1、8300 英文单词， 4.5 万英文字符 ，中文 1.5 万字 文献出处： An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firmsJ. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2012, 3(4):197-206. An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family rms James J. Chrisman, Jess
2、 H. Chua, Lloyd P. Steier, Mike Wright, DLisa N. McKee Abstract Family rms without able and willing family successors are frequently sold to non-family managers through management buy-outs (MBOs). Whether MBOs create value is thought to be dependent upon the ability to reduce ownermanager agency cos
3、ts. In this article we examine the agency costs of MBOs that acquire family rms. We contribute to theory by arguing that in such situations, value creation by reducing agency costs will depend upon pre-MBO agency costs, the ability to solve the double agency problem, and the relationship between the
4、 cost of agency control mechanisms and the residual losses from opportunism before and after the MBO. Keywords: Agency theory; Family business; Management buy-outs 1. Introduction Family rms account for the majority of rms around the world (La Porta, Lo pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Morc
5、k & Steier, 2005). These businesses are dened by the involvement of family members in the ownership and management of the rm and the owning familys desire for trans-generational control (Chris- man, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999). Combined, these characteristics expl
6、ain the preoccupation of family business owners and researchers with family business succession (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003) and successions central role in the theory of the family rm (Chua et al., 1999; Lim, Lubatkin, & Wiseman, 2010). Despite the desire of family owners to keep the rm in family hands, the conventional wisdom is that only about 30% of all family rms make the transition to the second generation and only about 10% make it to the third (Ward, 1997). These bu
