1、本科毕业论文(设计) 外 文 翻 译 原文: Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy Introduction One of the more puzzling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a compelling and widely accepted argument for dividend irrelevance in a world with perfect capital m
2、arkets. Many years later, Miller (1986) recognized that the observed preference for cash dividends is one of the soft spots in the current body of theory. So why do corporations pay dividends, and why do investors care? Black (1976) once described this issue as a dividend puzzle with pieces that jus
3、t dont seem to fit. To help explain this puzzle, financial economists developed various theories-signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand explanations. The profusion of theories led Ang (1987, p. 55) to observe, “Thus, we have moved from a position of not enough good reasons to
4、explain why dividends are paid to one of too many. Advocates of behavioral finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984), introduced concepts such as prospect theory and mental accounting to explain why investors like dividends. Statman (1997) contends that solving the dividend puzzle is impossible wh
5、ile ignoring the patterns of normal investor behavior. Today, corporate managers are left with a vast and often conflicting body of research about dividends. One way to enhance our understanding of why corporations pay dividends is to examine the views of managers who are responsible for making such
6、 decisions. Past fieldwork and surveys have provided important insights into how managers determine their firms dividend payouts and their views about various dividend policy issues. For example, Lintner (1956) conducted the seminal field study about the determination of dividend policy. Other resea
7、rchers including Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985) and Baker and Powell (1999) surveyed managers to obtain their views about dividend policy. Such studies complement other types of empirical research on dividend policy. Our study examines how managers view dividend policy but uses a different data
8、 set to extend and refine the scope of previous survey research. Specifically, we survey corporate managers of NASDAQ firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about Dividend policy , the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for payin
9、g dividendssignaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand arguments. Our motivation for conducting this study is to determine whether the evidence simply reaffirms what we already know or provides new insights about dividend policy. The study is timely given evidence by Fama and Frenc
10、h (2001) of the declining incidence of dividend payers, which not only reflects the changing characteristics of dividend payers but also their lower propensity to pay dividends. In this study, we do not focus on the views about dividend policy of managers from the typical NASDAQ firm because most NA
11、SDAQ firms either pay no dividends or pay dividends on an irregular basis. Instead, we investigate the views of a subset of NASDAQ firms, namely, those that Consistently pay cash dividends. The fact that most NASDAQ firms do not pay dividends is not surprising given their characteristics. As Damodar
12、an (1999) notes, a firms dividend policy tends to follow the firms life cycle. During the introduction and rapid expansion stages, firms typically pay no or very low dividends. Such firms characterize a large portion of firms trading on NASDAQ. Our study differs from previous research on dividend po
13、licy in several ways. First, unlike prior fieldwork and surveys that focus only on NYSE-listed firms from a few industries, we study managers from dividend-paying NASDAQ firms from numerous industries. Michel (1979) and Baker (1988) present evidence that dividend policies vary across industries. Our
14、 rationale for examining NASDAQ firms rests on the belief that the views of NASDAQ managers may differ from those of NYSE-listed firms because of different firm characteristics such as size. Second, we investigate several areas not examined in previous surveys such as views about historical patterns
15、 of dividends, dividend life cycle, and residual dividend policy. Finally, unlike most research that focuses on a single explanation of why companies pay dividends, we examine multiple explanations. By taking this approach, we can assess the relative importance of different reasons for paying divide
16、nds based on the level of agreement or disagreement with various statements involving each explanation. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the relevant dividend literature. The third section presents our research questions and empirical pr
17、edictions followed by a discussion of the methodology and limitations in the fourth section. The fifth section presents our survey results, and the final section provides a summary and conclusions. Previous Research In this section, we present three basic areas of dividend research. First, we discus
18、s Lintners (1956) classic study that investigates how corporate managers determine their firms dividend policies. We also review some of the subsequent research related to Lintners findings. Second, we review studies that examine whether dividend policy affects, firm value. Third, we present major r
19、esearch findings related to four common explanations for paying dividends-signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand arguments. Because the amount of research conducted in these areas is voluminous, we confine our review to a few key research findings in each area. 3 Determining a
20、 Firms Dividend Policy In his classic study, Lintner (1956) reports that firm have long-run target dividend payout ratios and place their attention more on dividend changes than on absolute dividend levels. He also finds that dividend changes follow shifts in long-run sustainable earnings (managers
21、smooth earnings). And managers are hesitant to make dividend changes that may later need to be reversed. Managers also try to stabilize dividends and avoid dividend cuts. Lintner developed a partial-adjustment model to describe the dividend decision process that explained 85 percent of year-to-year