1、中文 2825字 1868单词 外文文献： Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance Dimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki 1 Abstract： This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-para
2、metric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry s best practice frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We su
3、mmarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across
4、different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance. Firm performa
5、nce, capital structure and ownership Conflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as those between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932； Jensen and Meckling, 1976； Shleifer and Vishny, 1
6、986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (see for example, Morck et al., 1988； McConnell and Servaes, 1990； Himmelberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure remains largely unexplored. On the other
7、hand, a voluminous literature is devoted to capital structure and its effects on corporate performance see the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001). An emerging consensus that comes out of the corporate governance literature (see Mahrt-Smith, 2005) is that the interactions between cap
8、ital structure and ownership structure impact on firm values. Yet theoretical arguments alone cannot unequivocally predict these relationships (see Morck et al., 1988) and the empirical evidence that we have often appears to be contradictory. In part these conflicting results arise from difficulties
9、 empirical researchers face in obtaining direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs that are not confounded by factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). In the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature in this area focusing on th
10、e main hypotheses of interest for this study. Firm performance and capital structure The agency cost theory is premised on the idea that the interests of the company s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance
11、 of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. These conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take 1 来源： Journal of Banking & Finance , 2010
12、 (34) : 621 632，本文翻译的是第二部分 excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies. This leads us to Jensen s (1986) “ free cash flow theory” where as stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323) “ the problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capi
13、tal or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.” Thus high debt ratios may be used as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash flows to service debt (Jensen, 1986). In these situati
14、ons, debt will have a positive effect on the value of the firm. Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“ underinvestment” or “ debt overhang
15、” problem. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment problem. The model predicts that debt c
16、an have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance and presumably both effects are present in all firms. We allow for the presence of both effects in the empirical specification of the agency cost model. However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize thi
17、s in terms of our first testable hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firms performance. Reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure But firm performance
18、may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a b
19、etter position to substitute equity for debt in their capital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choose higher leverage ratios because higher efficiency is expected to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In essence, the efficiency-risk
20、hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all else equal, enable firms to fine tune their optimal capital structure. It is also possible that firms which expect to sustain high efficiency rates into the future will choose lower debt to e
21、quity ratios in an attempt to guard the economic rents or franchise value generated by these efficiencies from the threat of liquidation (see Demsetz, 1973； Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Thus in addition to a equity for debt substitution effect, the relationship between efficiency and capit
22、al structure may also be characterized by the presence of an income effect. Under the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) more efficient firms tend to hold extra equity capital and therefore, all else equal, choose lower leverage ratios to protect their future income or franchise value. Thus the effici
23、ency-risk hypothesis (H2) and the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) yield opposite predictions regarding the likely effects of firm efficiency on the choice of capital structure. Although we cannot identify the separate substitution and income effects our empirical analysis is able to determine which
24、 effect dominates the other across the spectrum of different capital structure choices. Ownership structure and the agency costs of debt and equity. The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance dates back to Berle and Means (1932) who argued that widely held corporations in the
25、US, in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of insiders tend to underperform. Following from this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop more formally the classical owner-manager agency problem. They advocate that managerial share-own
26、ership may reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders wealth or to engage in other sub-optimal activities and thus helps in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders which in turn lowers agency costs. Along similar lines, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show t
27、hat large external equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives to monitor and discipline management. In contrast Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in insider share-ownership stakes may also be associated with adverse entrenchment effe
28、cts that can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism at the expense of outside investors. Whether firm value would be maximized in the presence of large controlling shareholders depends on the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002； Villalonga and Amit, 2006； Dow and McGuire, 2009). Sever
29、al studies document either a direct (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986； Claessens et al., 2002； Hu and Zhou, 2008) or a non-monotonic (e.g., Morck et al., 1988； McConnell and Servaes, 1995； Davies et al., 2005) relationship between ownership structure and firm performance while others (e.g., Demsetz a
30、nd Lehn, 1985； Himmelberg et al., 1999； Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) find no relation between ownership concentration and firm performance. Family firms are a special class of large shareholders with unique incentive structures. For example, concerns over family and business reputation and firm sur
31、vival would tend to mitigate the agency costs of outside debt and outside equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985； Anderson et al., 2003) although controlling family shareholders may still expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002； Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Several studies (e.g., Anderson a
32、nd Reeb, 2003a； Villalonga and Amit, 2006； Maury, 2006； King and Santor, 2008) report that family firms especially those with large personal owners tend to outperform non-family firms. In addition, the empirical findings of Maury (2006) suggest that large controlling family ownership in Western Euro
33、pe appears to benefit rather than harm minority shareholders. Thus we expect that the net effect of family ownership on firm performance will be positive. Large institutional investors may not, on the other hand, have incentives to monitor management (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and they may even coe
34、rce with management (McConnell and Servaes, 1990； Claessens et al., 2002； Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations where control by large equity
35、 holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak investor protection and less developed capital markets where they also classify Continental Europe. We summarize the contrasting ownership effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment on firm performance in terms of two
36、competing hypotheses. Under the convergence-of-interest hypothesis (H3) more concentrated ownership should have a positive effect on firm performance. And under the ownership entrenchment hypothesis (H3a) the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is expected to be negative. The presence of ownership entrenchment and incentive alignment effects also has implications for the firm s capital structure choice. We assess these effects empirically. As external blockholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial opportunism they may prefer to use debt
