1、中文 3090 字 ,1750 单词， 1 万英文字符 外文翻译 原文 The Impact of Financial Services Trade Liberalization on China Material Source: The Impact of Financial Services Trade Liberalization on ChinaJ. Discussion Papers, 2005. Author: Li-Gang Liu Abstract This paper shows that financial services
2、trade liberalization in China has set impetus for accelerated domestic financial liberalization. Foreign banks, though still relatively small in size, have already exerted considerable influence on Chinas capital flows. Empirical finding from the cross-country study indicates that financial services
3、 trade liberalization under the WTO promotes bank loans to developing economies strongly though not evenly conditional on country characteristics. Keywords: Financial services trade liberalization, capital flows, financial and capital account liberalization, gravity model I. Introduction
4、 China is undertaking a set of simultaneous, though gradual, domestic financial and capital account liberalization. At the same time, its financial sector is also experiencing increased foreign competition as the country has already started to allow considerable foreign participation in its do
5、mestic financial sector. 2007 will be a watershed year as China will have to fully implement its WTO commitments on financial services trade liberalization. While foreign banks in emerging markets promote efficiency through enhanced competition and transfer of skills (Claessens, et al 2001, C
6、ommittee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), 2004), they also pose challenges to policy makers in areas of managing liberalization pace, upgrading supervision skills, and conducting monetary policy. Empirical findings suggest that with more countries embarking upon financial liberalization, the r
7、isk of financial crises has also increased. It was observed that since the 1980s, over two-thirds of IMF member countries have experienced significant problems in the banking sector (Lindgren, et. al1996). Studies on the relationship between financial liberalization and banking crisis also indicate
8、that financial liberalization raises the probability of a banking crisis (Demirguc-Kunt&Detragiache, 1998). Moreover, in emerging market economies, a banking crisis is usually associated with a balance of payment crisis when the countrys capital account is open (Kaminsky& Reinhart, 2000). &n
9、bsp; Because financial services trade liberalization often involves capital flows, foreign participation will certainly complicate the ongoing process of domestic financial and capital account liberalization in emerging market economies. It is hypothesized that foreign bank participation would accel
10、erate both domestic financial and capital account liberalization and in particular, it would make a host countrys capital control regime progressively more ineffective, thus leading to de facto capital account liberalization. Without necessary modifications regarding their exchange rate regimes and
11、the ways they conduct monetary policies, emerging market economies may experience inherent policy inconsistencies that could eventually lead to capital account crises. This paper intends to examine these issues raised above in two segments: First, it examines the impact of foreign bank presen
12、ce on Chinas rapidly evolving domestic and external financial liberalization. Using China as a case study, the paper intends to shed light on whether foreign participation helps accelerate Chinas domestic financial and capital account liberalization. The paper then examines the impact of the WTO fin
13、ancial services trade liberalization commitments and especially the banking sector commitments on bank loans to developing economies. Specifically, the empirical study of this section hopes to shed light on whether financial services trade liberalization helps promote bank loans to developing econom
14、ies. The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides an updated review on the General Agreement of Trade in Services with a focus on the financial services. Section III examines whether foreign bank presence in China helps accelerate domestic financial and capital account liberalization. S
15、ection IV presents some empirical findings on whether the financial services trade liberalization commitments promote bank loans to emerging market economies. Section V discusses implications for policy. II. Financial Services Trade Liberalization under the GATS II. 1: GATS Rules: An upd
16、ated review Financial services trade liberalization negotiations (FSTLN), under the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), aims at reducing or even totally removing all trade barriers in financial services sector by allowing foreign financial firms in insurance, banking, securities i
17、ndustry and other related financial services sectors to enter a host country and enjoy national treatment. The GATS, launched in the Uruguay Round in 1986, was not able to reach any agreement until April 1994, several months after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round at the end of 1993 (Kono, et al ,
18、 1997). Negotiations on financial services agreements were also extended far beyond the Uruguay Round and finally reached agreement in 1997. In the current and new Doha round of WTO negotiations, financial services and other services will be a “built-in” agenda, thus having the benefit of rene
19、wed emphasis (Key, 2003). FSTLN specifies general commitments, specific exemptions, and modes of supply of services. These commitments governing modes of financial services supplied and they can differ from country to country and can be phased in over time depending on the initial agreements.
20、 However, the general commitments of GATS also apply to FSTLN have the following features (Kono, et al , 1997) Most favored nation (MFN): All liberalization measures must be extended to all WTO members equally. Market access and national treatment: WTO member countries can not discrimi
21、nate between domestic and foreign firms, except when explicitly indicated at the time of joining the GATS. Transparency: Local regulations should be published and made accessible to all. Progressive liberalization: Member states agree to increase the number of liberalized sectors and t
22、o eliminate exceptions within sectors by committing to future negotiating rounds. Dispute settlement mechanism: All commitments are legally binding. Harmed states can initiate an arbitration procedure. If found harmed, the country can impose sanctions against the violating country. Howe
23、ver, FSTLN also has some important exemptions: Exemption for government services: Activities of the central banks or other government authorities carrying out monetary and exchange rate policies are excluded from GATS. Prudential carve-out: It is exempted from GATS and is designed to e
24、nsure that host country governments can protect their domestic financial system and participants of the financial system through the application of the host country prudential standards. These prudential measures in principle do not have to comply with the national treatment, market access commitmen
25、ts and its most favored nation responsibility (Key, 2003). However, the prudential carve-out is not meant to be an overriding exception to a members obligations, as prudential measures should not be used to avoid a members obligation or commitments. Some non-prudential related government regu
26、lations (for example, practices related to industrial policy to provide credit to certain industries) are also exempted from the commitments of the GATS unless such policies violate the general commitments as specified above (Kono, et al , 1997). Similar to other types of services, FSTLN also
27、covers four modes of supply: cross-border, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and movements of natural persons. Mode 1 or cross-border supply: If a consumer in country A and a supplier in country B, the service crosses the border to meet the need of the consumer in Country A (e.g., A Ja
28、panese bank in Tokyo lends to a Chinese firm in Shanghai). Depending on the nature of transactions, this mode of supply in financial services will often involve not only financial services but also capital flows (Table 1). Mode 2 or consumption abroad: It refers to a scenario that a consumer
29、in Country A will have to travel to Country B where the service supplier is located in order to conduct a transaction (e.g., A Japanese company opens a bank account with a bank in China (a Japanese, other foreign, or even a domestic Chinese bank) for transactions occurring in China). Mode 3 o
30、r commercial presence: It refers to a service in country A provided by a supplier in country B took place at a permanent place of business located in country A (e.g., A Japanese bank lends firms in China through its branch in China) (Table 2). Mode 4 or movement of natural persons: It refers
31、to a service in country A is provided by country B with personnel imported from country B (e.g., A branch of a Japanese bank draws its management from its headquarters in Tokyo). As discussed above, measures undertaken for prudential purposes are exempted from the basic rules. Because there i
32、s no necessity test of validity, such “carve-outs” could be potentially used as restrictions or barriers for foreign entry. In addition, only a sovereign, not a private bank, can bring complains to the WTO dispute panel (Key, 2003). Although financial services often involve capital flows, the
33、 FSTLN under GATS does not have any authority to override the measures of capital controls in a host economy. Under capital controls, a cross-border financial service trade may occur but not necessarily the capital flows associated with the service. This is because FSTLN under GATS has to be consistent with the current account transactions of the IMF Articles of Agreement. It does not, however, cover capital account transactions. In principle, countries that have signed on the GATS in financial services can
