1、中文 3300 字， 1950 单词 Source: David M. walker. Accounting Profession: Oversight, Auditor Independence,and Financial Reporting Issues N.GAO-02-742R Accounting ProfessionIssues,2002:1-12. 外文文献翻译 原文 : Accounting Profession: Oversight, Auditor Independence, andFinancial Reporting Issues This letter respond
2、s to your recent request that we provide our views regardingwhat steps the Congress should consider taking to strengthen oversight of ounting profession, auditor independence, and selected financial reporting matters.The sudden and largely unexpected bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation (Enron) andot
3、her large corporations financial reporting restatements have raised questions aboutthe soundness of the current self-regulatory and financial reporting systems anresulted in substantial losses to employees, shareholders, and other investors. Theseevents have also raised a range of questions regardin
4、g how such dramatic andunexpected events can happen and the role and capacities of various key playersunder the existing systems. The issues surrounding the accounting professions current self-regulatory systemfor auditors involves many players in a fragmented system that is not well coordinated,inv
5、olves certain conflicts of interest, lacks munication, has a fundingmechanism that is dependent upon voluntary contributions from the accountingprofession, and has a discipline system that is largely perceived as being ineffective.(Enclosure 1 serves to illustrate plexity of the current system of re
6、gulation andoversight and the stakeholders who rely on the system.) Simply stated, the current self-regulatory system is broken and oversight of the selfregulatory system by the Securities and mission (SEC) has not beeneffective in addressing these issues to adequately protect the public interest. A
7、s result, given the important role that independent auditor play and various inherentproblems in the current self-regulatory system, direct government intervention isneeded to statutorily create a new body to oversee the accounting professionsresponsibilities for auditing panies. This step is necess
8、ary in order toincrease the effectiveness of the audit process and to rebuild public confidence. Thenew body should be independent of the accounting profession, have significantstandards-setting, oversight, and disciplinary authority, be adequately resourced toPage 2 GAO-02-742R Accounting Professio
9、n Issues fulfill its responsibilities, andhave sufficient operating flexibility to attract and retain quality leadership andsupporting staff. On the other hand, the concerns relating to the timeliness, relevancy andtransparency of the financial reporting model may be best addressed through the SECwo
10、rking more closely with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),assuring that the FASB has an adequate and independent source of funding for itsoperations, and reporting periodically to the Congress in connection with certainFASB matters. If such an approach is not essful in achieving the ex
11、pectedimprovements in the financial reporting model in a timely and effective manner, thegovernment can then take further action. The areas of oversight of the accounting profession, auditor independence, andfinancial reporting are important on their own, but they also represent interrelatedkeystone
12、s to protecting the publics interest. Failure in any of these areas can place astrain on the entire system. Consequently, potential actions should be guided by thefundamental principles of having the right incentives for the key parties to do the right thing, adequate transparency to provide reasona
13、ble assurance that the right thing willbe done, and full accountability if the right thing is not done. These three fundamentalprinciples represent a system of controls that should operate in conjunction with apolicy of placing special attention on areas of greatest risk. NEW BODY NEEDED TO REGULATE
14、 AND OVERSEE THE ACCOUNTINGPROFESSION Enrons failure and a variety of other recent events have brought a direct focus onthe ineffectiveness of the current system of regulation and oversight of the accountingprofession. Independent auditors have a key role to play in protecting shareholdersand the pu
15、blics interest in our capital market system. They hold a public trust andtheir actions or inactions can have significant implications on investors, creditors andother users of financial reports. In this regard, auditors must place additional emphasison whether financial statements are “fairly presen
16、ted in all material respects” inaddition to their traditional emphasis on whether such financial statements areprepared “in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.” Fairpresentation requires providing reasonable assurance that major value and riskelements are appropriately reflecte
17、d in the financial statements and related notes in anunderstandable fashion. It also requires employing an “economic substance” versus“transaction form” approach to important accounting and reporting issues. Many proposals are before the Congress to establish a new body to regulate andoroversee acco
18、unting firms that audit panies. In our view, the Congressshould consider the following key factors or criteria in establishing this new body,each of which is critical to its likely effectiveness. The new body should have direct responsibility and authority for certain criticalfunctions in connection
19、 with public accounting firms and their members who panies. These include: establishing professional standards (independence standards； quality controlstandards, auditing standards, and attestation standards). The new body should beauthorized to issue professional standards. In that respect, the new
