1、中文 2940 字， 1990 单词 外文文献翻译 原文： Factors influencing a firms accounting policy decisions when tax accounting and financial accounting coincide 1. Introduction A firms accounting policy decisions are made on the basis of the economic consequences of the alternative policies. According to Holthausen and
2、Leftwich, a firms reporting policy choice has economic consequences when changes in the rules used to calculate accounting numbers alter the distribution of a firms cash flows, or the wealth of parties who use those numbers for contracting or decision making. In addition to their use in the contract
3、ing agreements between the various parties of a firm, reported accounting fi the level of a companys tax liability . This is the case, provided that the same accounting treatment is used for financial reporting and tax purposes alike. Tax planning can result in an increase in the firms tax saving an
4、d consequently it can have a positive effect on a firms cash flows .As a consequence, assuming rationality and efficient capital markets, an accounting policy that minimizes taxable ncome should be preferred ；However, given that the reduction of a firms tax liability is usually accompanied by a corr
5、esponding decrease in its reported income, tax planning, under certain circumstances, can have serious implications for various parties involved with a firm. The unfavorable picture of the firms financial position that may emerge as a result of a decrease in the level of reported figures, can have s
6、erious consequences with regard to firms ability to meet its contractual and regulatory obligations, while shareholders and managers personal wealth may be affected as well. These implications have been designated as the non-tax costs-or financial reporting costs-of a tax reducing policy. Each party
7、 of a firm is supposed to trade-off the tax benefits of an accounting choice, against the ensuing non-tax costs. The outcome of this trade-off is supposed to influence a firms accounting policy decisions. The aim of this study is to provide an understanding of the factors that influence the accounti
8、ng-policy decisions of firms operating in an accounting environment in which tax rules are used for financial reporting purposes. For this purpose, the accounting environment of Greece has been chosen. In Greece, tax accounting and financial accounting coincide and it is expected that tax considerat
9、ions will influence managements accounting policy decisions. This study investigates whether non-tax considerations can influence firms accounting-policy decisions and prompts them to deviate from a tax-reducing policy. The structural characteristics of the broader economic and business environment
10、of Greece affect the significance of the non-tax costs relating to a particular accounting policy decision. The similarities of the Greek accounting and business environment with that of other European and non-European countries means that the findings of this study may be of some help in understand
11、ing the accounting policies of firms operating in other countries. 1. Factors giving rise to significant non-tax costs The significance of tax benefits and non-tax costs are conditional upon certain characteristics of a firm. A firms ownership structure has been hypothesized to be associated with th
12、e magnitude of the non-tax costs that can be generated from tax-minimizing strategy. The management of firms characterized by a diffuse downership and a separation between management and ownership might facesignificant non-tax costs. The extensive use of accounting-basedcontracts in these firms can
13、induce managers to assign a great deal of importance to the level of reported income. Furthermore, managers perceptions regarding the impact that accounting figures have on their evaluation by the external users of accounts may make them particularly concerned about the level of reported profits. On
14、 the other hand, for those firms in which ownership is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of shareholders who actively control the firms management, the necessity for using a bonus scheme is reduced, while managers can communicate any information directly to shareholders without
15、having to use published financial statements (Klassen, 1997). Thus, non-tax costs may be of lesser importance and firms are expected to pursue a more aggressive tax-reducing policy. The findings of empirical research seem to support the argument that in comparison to the widely-held firms, the close
16、ly-held ones are less concerned about the non-tax consequences of their accounting choices, and they are more inclined to implement a tax-reducing strategy (Smith, 1976； Dhaliwal et al., 1982； Hunt, 1986； Penno and Simon, 1986； Niehaus, 1989； Scholes and Wolfson, 1992； Wolfson, 1993；Cloyd et al., 19
17、96； Klassen, 1997). In Greece, as in many European countries (e.g. France, Italy), the ownership-structure of the majority of the firms is characterized by a high level of concentration (Nobes and Parker, 2000). In most cases the owners are actively involved in their companies administration, occupy
18、ing important posts within the organizational structure of their firms (OECD, 1995； Makridakis et al., 1997； Sykianakis, 2004). Firms owners can directly and effectively monitor and motivate their subordinate managers and they do not need to employ incentive schemes. Further, managers in such firms
