1、本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： The Political Economy of the US Crop Insurance Program 出 处： The Economic Impact of Public Support to Agriculture (2010)7:243-308 作 者： Bruce A.Babcock 原 文 The Political Economy of the US Crop Insurance Program Abstract： Taxpayer support for the crop insurance industry has grown rapid
2、ly since 2000 even though total crop acres insured is stagnant and the number of policies sold has declined. Staunch support for the program by key members of Congress meant defeat for proposals in the 2008 Farm Bill to significantly reduce cost. These proposals included large changes in the formula
3、s used to calculate industry reimbursement and for new programs that would be integrated with or reduce the amount of risk insured by the crop insurance program. The reason for this resilience is program complexity and biased analysis, which has allowed the industry to claim that they are undercompe
4、nsated despite a doubling of taxpayer support. One unforeseen outcome of the strength of the crop insurance industry in protecting its interests is that a new insurance program called Average Crop Revenue Selection (ACRE) was passed in the farm bill. Large unintended consequences that could be broug
5、ht about by ACRE include the likely demise of the marketing loan and countercyclical programs, increased risk that the United States will violate its amber box limits, and in the not-too-distant future, a complete change in the way that US crop insurance is delivered to farmers. Introduction The dif
6、ficulty with which Congress passed a US Farm Bill was hampered more by a need to find increased funds than with any broad philosophical debate about the proper direction for US farm policy. At first perusal, the new US commodity policy largely follows the policy set forth in the 2002 farm bill. Dire
7、ct payments, countercyclical payments, and the marketing loan program still exist and are largely unchanged. Wheat and soybeans have a slightly higher target price and lentils have a slightly lower loan rate. To maintain this program structure largely in tact while boosting funding for nutrition pro
8、grams required Congress to find new funds. Congress had no appetite for reducing direct payments, which left only the crop insurance program that could be tapped for savings. The debate over how much to take away from the crop insurance program provided many with their first detailed reason to under
9、stand a program that has grown tremendously since 2000. The stakes of those with vested interests in the program are now in the billions of dollars annually, which makes change more difficult than when the stakes were in the millions of dollars. Not surprisingly, those with a large vested interest i
10、n the crop insurance program came out largely unscathed in the 2008 farm bill. Although supporters of the program lament the large cuts that crop insurance took, the cuts really only took away a small portion of the gains that accrue to its beneficiaries. One unforeseen outcome of the strength of th
11、e crop insurance industry in protecting its interests is that the new insurance program that was passed in the farm bill will be operated completely by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) instead of by the Risk Management Agency (RMA). The new program, called ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Election), will not
12、 be integrated into the existing crop insurance program because such integration would have meant less risk being handled by the crop insurance industry. The remainder of this chapter provides a political/economic analysis of why the United States finds itself with two crop insurance programs and an
13、 exploration of the possibly large, unintended consequences of having both programs. The explanation for why we have both programs lies, not surprisingly, in Congress trying to find an outcome that would give a diverse set of interest groups what they want, while providing the necessary funds for ex
14、panded nutrition programs, which was a major objective of House leadership. The large unintended consequences that could be brought about by ACRE include the likely demise of the marketing loan and countercyclical programs, increased risk that the United States will violate its amber box limits, and
15、 in the not-too-distant future, a complete change in the way that US crop insurance is delivered to farmers. Background on the US Crop Insurance Program The US crop insurance program has two broad public policy objectives: help farmers manage financial risk and eliminate the need for Congress to pas
16、s supplemental ad hoc disaster assistance programs. To meet these twin objectives, Congress reformed the program in 2000 with the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA). The reform was justified by President Clinton in his statement upon signing the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000:
17、“I have heard many farmers say that the crop insurance program was simply not good value for them, providing too little coverage for too much money. My FY 2001 budget proposal and this bill directly address that problem by making higher insurance coverage more affordable, which should also mitigate
18、the need for ad hoc crop loss disaster assistance such as we have seen for the last three years.” And in 2006 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, former USDA under secretary J.B. Penn said, “One of the overarc
19、hing goals of the crop insurance program has been the reduction or elimination of ad hoc disaster assistance.” By all accounts, Congress has seemingly succeeded in its objective to help farmers manage risk. Coverage is provided to more than 350 commodities in all 50 states and Puerto Rico. And more
20、than 80% of eligible acres are now insured under the program. However, this success has come at a high cost. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections made in 2007 indicate that the crop insurance program will cost taxpayers an average of more than $5 billion per year for the next 5 years, which
21、 is about double what the program would have cost without the reform. Actual expenditures will be much higher if crop prices stay high. One might be able to justify this additional cost if the second objective of the program had been met also. But passage of ACRE and a permanent disaster program in
22、the new farm bill indicates that crop insurance provides inadequate coverage for farmers, as does inclusion of $3.5 billion in yet another disaster assistance program in the 2008 Iraq funding bill. Members of the House and Senate Agricultural Committees justify the need for disaster assistance despi
23、te large amounts of crop insurance aid because even an expanded crop insurance program cannot provide adequate assistance to farmers in financial stress. The large losses in Iowa from excess rainfall in 2008 will once again test Congress ability to count on the crop insurance program to deliver adequate aid to farmers. A Simple Model of Competition in Crop Insurance