20、 body should alsobe authorized to affirmatively adopt, at its discretion, professional standards, in wholeor in part, promulgated by another standard-setting body. In the area of new standards,the new body may choose to require auditor reporting on the effectiveness of internalcontrol over financial
21、 reporting in connection with audits of panies, whichis currently not required under existing auditing standards. It may also decide not toaffirmatively adopt a standard developed by another standard-setting body but insteadissue a modified version of the standard. monitoring public accounting firms
22、 pliance with applicable professionalstandards. For efficiency, except for quality reviews of the largest firms and thosefirms in which the nature of the audits they perform pose a higher level of risk asdetermined by the new body, the new body should be authorized to use contractors ounting firms t
23、o perform quality reviews in accordance with standards andprocesses set by the new body. However, the new body should have final approvalauthority in connection with any quality review engagements performed by anycontractors or accounting firms. investigating and disciplining public accounting firms
24、 andor individual auditors ofpublic accounting firms who do ply with applicable professional standards.Investigations and disciplinary actions of the new body should be in addition toexisting investigatory and disciplinary authority that already exists with the SEC andstate boards of accountancy. es
25、tablishing various auditor rotation requirements for key pany auditengagement personnel (i.e., primary and second partners, and engagement managers).Related to this function, we believe the new body should undertake a study and reportto the Congress on the pros and cons of any mandatory rotation of
26、accounting firmsthat audit panies before taking any action with regard to establishingrequirements for any mandatory rotation of accounting firms. Funding for the New Body The new body should have independent sources of funding by virtue of mandatory,not voluntary, payments. Public accounting firms
27、and audit partners that auditfinancial statements, reports, or other documents of panies that arerequired to be filed with the SEC should be required to register with the new body.The new body should have the authority to set annual registration fees and fees forservices such as peer reviews of publ
28、ic accounting firms. The fees should be set torecover full costs and sustain the operations of the new body. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE For over 70 years, the public accounting profession, through its independent auditfunction, has played a critical role in enhancing a financial reporting process that has
29、supported the effective functioning of our domestic capital markets, which are widelyviewed as the best in the world. The publics confidence in the reliability of issuersfinancial statements, which relies in large part on the role of independent auditors,serves to encourage investment in securities
30、issued by panies. This senseof confidence depends on reasonable investors perceiving auditors as independentexpert professionals who have neither mutual, nor conflicts of, interests in connectionwith the entities they are auditing. Accordingly, investors and other users expectauditors to bring to th
31、e financial reporting process integrity, independence, objectivity,and petence, and to prevent the issuance of misleading financialstatements. Enrons failure and certain other recent events have raised questions concerningwhether auditors are living up to the expectations of the investing public； ho
32、wever,similar questions have been raised over a number of years due to significantrestatements of financial statements and certain unexpected and costly businessfailures, such as the savings and loan crisis. Issues debated over the years continue tofocus on auditor independence concerns and the audi
33、tors role and responsibilities.Public accounting firms providing nonaudit services to their audit client is one of theissues that has again surfaced by Enrons failure and the large amount of annual feescollected by Enrons independent auditor for nonaudit services. Auditors have the capability of per
34、forming a range of valuable services for theirclients, and providing certain nonaudit services can ultimately be beneficial toinvestors and other interested parties. However, in some circumstances, it is notappropriate for auditors to perform both audit and certain nonaudit services for thesame clie
35、nt. In these circumstances, the auditor, the client, or both will have to make achoice as to which of these services the auditor will provide. These concepts, whichwe strongly believe are in the publics interest, are reflected in the revisions to auditorindependence requirements for government audit
36、s, which GAO recently issued as partof Government Auditing Standards. The new independence standard has gone throughan extensive deliberative process over several years, including extensive ments and input from my Advisory Council on Government Auditing Standards.The standard, among other things, to
37、ughens the rules associated with providingnonaudit services and includes a principle-based approach to addressing this issue,supplemented with certain safeguards. The two overarching principles in thestandard for nonaudit services are that: auditors should not perform management functions or make management decisions.
