1、1962 单词， 3840 汉字 出处： Source: Andrea Kelton,2008.“The Impact of Corporate Goverance on Financial Reporting”.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,vol.27,no.1,January,pp.62-67. 原文 : The impact of corporate governance on financial reporting The is a unique information dissemination tool in that it en
2、couragesflexible forms of presentation and communication with an unlimited numberof potential and existing shareholders. Currently, the majority of financialreporting (IFR) practices is voluntary1 and, for the most part, unregulated. Financialinformation provided on corporate web sites varies compan
3、ies and rangeswidely from required Securities and mission (SEC) filings to variousunaudited and forward-looking voluntary disclosures. In addition, IFR supportspresentaion methods that are not available in traditional, paper-based financialreporting, such as hypertext, multiple file formats (i.e. pd
4、f, text-based), andmultimedia. For example, Debreceny et al. (2002) conduct a cross-country analysisand show that firm size, listing on U.S. securities market and the level of technologyare significantly positively associated with the level of financial reporting.Ettredge et al. (2002) investigate t
5、he characteristics of IFR firms and document asignificant positive association between voluntary financial disclosures andfactors such as firm size, demand for external capital, information asymmetry, anddisclosure quality ratings. In examining the factors that affect listed panies voluntary adoptio
6、nof IFR and their extent of disclosure, find significant association-based disclosure choices and the multiclass of ownership structure, such asgovernment agencies ownership, state-owned corporations ownership, and legalperson ownership. We extend prior corporate governance and IFR research byexamin
7、ing the impact of firms corporate governance structures on the content andformat of financial disclosures of U.S. companies. There has been anincreasing call for firms to improve on their corporate governance structure andfinancial disclosures. The current study examines several corporate governance
8、mechanisms in a single model assuming different mechanisms may offset or interactwith each other. As corporate governance and disclosure are considered necessarymeasures to protect shareholders, our results provide empirical evidence to policymakers and regulators for implementing new corporate gove
9、rnance requirements andIFR guidelines. Research on IFR has produced valuable insights into the determinants panies disclosure choices. For example, Ashbaugh et al. (1999) document IFRpractices and provide preliminary evidence on why some firms disseminate financialinformation on their corporate web
10、sites, while others do not. The results indicate thatfirms engaging in IFR are larger and more profitable than those not engaging in IFR.Furthermore, firms responding to their survey indicated that disseminatinginformation to shareholders was an important reason for establishing an presence. Debrece
11、ny et al. (2002) study voluntary financial reporting in 22countries to identify the firm and environmental determinants of financialreporting. Instead of separating the financial content into required andvoluntary items, they examine both the content and presentation methods ofdisclosure. The findin
12、gs reveal that the presentation aspect of IFR is more associatedwith the level of technology and disclosure environment than the content of IFR.Their primary focus is on factors unique to the Chinese context, such as the existenceof state ownership dominance. They find that IFR is positively and sig
13、nificantlyassociated with the proportion of legal person ownership, but not with ownership bydomestic private investors, foreign investors, or the state. One characteristic of prior studies is the strong focus on quantitative aspects ofthe determinants of IFR. A number of studies examine the relatio
14、nship between IFRand factors such as firm size, profitability, leverage, etc. Only a few studiesinvestigate qualitative determinants of -based disclosures such as ownershipstructure and level of technology Another characteristic of prior studies is non use of analysts ratings obtained from the CFA I
15、nstitute (formerly AIMR).In order to explore the link between firms engagement in IFR and reputations fortheir corporate reporting practices, both Ashbaugh et al. (1999) and Ettredge et al.(2002) use a sample of firms for which analysts ratings of overall disclosure qualitywere available from the CF
16、A Institute in its 1994/95 and 1995/96 An Annual Reviewof Corporate Reporting Practices. For purposes of understanding IFR in todaysenvironment, the applicability of their findings is limited by the use of 1994/95 and1995/96 data. The impact of corporate ownership structure on financial reporting us
17、ingmeasures of managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Managerial ownershipreconciles the (potential) agency conflicts between managers and shareholders andthus reduces agency costs. Empirical studies find that managerial es the problem of managerial myopia, with high managerial ownershipa
18、ssociated with an increase in innovation and productivity of firms and, in the longterm, the value of these firms.The corporate governance mechanisms affect a firm financial reporting behavior, including both the content and presentationformat of disclosures. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976)
19、 provides aramework linking disclosure behavior to corporate governance. In theory, the impactof corporate governance on voluntary disclosures may plementaryorsubstitutive. It plementary when adoption of governance mechanismsstrengthens the internal control of the firm and makes it less likely for m
20、anagers towithhold information for their own benefits, leading to improvements in preensiveness and in the quality of financial statements. On the other hand, it issubstitutive when governance mechanisms reduce information asymmetry andopportunistic behaviors in the firm, resulting in a decrease in
