什么样的待遇。人们希望，随着 Dennison 案件的发回重申，
12、能够取得一些进展，解决这些重要问题。 While much has been written on the law/fact dichotomy, a brief overview is in order. The terms, “law” and “fact” are used several ways, and it is necessary to define them in the present context. Approached that way, the term, “fact,” is more precisely called “adjudicative fact,” a
13、nd the most accurate definition is operational. In short, a question of adjudicative fact is one of the kind traditionally regarded as appropriate for juries. Conversely, a question of “law” is anything that remains including questions of “legislative” fact, the latter being used, even by courts, in
14、 conjunction with values, to evolve general rules. 尽管 很多案例已经被写进了法律 /事实 二分法，下面就来一个简单的介绍。 法律术语 “法律”和“事实” 被用于若干方面 ， 在目前的情况下，我们有必要去 给这个两个术语下定义 。 专业术语“事实”，更精确地 应该被 称为“裁决的事实”， 而这个 最准确的定义具有可操作性。总之，事实问题的裁决 历来是陪审团认为比较合适的裁判种类之一 。相反， “法律”问题 则是被遗留的问题 包括“立法”事实问题，它甚至被法院使用并与 价值相结合后，演变成 一般规则。 The closest one can co
15、me to avoiding circularity is to look at whether a fact is critical only to the outcome of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the classes of which the parties are merely members. See generally, e.g., B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 213-16 (2d Ed. 1984). 最接近的一次可以 用
16、 来避免循环 是看 事实是否 只对具体纠纷的结果，或只是去 建立 阶级中少数成员的权利和义务 。一般见，例如， B. Schwartz 行政法， 16 卷 213 页 （ 1984 年 第二版 ）。 Unfortunately, the water is muddied when courts occasionally resolve fact issues as a“ matter of law.” Yet, even then, the operational definition stands: If a matter is sufficiently well established i
17、n the record that reasonable minds could not differ, it is within the ultimate control of judges, not a jury. Hence, in sorting out “law” and “fact” issues, roles of judge and jury are paramount. 不幸的是，在法院偶然的一次将事实问题当做判例法来解决后水还是被搅浑了。 然而，即使如此，在操作上它就 定义 为 ：如果一个 事件被充分地记录了 但是合理的分析又不能将 它 辨别，那么只有 法官有 最终控制权，
18、而不是陪审团。因此，在 对 “法律 ”和 “事实 ”问题 进行分类时 ，法官和陪审团的角色是至关重要的。 Indeed, this is inherent in rights to jury trials； without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. While appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact proper
19、ly entrusted to juries are entitled to exceptional deference under the “substantial evidence” standard. 事实上，这是陪审团的固有权利；没有这些区 别，陪审团的这一权利就是被架空的，上诉法官和审判法官也一样。虽然上诉法院可能是法律问题的最终仲裁者，但是为了表示特殊的敬意，法院通常会在有大量充足的证据情况下的将事实案件妥善地交给陪审团。由于某些不同的原因，事实的裁决范围要被扩大，就像在 Dennison 案件中法官的审判，有“明显错误”的审查适用。 For somewhat different
20、reasons, deference to fact finding is also extended, as in Dennison, to bench trials. There “clearly erroneous” review applies. That standard is less deferential, but the Supreme Court demonstrated in Dennison, and more so in Inwood Laboratories more than token deference is required. 该标准是不那么恭敬，但最高法院
21、在 Dennison 案件表现出来的，以及在 Inwood 实验室案件中说明超过象征 性的尊重是必需的。 Until 1985, the depth of review sometimes varied depending on whether cases turned on demeanor or documentary evidence. The latter had sometimes been accorded less deference.直到 1985年，审查的深度有时视乎案件的行为或书面证据而不等。后者有时不被给予尊重。 The principal argument advanc
22、ed in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings. based solely on documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule but, in explaining the change made that year, the Advisory Committee said: These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy
23、 that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply
24、 appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority. 主要论点有利于推进 搜索上诉审查 结果 .纯粹 证据的基础是，规则的理由， 但是，在解释改变这一年，咨询委员会说： 这些考虑 公众舆论的 和司法经济 会被审判法庭，而不是 上诉法庭 要允许上诉法院 。 更加积极地 分享实况调查功能往往会破坏在当事人的心目中的区法院的合法性，一些事实问题的上诉重审 案件将会速度增加，司法权威将会 不必要的重新分配。 “Constitution
25、al Facts” “宪法事实” Despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give above-average scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at stake.Indeed, the Supreme Court held exactly that in Bose Corp v. Consumers Union U.S. While the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not patents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. 尽管如此，也不管是否事实发生在审判 前， 在危急时刻宪法关注的一项争议可以使 法院 给予 高于平 均水平的审查。事实上 ，最高法院认为正是在 Bose公司诉美国消费者联盟案件， 虽然决定 有关于 言
