1、中文 3850 字， 2130 单词 出处： Richard Brown. Auditing And Pubic AdministrationJ. Interal Auditor, 2010,16:60-65. 外文文献翻译 原文 : Auditing And Administration Schools of public administration over the years have given attention bordering on idol worship to who gets what, when, and how. In some ways that worship
2、is understandable. Public budgeting and the appropriations process are at the heart of policy and decision making in American government. Schools and programs in public administration teach budgeting under a variety of titles. When contemplating career opportunities, their students learn that budget
3、ing is where the action is. Regrettably, little attention has been given in American public administration to issues of accountability how funds are used； how their use is reported to the public； and what impact funding has had. Auditing raises these questions and provides answers. But auditing is l
4、ittle known in public administration circles and, with few exceptions, public administration does not teach auditing. The concept of financial, efficiency, and effectiveness accountability is almost foreign to public administration students and to public managers. The current interest in program eva
5、luation by executive branch agencies does not address the deeper and more lasting issues: how are public sector managers to report to legislators on the use of public resources? Can this be accomplished as an integral part of the budget process? Public administration programs must explore answers to
6、 these questions. since mid-1990s public executive agencies in the United States have dramatically expanded evaluation activities. This expansion has been marked by theestablishment of large planning and evaluation staffs in cabinet level departments of the federal government, the publication of num
7、erous books on the topic, the appearance of journals devoted exclusively to evaluation, and the introduction of evaluation courses and fields of concentration at major universities Nevertheless, the considerable growth and change of formal post audit and evaluation activities at the state legislativ
8、e level has gone largely unnoticed. The U.S. General Accounting Office GAO, created in 1921, has received somewhat more attention. However, its important role as a congressional agency is still not well understood. State legislatures evaluate existing government programs departments require authoriz
9、ation for new programs. But the publication of formal performance audit reports has become a widespread phenomenon only in the1970s. The number of performance-type reports sent to the Legislative Program Evaluation Section LPES Clearinghouse at the Eagleton Institute of Politics ofRutgers University
10、 has grown from five reports published in 1971 by one New York State agency to 134 reports published by state legislative audit agencies in 20 states in 1977. The growth of performance audit reports reflects the growth of the organizations which produce them. The Council of State Governments reporte
11、d that in 1998 there were only five states where sole post audit responsibilities rested with a legislative auditor. By the mid-1970s the number had grown to 25 and in others the legislatures shared post audit responsibility with executive branch agencies. By the 1977-78 biennium 44 states had at le
12、ast one legislative staff agency with primary responsibility for the post audit function. Regrettably, little attention has been given in American public administration to issues of accountability?how funds are used； how their use is reported to the public； and what impact funding has had. There are
13、 two major structural approaches to performance auditing in state legislatures. One places the performance auditing capacity in the office of the legislative auditor. In most cases the legislative auditor and his staff are responsible to a legislative audit committee which includes members of both c
14、hambers and political parties. Traditionally, legislative auditors confined their activities to financial and compliance audits. Recently, auditors have increased efforts to assess not only efficiency but also the effectiveness of state agencies and programs. In 1967, for example, the Montana Office
15、 of the Legislative Auditor placed the performance auditing capacity in the legislative auditors office. Before 1973, however, the office produced only financial-compliance audits. Since then the auditor has issued performance audits covering topics such as workmens compensation, the state motor veh
16、icle pool, and milk price regulations. In addition, eight sunset reviews have been carried out, covering state regulatory boards such as those on accountants, plumbers, and banks. Other states which employ the post audit approach include California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, and Tennessee
17、 The establishment of a special purpose legislative audit or evaluation committee with its own professional staff is a second approach to building a performance audit capacity. These staffs generally conduct performance reviews, while the more traditional audit work is left to the states audit agenc
18、ies. In all cases these committees include members of both political parties. The Connecticut Program Review and Investigations Committee, established in 1972, is an example of the special purpose committee approach. Originally limited strictly to performance evaluations, the committee received stat
19、utory power in 2001 conduct investigations authorized by legislative resolution. In 1999 the legislature gave the committee the responsibility to conduct sunset reviews. The committee, with a staff ofabout 10, has published 12 program evaluations on topics such as vocational education, medicaid, and