21、the need for moremonitoring and voluntary disclosure. Corporate governance by shareholder rights,ownership structure, and position. Shareholder rights vary across firms.Some firms reserve little power for management and allow shareholders to quicklyand easily replace directors (by either internal or
22、 external takeover) while other firmsreserve extensive power for management and place strong restrictions onshareholders ability to replace directors. As shareholder rights decrease, the cost ofreplacing management increases for shareholders. FASB (2000, Chapter 2) describes IFR in terms of content
23、and presentation. Thefinancial content on a firms web site usually contains voluntary disclosures, such asstock quotes, press releases, financial history, etc., in addition to traditional requiredfilings, such as quarterly and annual financial reports. The presentation forms rangefrom the equivalent
24、 format of printed annual report to dynamic forms such as soundand video to enhance the display, readability, and understandability of financialinformation. IFR refers to the use of the firms web sites to disseminate informationabout the financial performance of the corporations. In this new approac
25、h, firms areusing the to market panies to shareholders and investors. In IFRfirms (that is, firms that have implemented IFR), the marketing activities no longerare limited to the products, and the firms web sites are not dedicated solely toordinary consumers. The usefulness of a firms financial repo
26、rting depends onhow easy it is to access its online financial information, the amount of thisinformation reported and whether users can download or analyze this information.Undoubtedly, IFR wille increasingly popular worldwide. The financialreporting implementation by firms creates new challenges to
27、 management in chargeof establishing the control framework and to internal auditors in charge of reviewingthe controls. The growing popularity of financial reporting will continue inmany countries and cities, after firms have realized the many advantages associatedwith it. It will be risky for the m
28、anagement and internal auditors of a firm to ignoreIFR. Indeed, in the interest of the users of financial information, management andinternal auditors have to provide their expertise to ensure that the electronic forms ofreporting produce quality financial information. A firms corporate governance m
29、echanisms influence financial reportingbehavior, including both the content and presentation format of disclosures. financial reporting provides an efficient means panies to communications with investors, decrease costs associated with distributing hard-copyinformation, and increase the frequency of
30、 information disclosures. The alsoprovides more flexibility as to the type of information disclosed to investors and thepresentation format of the disclosures. The number of individual investors that use to research investment opportunities and conduct stock trades online isconstantly growing , whic
31、h makes IFR an important area of academic research. Currently, disclosure on the is for the most part voluntary； consequently,there are limited assurances as to the quality of the information reported on corporateweb sites . The Financial Accounting Standards Boards Business Reporting ResearchProjec
32、t (2000) noted concerns with the quality of web financial information: “withincreased timeliness there is the potential for decreased reliability” Regulators havealso expressed concern over the format in which information is displayed on the web:“pany may inadvertently give visitors the impression t
33、hat all informationprovided in other web sites to which panys web site is linked is afforded thesame level of accuracy and reliability” We find that firms with weak shareholderrights are more likely to use the to disseminate information to existing andpotential investors. Interestingly, firms with w
34、eak shareholder rights are also morelikely to provide specific information regarding corporate governance on their websites. A possible explanation is that managers provide additional disclosures toshareholders in response to the increase in agency costs that result from theexistence of weak shareho
35、lder rights. In addition, we find that firms with a greaterpercentage of independent directors are more likely to engage in IFR. recent researchthat has shown that corporate disclosure increases with board independence. Boardindependence is an important element in monitoring the corporate ounting pr
36、ocess and affecting the reliability of financial reports. A high percentageof independent directors on the board enhances the monitoring of managerialopportunism and reduces managements chance of withholding information.Empirical evidence suggests that corporate disclosure increases with boardindepe
37、ndence. Beasley (1996) finds that the proportion of independent directors onthe board is positively related to the boards ability to influence disclosure decisions.We find that board independence also increases disclosure using a voluntarydissemination tool-the . Importantly, we also find a positive
38、 associationbetween board independence and corporate governance disclosures. Our resultssuggest that board independence is effective in increasing voluntary corporatedisclosures.Eng and Mak (2003) find that increased presence of outside directors isassociated with reduced disclosure using a sample o
39、f Singapore firms, suggesting thatexternal directors in Singapore play a substitute-monitoring role to disclosure ratherthan plementary-monitoring role. Outside directors may be elected by blockholders and have direct access to acquire information, thus demand less disclosure. Traditional accounting measures do not fully capture the value of firms with highgrowth prospects and high intangibles. Therefore, high growth firms attempt tomitigate information
