1、中文 2450 字 1980 单词 外文文献翻译译文 一、 外文原文 原文 ： Financial accounting information and corporate governance systems Abstract We posit that limited transparency of firms operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. The accounting information system
2、 is one part of the company governs, which has a close relation with the corporate governance. The accounting information system has a reaction to the corporate governance. And the quality of the accounting information would be influenced by the corporate governance .In current society, the phenomen
3、on that accounting information distortion keeps appeared all the time. However,this reasonable arrangements wouldnt be carried out effectually because the sanction for the unit principal is not enough and its range is dwindled. And therefore,this paper suggests that Accounting Law and Criminal Law s
4、hould be revised,examinations on the quality of accounting information should be strengthened and the socially informing system should be set up. It is necessary to perfect corporate governance in order to make the quality of the accounting information better in this article； I explain what the corp
5、orate governance and the quality of accounting information are present now. And then I will try to analysis the relationship between the deficiency of corporate governance and the accounting information quality, the influence that the accounting information quality 。 Introduction In the U.S. and in
6、other economies with strong legal protection of outside shareholders rights, transparency of a firms operations and activities to outside investors disciplines managers to act in shareholders interests.1 Wepos it that limited corporate transparency increases demands on corporate governance systems t
7、o alleviate moral hazard problems resulting from a more severe information gap between managers and shareholders, ceteris paribus. We consider two factors that limit corporate transparency to varying degrees across large public U.S. companies: (1) relatively uninformative financial accounting system
8、s characterized by the inability of firms GAAP earnings to explain changes in shareholder value in a timely fashion (low earnings timeliness) and, (2) firm complexity due to extensivegeographic and/or line of business diversification. Accounting information can have a significant impact on economic
9、life. Real reliable accounting information is the important basis for companies to operate day-to-day business and make correct decisions, the important reference for the Governments to make macro-economic regulation and control, the favorable protection for the normal operation of market economy. A
10、s Chinas market economic system has improved steadily, the role of accounting is increasingly important in economy, it is the greatest concern and must be answered by accounting profession that whether accounting information is used to make decisions for government, investors and other users. But Ch
11、inas current disclosure of accounting information should not be optimistic, kinds of disclosure problems often occur such as excessive disclosure of accounting information, inadequate disclosure, untrue disclosure, untimely disclosure, abnormal disclosure, etc. These problems seriously affects corre
12、ct decision-making of the information users, disrupts the distribution of social resources. With respect to monitoring technology, we conjecture that inherent limitations o firms information systems in generating information relevant for monitoringmanagerial behavior influence governance structure f
13、ormation by affecting the costbenefit trade-off underlying governance mechanism configurations. Financialaccounting systems are a logical starting point for investigating properties ofinformation systems important for addressing moral hazard problems. Auditedfinancial statements prepared under Gener
14、ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) produce extensive, credible, low cost information that forms the foundation of the firm-specific information set available for addressing agency problems. Inmonitoring top managers, boards and outside investors cannot simply rely on stockprice changes to pr
15、ovide necessary information about the source of changes to firmvalue. For example, agency models generally imply that managers should be held. accountable for controllable events and not uncontrollable events, while stock returns aggregate the implications of all events. The accounting system facili
16、tates boards efforts to separate controllable from uncontrollable events. As an illustration, managers often submit budgets to the board and then make periodic reports explaining variances from budget, presumably aiding boards in separating controllable from uncontrollable events (e.g., Zimmerman, 2
17、002, Chapter 6) Measuring governance value of accounting numbers We conjecture that the extent to which current accounting numbers capture theinfor mation set underlying current changes in value (i.e., earnings timeliness, asdefined in our study) is a fundamental determinant of their governance valu
18、e todirectors and in vestors. Directors monitor managerial and firm performance, ratify managerial decisions, provide managerial incentives, and aid in strategic planningactivities (e.g., strategy development, succession planning). To carry out these duties, directors demand information to help them understand both how and why equity values are changing. For example, the detailed accounting system
