1、1850 单词， 1 万英文字符， 3200 汉字 出处： Journal of Accounting and Economics Volume 53, Issues 12, FebruaryApril 2012, Pages 391411 The incentives for tax planning Christopher S. Armstrong， Jennifer L. Blouin ， David F. Larcker I. Introduction This paper investigates the type of tax planning included in tax di
2、rectors compensation contracts. Using detailed data on tax director incentive compensation, we examine whether the incentives provided to tax directors are associated with lower effective tax rates and/or a wider book-tax gap. We also examine whether tax director incentives are more strongly linked
3、to measures of the impact of taxes on cash flows (i.e., cash effective tax rates and taxable income) or earnings (i.e.,GAAP effective tax rates and pre-tax book income). Finally, we investigate whether tax director incentives are associated with proxies for aggressive tax planning. Our study complem
4、ents and extends the recent literature that links tax planning with top executive incentive compensation (e.g.,Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Rego and Wilson, 2010) and executive/corporate culture (e.g., Frank et al., 2009; Dyreng et al., 2010).1 Although these studies show that both the incentives of
5、top management and corporate culture have a significant impact on effective tax rates, it is not clear whether top management directly engages in tax planning or whether the documented tax effects are a byproduct of the investing,financing and operating decisions made within the rm. For example, an
6、observed relationship between top managements incentives and measures of tax planning may be an indirect outcome of the investment decision rather than from deliberate tax planning. To understand the link between performance measures and observed tax attributes, it is necessary to explicitly consider the incentive compensation of the tax director, who is the executive charged with overseeing the firms tax function. However, an alternative scenario is that all tax planning decisions ar
