1、中文 5150 字， 3200 英文单词， 17500 英文字符 文献出处： Anginer D, Demirguc-Kunt A, Zhu M. How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis J. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, 48:312-321. How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis Deniz Anginer, Asli D
2、emirguc-Kunt, Min Zhu Abstract Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a nancial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking
3、. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent nancial crisis. We nd that generous nancial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global nancial crisis. However, d
4、uring the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our ndings suggest that the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the stabilization effect of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The over
5、all effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we nd that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequenc
6、es of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability. Keywords: Bank risk， Systemic risk， Deposit insurance， Bank supervision and regulation， Financial crisis 1. Introduction In response to the global nancial crisis, a number of countries substantially increased the coverage of their nancial safety nets in order to restore market condence and to avert p
