1、中文 4540 字， 2485 单词 外文文献翻译 原文： Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis Abstract Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an
2、impact on subsequent firm behavior - often resulting in lower levels of pollution - little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome
3、a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the eff
4、ect of two sources of pollution -only one of which is subject to information disclosure 1. Introduction Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation mandatory disclosure of information. Perhaps the best-known example is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI
5、) program in the U.S., whereby firms are required to disclose legally emitted chemical releases. TRI has brought about significant reductions in chemical emissions.For example, total on-site and off-site releases of toxic emissions are reportedly down by 45.5% between 1988 and 1999 (EPA, 2001: Table
6、 E-6). Other disclosure programs have focused on drinking water safety and risk management plans for chemical releases.1 Similar programs have been instituted in other countries and contexts, including India, Indonesia, Philippines,Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (Afsah, Laplante and Wheeler, 1996). The
7、 mechanisms by which information disclosure programs lead to reductions in pollution are varied and still being studied (see e.g., Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000； and Konar and Cohen, 2000). Depending on the context, consumers may decide to reduce or withdraw from consuming the product of a firm th
8、at is a high polluter. Investors may shun the stock of firms that are found to be high polluters either through socially active investment decisions or by an assessment that highly polluting firms will ultimately be less profitable. Victims2 may bring about pressure on polluting firms to reduce emis
9、sions by picketing, lobbying local zoning boards for more stringent restrictions, pressuring government enforcement agencies to scrutinize large polluters more carefully, or calling for new regulations. They might also sue for damages under various theories of tort law. Regardless of the mechanism,
10、information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior. Tietenberg (1998) has characterized information disclosure as being the third wave of environmental regulation following the original command and control approach and the subsequent introduction of market-based inc
11、entives such as emission fees and marketable permits. Information disclosure programs have been widely touted by policymakers for numerous reasons. One obvious benefit is the fact that information disclosure has been found to result in significant improvements in environmental quality. In addition,
12、however, information disclosure programs satisfy the democratic belief that the public has a right to know that they might be affected by third party pollution. On a more practical level, information disclosure programs are generally thought to cost the government far less than drafting and implemen
13、ting industry wide regulations. As a result of these presumed benefits, information disclosure programs might also be politically more feasible than new coercive regulations. Despite these presumed benefits, information disclosure programs are not free. As with any government policy, they should be
14、subject to the scrutiny of a cost-benefit analysis. The benefits are obvious improvements in the environment that are presumably valued by some members of society. On the cost side, information disclosure requires some amount of government rule-making along with data collection, verification, and di
15、ssemination. Firms also incur the costs of collecting and disseminating data and presumably incur the costs of any voluntary pollution reduction. Consumer groups and other non-governmental groups that exert pressure on polluting firms to reduce their emissions also incur costs the cost of collective
16、 action, lobbying, litigation, etc. These costs substitute to some extent for the savings from reduced government monitoring and enforcement. Finally, there is another potential cost associated with information disclosure programs the opportunity cost of foregone pollution reduction benefits outside
17、 the industry/pollutant subject to information disclosure. That is, by placing attention on one form of pollution, a mandatory disclosure program might divert the attention and limited resources of consumer, community, and environmental groups away from other forms of pollution that might be worse t
18、han and/or less expensive to control than the pollutant subject to information disclosure regulation. Worse yet, it is possible that information disclosure programs may result in no net benefit in environmental quality and even a worsening to the extent that firms substitute one form of pollution fo
19、r another. To date, virtually all of the literature on information disclosure has been empirical either demonstrating the aggregate effect of an information disclosure program on emissions or attempting to characterize the mechanisms by which information disclosure leads to these emission reductions
20、. Examples include Hamilton (1995), Konar and Cohen (1997 and 2000), Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova (1998), and Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000). In spite of this growing literature on information disclosure, no attempt has been made to theoretically analyze. 2. Bargaining between polluter and victim:
21、The impact of victims ignorance of his damage The problem we are considering is similar to but not typical of a Coasean bargaining model with asymmetric information (see Coase, 1960； and Huber and Wirl, 1998). In a standard asymmetric information problem, the victim knows the damage caused by pollution, but does notknow the cost of pollution control. However, in this