20、 juvenile corrections. It also has conducted investigations of the Department of Environmental Protection and civil rights compliance by several departments. Other states using this structural approach include Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Virginia, and Washington. Despite the different stru
21、ctures for performance audit efforts, staff directors agree on the need to recruit staff without regard to political affiliation. Most staffs include fewer than 15 professional employees. Almost all agencies try to hire people with varied educational backgrounds. The most prevalent academic discipli
22、nes include business and public administration, and the social sciences. A few staffs include lawyers, behavioral and natural scientists, and statisticians. Staff directors believe that basic research competence, analytical ability, and oral and written communication skills are more important than b
23、ackgrounds in specific fields. In contrast, individuals with strong backgrounds in accounting and finance continue to perform financial audits. Most state legislative audit staffs follow the general guidelines set down in the GAOs 1972 Yellow Book, Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations,
24、Programs, Activities, and Functions. The Yellow Book covers standards for audit work such as staff qualifications, planning, supervision, evidence, reporting, and review . One major difference among the staffs is the degree to which legislators participate in various stages of the projects. In most
25、states legislators formally chose the topics for study while the staff always designs the audit reviews and collects the data. In a few states legislators participate by holding legislative hearings, visiting program sites, or in one state even assisting in interviews. Staff personnel analyze the da
26、ta, reach conclusions, and draft audit reports. In almost all states the staff drafts recommendations. Legislators normally participate in the recommendations process through adopting, modifying, or rejecting them. Adoption by legislators can mean merely rubberstamping staff recommendations or activ
27、ely debating and altering those recommendations. Most legislative audit agencies send a copy of completed final reports for comment to the executive branch agency under review. These comments are published as part of the reports. Many post audit agencies conduct regular report flow-up activities Ann
28、ual staff reports note the extent of progress in implementing report recommendations by the legislature and executive branch. State legislative auditors are placing renewed emphasis on the specific uses made of the reports by both legislative and executive officials. the considerable growth and chan
29、ge of formal post audit and evaluation activities at the state legislative level has gone largely unnoticed. Executive agency officials do not always view the process this way. They fall into the ready trap that if only more money were available more good would result. If left to themselves, it seem
30、s likely that public works and highway departments would surely pave the whole nation with concrete. This type of agency thinking gave birth to a wildlife flyway and feeding system proposed for varied species of fowl as they crossed through the Tennessee Valley . When presented to the Board of Direc
31、tors of the Tennessee ValleyAuthority, officials estimated that 100,000 birds, including innumerable ducks, could be expected to use the system. When the board chairman discovered the cost would be $100,000, he exclaimed: My God, that a buck a duck! No one knows if feeding a duck on its way to winte
32、ring in better weather is worth a dollar, but it is not a bad way to think about the flyway and feeding system program. Overly zealous quest for audit implementation, however, can lead auditors to avoid important areas, where either controversy or disinterest could result in a lack of action on staf
33、f recommendations. This would impair, rather than assist, legislators in their oversight responsibilities. The easiest way to improve an audit implementation score is to learn what key officials want and then put it in an audit report. No one advocates that strategy. Simply providing objective infor
34、mation for consideration in future decisions is a crucial task of performance audit-evaluation. Many audit-evaluations bring to the attention of key officials potential problems before they become actual and costly ones. A Kansas audit on water use policies recommended ways to improve existing water
35、 laws and integrate current information about water use for more effective management of current water resources. The audit has served as a study document for legislative hearings and regionalconferences on water use, and its findings and recommendations should enable planners to make better decisio
36、ns on water supply years from now. Many important effects of the audit process are intangible and thus not readily susceptible to measurement. The labels watch dog and bird dog did not come to audit agencies by accident. Audits of government agencies have long been considered valuable because they a
37、re believed to help minimize fraud, waste, mismanagement, and unrealistic budget requests. Like a regular medical examination, this preventive effect is valuable but difficult to measure in dollars. There are instances of officials resigning after completion of an audit in protest, in anger, or in sad recognition of the audits accuracy. Such resignations-like that following publication of the South
