1、中文 3740 字， 2336 单词， 13000 英文字符 出处： Nourayi M M, Krishnan S. The impact of incentives on CEO compensation and firm performanceJ. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, 2006, 53(3): 402-420. 毕 业 设 计（论 文）外 文 参 考 资 料 及 译 文 译文题目： 激励对 CEO报酬与公司业绩的影响 学生姓名： 学 号： 专 业： M会计学 所在学院： 商学院 指导教师：
2、 职 称： 2011 年 12 月 09 日 RISEC, Volume 53 (2006), No. 3, 402-420 THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVES ON CEOCOMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE By MAHMOUD M. NOURAYI and SUDHA KRISHNAN Abstract: A significant component of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compen
3、sation contracts. Most executives are rewarded in the form of cash and company stock. Our data indicate that over 82.5 percent of the observations include a bonus pay to CEOs and an even larger percentage, about 94.5 percent, have stock option grants. Our analyses indicate that the means of market-b
4、ased returns are significantly larger for companies with no stock option incentives. However, the accounting-based returns do not appear to be significantly influenced by stock-based rewards. (JEL: J30, G30, L21) Keywords: CEO compensation; agency contract; incentives; performance; accounting-based
5、incentives; market-based incentives 1. Introduction A significant component of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compensation contracts. A well-designed incentive system can deal effectively with both adverse selection and moral hazard issues in
6、an agency contract. The degree to which compensation contracts vary in relation to the measure of performance, determines the level of self-confidence and risk-taking attributes of the applicants. The main objective of this study is to identify the influence of incentive contracts and performance measures on executive compensation. We also assess the sensitivity of CEO pay to cash incentives as compared to stock-based incentives. The relations
