1、中文 3800 字， 2100 单词， 12500 英文字符 出处： Baker H K, Powell G E, Veit E T. Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend PolicyJ. Journal of Economics & Finance, 2002, 26(3):267-283. 原文 Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy Author:H.Kent Baker,GaryE.Powell,Theodore Veit One of the more puz
2、zling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a compelling and widely accepted argument for dividend irrelevance in a world with perfect capital markets. Many years later, Miller (1986) recognized that the observed preference for cash dividends is one of
3、the soft spots in the current body of theory. So why do corporations pay dividends, and why do investors care? Black (1976) once described this issue as a dividend puzzle with pieces that just dontseem to fit. To help explain this puzzle, financial economists developed various theories-signaling, ta
4、x- preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand explanations. The profusion of theories led Ang(1987) to observe, Thus, we have moved from a position of not enough good reasons to explain why dividends are paid to one of too many. Advocates of behavioral finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984)
5、, introduced concepts such as prospect theory and mental accounting to explain why investors like dividends. Statman(1997) contends that solving the dividend puzzle is impossible while ignoring the patterns of normal investor behavior. Today, corporate managers are left with a vast and often conflic
6、ting body of research about dividends. One way to enhance our understanding of why corporations pay dividends is to examine the views of managers who are responsible for making such decisions. Past fieldwork and surveys have provided important insights into how managers determine their firms dividen
7、d payouts and their views about various dividend policy issues. For example, Lintner(1956) conducted the seminal field study about the determination of dividend policy. Other researchers including Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman(1985) and Powell(1999) surveyed managers to obtain their views about divid
8、end policy. Such studies complement other types of empirical research on dividend policy. Our study examines how managers view dividend policy but uses a different data set to extend and refine the scope of previous survey research. Specifically, we survey corporate managers of Nasdaq firms that con
9、sistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy, the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for paying dividends-signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand arguments. Our motivation for conducting this study is to d
10、etermine whether the evidence simply reaffirms what we already know or provides new insights about dividend policy. The study is timely given evidence by Fama and French(2001) of the declining incidence of dividend payers, which not only reflects the changing characteristics of dividend payers but a
11、lso their lower propensity to pay dividends. In this study, we do not focus on the views about dividend policy of managers from the typical Nasdaq firm because most Nasdaq firms either pay no dividends or pay dividends on an irregular basis. Instead, we investigate the views of a subset of Nasdaq fi
12、rms, namely, those that consistently pay cash dividends. The fact that most Nasdaq firms do not pay dividends is not surprising given their characteristics. As Damodaran(1999) notes, a firms dividend policy tends to follow the firms life cycle. During the introduction and rapid expansion stages, fir
13、ms typically pay no or very low dividends. Such firms characterize a large portion of firms trading on Nasdaq. Our study differs from previous research on dividend policy in several ways. First, unlike prior fieldwork and surveys that focus only on NYSE-listed firms from a few industries, we study m
14、anagers from dividend-paying Nasdaq firms from numerous industries. Michel (1979) and Baker (1988) present evidence that dividend policies vary across industries. Our rationale for examining Nasdaq firms rests on the belief that the views of Nasdaq managers may differ from those of NYSE-listed firms
15、 because of different firm characteristics such as size. I second, we investigate several areas not examined in previous surveys such as views about historical patterns of dividends, dividend life cycle, and residual dividend policy. Finally， unlike most research that focuses on a single explanation
16、 of why companies pay dividends, we examine multiple explanations. By taking this approach we can assess the relative importance of different reasons for paying dividends based on the level of agreement or disagreement with various statements involving each explanation. The remainder of the paper is
17、 organized as follow. The next section provides a brief review of the relevant dividend literature. The third section presents our research questions and empirical predictions followed by discussion of methodology and limitations in the fourth section .The fifth section presents our survey results ,
18、and the final section provides a summary and conclusions. Previous Research In this section, we present three basic areas of dividend research.First,we discuss Lintners(1956)classic study that investigates how corporate managers determine their firms dividend policies. We also review some of the sub
19、sequent research related to Lintners findings. Second, we review studies that examine whether dividend policy affects firm value. Third； we present major research findings related to four common explanations for paying dividends-signaling, tax- preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand argument
20、s. Because the amount of research conducted in these areas is voluminous, we confine our review to a few key research findings in each area. Determining a Firms Dividend In his classic study, Lintner (1956) reports that firms have long-run target dividend payout ratios and place their attention more
21、 on dividend changes than on absolute dividend levels. He also finds that dividend changes follow shifts in long-run sustainable earnings (managers smooth earnings) and managers are hesitant to make dividend changes that may later need to be reversed. Managers also try to stabilize dividends and avo
22、id dividend cuts. Lintner developed a partial- adjustment model to describe the dividend decision process that explained 85 percent of year-to- year dividend changes. Several studies including Fama and Babiak (1968), Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985), and Baker and Powell (1999) support Lintners b
23、ehavioral model. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) conclude that .Lintners model of dividends remains the best description of the dividend setting process available. Dividend Policy and Value Much empirical research exists investigating whether dividend policy affects firm value. Graham and Dodd
24、 (1951) and Gordon (1959) argue that an increase in the dividend payout increases stock price (value) and lowers the cost of equity, but empirical support for this position is weak. Others such as Litzenberger (1979) and Ramaswamy (1982),Blume(1980),and Ang and Peterson(1985) take the opposite posit
25、ion. Their studies report that stocks with high dividend payout rations have higher required returns and therefore lower prices. Still others such as Black and Scholes (1974), Miller(1978) and Scholes (1982), Miller (1986), and Bemstein (1996) maintain that dividend policy makes no difference becaus
26、e it has no effect on either stock prices or the cost of equity. Researchers have tested these alternative theories of dividend policy but have not obtained conclusive results. Thus, the issue of which explanation of dividend policy is most correct remains unresolved. Explanations for Paying Dividen
27、ds The finance literature contains four standard explanations for paying dividends-signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand. The signaling, or asymmetric information, models for paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya(1979),John and Williams(1985),and Miller and Rock(1985),s
28、uggest that managers as insiders choose dividend payment levels and dividend increases to signal private information to investor. Managers have an incentive to signal this private information to the investment public when they believe that the current market value of their firms stock is below its i
29、ntrinsic value. The increased dividend payment serves as a credible signal when other firms that do not have favorable inside information cannot mimic the dividend increase without unduly increasing the chance of later incurring a dividend cut. Strong support exists for the signaling explanation inc
30、luding research by Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Kalay and Lowenstein (1986), Healey and Palepu (1988), and Nissim and Ziv (2001). A second explanation for paying dividends is tax-preference theory. Favorable tax treatment on capital gains (lower capital gains tax rate and de
31、ferral of capital gains tax) should cause investors to prefer no dividend-paying stocks. Tests of this tax-preference explanation for paying or not paying dividends take two forms. According to Brennans (1970) version of the capital asset pricing model, dividend-paying stocks must offer higher pre-t
32、ax returns than no dividend- paying stocks, all else equal. Brennans empirical tests, however, are mixed. Also, Black and Scholes (1974) find no evidence of this tax effect, while Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Kalay and Michaely (1993) find evidence that pre-tax returns are related to divide
33、nd yield. Other studies examine the ex-dividend date price drop. Favorable capital gains tax treatment could cause the price drop to be less than the dividend payment and cause investors to prefer no dividend-paying stocks. Empirical evidence on this matter is also inconclusive. For example, Elton and Gruber (1970) find an ex-dividend date price drop that is less than the dividend amount, but Michaely (I991) finds an ex-dividend date price drop equal to the dividend payment.
