1、1870 单词， 2174 汉字 出处： YAN DONG, JOHN WALLEY. HOW LARGE ARE THE IMPACTS OF CARBON MOTIVATED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS?J. Climate Change Economics, 2012, 03(01): 1250001-1-1250001-28. 外文翻译 原文 HOW LARGE ARE THE IMPACTS OF CARBON MOTIVATED BORDER TAX DJUSTMENTS Author:JohnWhalley,Yan Dong This paper discuss
2、es the size of impact of carbon motivated border tax adjustments on world trade .We report numerical simulation results which suggest that impacts on welfare, trade, and emissions will likely be small. This is because proposed measures use carbon emissions in the importing country in producing goods
3、 similar to imports rather than carbon content in calculating the size of barriers. Moreover, because border adjustments involve both tariffs and export rebates, it is the differences in emissions intensity across sector rather than emissions level which matters. Where there is no difference in emis
4、sions intensities across sectors, Lerner symmetry holds for the border adjustment and no relative effects occur. In our numerical simulation analyses border tax adjustments accompany carbon emission reduction commitments made either unilaterally, or as part of a global treaty and to be applied again
5、st non signatories. We use a four-region US, EU, China, ROW general equilibrium structure which captures energy trade and has endogenously determined energy supply so that global emissions can change with policy changes. We calibrate our model to 2006 data and analyze the potential impacts of both E
6、U and US carbon pricing at various levels, either along with or without carbon motivated BTAs policies on welfare, emissions, trade flows and production. Results indicate only small impacts of these measures on global emissions, trade and welfare, but the signs of effects are as expected. BTAs allev
7、iate leakage effects as expected. In trade impacts, compared with no BTAs, BTAs reduce imports of committing countries, and increase imports by other countries. EU and US BTAs against China reduce exports by China. With BTAs, the value of production in the country with carbon reduction measures are
8、introduced increases, and other countrys production decreases compared with the case of no BTAs. With the contraction of world trade flows caused by the financial crisis, carbon motivated BTAs offer a prospect of a compounding effect in a world which is going protectionist and decarbonized at the sa
9、me time ,but the added effects of BTAs seems small. Emerging policy proposals for carbon based tariffs or border tax adjustments by EU, US and other OECD countries against developing countries that do not participate in global emissions reduction agreements are a central issue for current climate ch
10、ange negotiations1.Although not formally part of the post Bali road map, de facto the threat of such measures is a central part of the negotiation process. Proposals for carbon motivated tax adjustments include both import tariffs carbon tariffs and export rebates by countries with emissions reducti
11、on commitments against those without commitments. Such border adjustments by participating countries are driven by two related objectives. One is to provide competitiveness offsets for domestic producers since the added costs for domestic producers involved with domestic carbon pricing impose a comp
12、etitive disadvantage on them. The other is leakage, i.e. that the reductions in emissions in participating countries such as the EU and the US generate increases in emissions elsewhere. For countries such as China, who are heavily export-oriented, and towards manufactures, the prospect is one of a w
13、orld being decarbonized and going protectionist at the same time against a background of a continuing downturn in world trade for the financial crisis. Border tax adjustments and both their rational and effects on trade is not a new topic. Earlier debate on border tax adjustments occurred following
14、the adoption of the value added tax in the EU as a tax harmonization target in the early 1960s see Dosser 1967, Shibata 1967, Krauss & Johnson 1972. The academic literature at that time suggested that with BTAs, a change between origin and destination is simply that between a broadly based productio
15、n and consumption rate both of which are neutral, with no direct effects on trade. Neutrality of trade, production, and consumption effects would thus prevail under a tax basis change see Krauss & Johnson 1972, Whalley 1979, Grossman 1980, and Lockwood et al.1994. As recently noted by Lockwood &Whal
16、ley 2008, carbon motivated border tax adjustments differ by product and sector, and so unlike in the debate on the VAT one needs to distinguish between price level and relative price effects Neumark 1963, Hufbauer1996. With product or sector specific BTAs, relative price effects will come into play,
17、 and neutrality only holds in special cases. This paper presents numerical simulation results exploring the effects of carbon motivated border tax adjustments in large OECD economies on welfare, global and country emissions, trade flows and production1. We use a multi-region general equilibrium stru
18、cture covering the US, EU, China and a residual rest of the world. In this, countries produce commodities of varying emissions intensities using substitutable fossil fuel based oil and non-oil inputs. Unlike in conventional trade models in which there is a fixed endowment of factor inputs for each c
19、ountry, here we incorporate a supply function for energy exporting countries with increasing extraction costs. Since emissions are directly related to energy use in production, emissions levels globally are endogenously determined and can change with policy change. In our numerical simulation analys