19、can communicate information regarding their performance directly to their superior owner-managers without having to rely upon financial statements. Under these circumstances, it is argued that the ownership-structure of most Greek firms contributes to the adoption of an aggressive tax-reducing strat
20、egy, since their ownership status does not appear to generate significant non-tax costs. The use of accounting figures in a firms negotiations with the providers of credit capital, and the inclusion of accounting numbers-based terms in the debt agreements, suggest that a particular accounting choice
21、 can generate important non-tax costs (Wolfson,1993). Lower reported profit figures may adversely influence the bankscredit decisions, and thus raise the cost of capital for the firm (Deakin, 1979).Furthermore, the violation of the terms of loan agreements places a firm in technical default, a situa
22、tion that can have particularly adverse consequences for a firm(Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995). In order to reduce the likelihood that these events will occur, firms are more likely to adopt an income-increasing accounting policy. However, such a decision is most likely to be associated with impo
23、rtant tax costs, since the resulting increase in the reported income is likely to follow an increase in taxable income (Maydew, 1997). The financial leverage of a firm is used as a proxy for the firms need for debt capital, and its proximity to violating debt covenants (Christie,1990). The more leve
24、raged firms are expected to face higher non-tax costs, and thus they are more likely to select the income increasing choice. Findings of empirical research suggest that the more leveraged firms do trade-off tax benefits against non-tax costs. Banks are the main providers of funds for Greek companies
25、. The dominant role of bank credit in the financing of business enterprises is a distinct characteristic not only of the Greek business environment, but also of many other European countries(e.g. France, Germany). Banks have developed a close relationship with many companies, while in certain cases
26、they own part of the firms share capital. Thus, banks in many instances may directly obtain any relevant financial information, without having to rely upon publicly disclosed data. It has been argued that the fact that financial accounting in many European countries has been dominated by tax regulat
27、ions and has never developed into a genuinely independent branch of accounting can be partially attributed to the fact that when: . . . even listed companies in continental countries are dominated by banks, governments or families, the need for published information is less clear . Furthermore, in G
28、reece the large state-controlled banks are not supposed to always base their credit decisions on entirely objective and rational financial criteria (OECD,1995； Papas, 1993； Makridakis et al., 1997). Consequently, the importance of public accounting information may further diminish. Moreover, a conse
29、quence of the close relationship between banks and companies is such that a violation of a debt covenant may not have serious consequences for a firm. Within this context, a tax-reducing strategy is not likely to give rise to important non-tax costs. Yet, some significant non-tax costs can still ari
30、se. Even if economic criteria do not always play a crucial role in banks credit decisions, most companies will be required to meet some official criteria based on accounting numbers when making a loan application. If the applying firm has a strong link with a particular bank, one cannot rule out the
31、 possibility that the banks officials will tolerate some “adjusting” of accounting figures in order to allow the firm to comply with the relevant terms. Thus, a tendency of a firm to influence accounting figures through the choice of an appropriate accounting policy may be reinforced.Furthermore, it
32、 cannot be assumed that all firms enjoy the privilege of having a close relationship with a bank. As a consequence, financial accounting considerations can still influence a firms accounting-policy decisions. Within a framework of efficiently functioning capital markets, shareholders of public (list
33、ed) firms would prefer higher cash flows, since that would result in higher share prices. Consequently, higher tax-savings would be preferred. This could have been the case for Greek public firms, since the majority of them are owner-controlled firms and stockholdings constitute a substantial propor
34、tion of the personal wealth of the owner-managers. Yet, the perceived influence that accounting figures may have on the firms share price can enhance the importance assigned to financial reporting figures. A firms management might believe that reported figures have a considerable impact on its share
35、 price. This impact maybe greater than that resulting from a possible change in the level of firms tax-liability.In this case, it is possible that a firms management will aim to report higher figures in order to influence its share price, despite a corresponding increase in tax costs. Thus, public f
36、irms are more likely, compared to the private (non-listed) ones, to prefer the income increasing option. The fact that the owner-managers are prepared to forego tax benefits in order to achieve higher reported earnings, does not imply that they do not aim towards the maximization of a firms value, and as a consequence of their wealth. The owners-managers believe that firms value is a function of the firms accounting profits. As Cloyd et al. put it：
