1、2900 单词， 16500 英文字符， 5200 汉字 出处： Roesch B J. Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in DoctrineJ. Suffolk UL Rev., 2005, 39: 379-386. 外文文献原稿 Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine Roesch B J I. Introduction The judic
2、ial branch of the federal government has historically had an uneasy relationship with public opinion. Like the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary depends on public support for its legitimacy. But unlike the political branches, the judiciary is not electorally accountable to those whos
3、e support it requires. To the contrary, one of its defining attributes is the duty to thwart political expressions of popular will that run afoul of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the arguments of appellate judges in the Common Law world necessarily rest, according to some le
4、gal scholars, on community consensus about extralegal values. n1 In other words, the often counter-majoritarian judiciary must produce results acceptable to the general public over the long term in order to maintain its legitimacy. Professor Chemerinsky has posited that the judiciarys legitimacy act
5、ually hinges on both the general acceptability of the results it produces and the relative consistency of the methods by which those results are reached. Traditionally, scholarly and judicial commentary on the influence of public opinion on the federal judiciary has followed two courses. Some commen
6、tators and jurists argue that judicial independence requires that public opinion have no influence on judicial decision-making. Another group of scholars advocates an indirectly influential role for public opinion in limited contexts. These scholars believe judges should refer to objective measures of public opinion as guidelines when deciding questions of statutory interpretation and delineating the Eighth Amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Recent developments
