1、中文 3285 字， 1800 英文单词， 10800 英文字符 文献出处： Spindler M, Winter J, Hagmayer S. Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence From GermanyJ. Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2014, 81(4):781-801. Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Germany Marti
2、n Spindler , Joachim Winter Steffen , Hagmayer Abstract Asymmetric information is an important phenomenon in insurance markets, but the empirical evidence on the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard is mixed. Because of its implications for pricing, contract design, and regulation, it is cru
3、cial to test for asymmetric information in specific insurance markets. In this article, we analyze a recent data set on automobile insurance in Germany, the largest such market in Europe. We present and compare a variety of statistical testing procedures. We find that the extent of asymmetric inform
4、ation depends on coverage levels and on the specific risks covered, which enhances the previous literature. Within the framework of Chiappori et al. (2006), we also test whether drivers have realistic expectations concerning their loss distribution, and we analyze the market structure. Introduction
5、Since Akerlof (1970), the consequences of asymmetric information, in particular, ad- verse selection and moral hazard, have been explored in a vast body of research. The initial gap between the theoretical developments and empirical studies of asymmetric information has recently become narrower. In
6、particular, insurance markets have proved a fruitful and productive field for empirical studies, for two reasons. First, the data are well structured: insurance contracts are usually highly standardized, they can be described completely by a relatively small set of variables, and data on the insured persons claim history, that is, the occurrence of claims and the associated costs, are stored in the database of an insurance company. Second, insurance companies have hundreds of thousands or ev