20、is of BTAs we construct a benchmark global equilibrium data set based on data for 2006 using a number of data sources. This covers production, consumption , and trade between the four regions China,EU,US, ROW .We calibrate our model to this data set using literature based estimates of key elasticiti
21、es. Results show that BTAs effects generally are small, depending on the carbon pricing or size of emissions mitigations adopted by importing countries. This is because both using carbon emissions in production of comparable goods in importing countries produces small barriers compared to using dire
22、ct carbon content of goods and what produces real side effects is the difference in emission intensity across goods not the level of emission. Carbon border adjustments are not neutral since border tax adjustments in the carbon case are sector specific and relative price effects occur. Carbon BTAs a
23、lleviate the leakage effects as expected, but counteract the global emissions reduction effect of carbon pricing. Compared with no BTAs , BTAs reduce imports of committing countries, and increase imports by other countries. With BTAs the value of production in countries with carbon taxes increases,
24、and other countrys production in value terms decreases compared with no BTAs. The impacts generally on all countries from carbon motivated border measures are small. These reflect both the calculation of border measures discussed earlier and based on the emissions generated by comparable domestic pr
25、oduction in the importing country, rather than the carbon contained in the imported good, and the role played by the difference in emission intensity across sectors rather than levels. We use carbon emissions by domestic production in the importing country measure as this correspond to proposed bord
26、er measures in the US case. We have used the resulting calibrated model based on the date in section 3 above to simulate the impacts of carbon pricing and border tax adjustments on country welfare and global emissions, cross country trade flows and on production by country. The carbon motivated poli
27、cies include domestic carbon pricing at various assumed prices without BTAs, similar carbon pricing with BTAs , and carbon pricing with only an import tariff no export rebates. Results from comparing the base case data to model solutions generated for these border and domestic measures are presented
28、 in Tables 3-1 to 3-6. The impacts generally on all countries from carbon motivated border measures are small. These reflect both the calculation of border measures discussed earlier and based on the emissions generated by comparable domestic production in the importing country, rather than the carb
29、on contained in the imported good, and the role played by the difference in emission intensity across sectors rather than levels. We use carbon emissions by domestic production in the importing country measure as this correspond to proposed border measures in the US case. The result also confirm tha
30、t BTAs are not neutral in their impacts due to sector specificity , and hence relative price effects occurs. As for the effects of BTAs on emissions, BTAs alleviate leakage effects as expected1, which counteract the emissions reduction effects of country carbon pricing. As for trade flows, compared
31、with no BTA .BTAs reduce the imports of countries implementing measures and increase the imports of other countries. With carbon pricing and BTAs the value of production in countries with carbon taxes increases, and other country production values decrease compared no BTAs. In this paper, we present
32、 models from a numerical multi country general equilibrium model with endogenous determined energy extraction which we use to analyze the potential impacts of carbon motivated border adjustments on welfare, trade, and emissions. We calibrate our model to 2006 benchmark data, and using the calibrated
33、 parameters analyze the impacts of EU and USs carbon motivated BTAs on welfare, emissions, trade flows and productions. We compare cases of no carbon pricing, carbon pricing with BTAs, carbon pricing with only a carbon tariff in a model with the US, the EU, China and a residual rest of the world. Th
34、e most striking feature of model results is that the impacts, while of the sign predicted, are generally very small. This, in turn, reflects the relatively small barriers involved if carbon emissions in production in the importing country are used. If BTAs are uniform across industries when the carb
35、on content of the goods are same, price level effects result in neutral impact. Smallness of result thus also reflects the impact of differences in carbon emissions intensity across production rather than the level of emissions intensity. Carbon motivated BTAs are not neutral when border tax adjustm
36、ents are sector specific and our results show this, but as we emphasize produce small welfare impacts. This is in contrast to larger impacts of measures based on carbon content of commodities as discussed in Mattoo et al 2009. As for the effects of BTAs on emissions, though BTAs alleviate leakage ef
37、fects as expected, they also counteract the emissions reduction effects of carbon pricing. For trade flows, compared with no BTAs, BTAs reduce imports of the domestic country, and increase the imports of other countries. EU or US BTAs against China reduce exports in value terms by China. With BTAs, the value of production in the implementing country increases with carbon pricing, and the value of production in other countries falls compared to the case with no BTAs. The negotiation in Copenhagen in December 2009 and to follow is to set a new series of
