1、中文 5300 字 一、 外文原文 Chinese states economic cooperation Related investment: An investigation of its direction and some Implications for outward investment By: Sumon Bhaumik and Catherine Yap Co Sumon Kumar Bhaumik* BrunelUniversity, William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and IZ
2、A Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn Email: Sumon.Bhaumikbrunel.ac.uk Catherine Yap Co* University of Nebraska at Omaha Email: ccomail.unomaha.edu Abstract The Chinese state undertakes large scale investments in a number of countries under the auspices of economic cooperation related investment
3、 (ECI). While there are suggestions that it is an extension of Chinas soft power aimed at facilitating Chinese FDI in those countries, often for access to natural resources, there is no systematic analysis of this in the literature. In this paper, we examine this investment of the Chinese state over
4、 time. Our results suggest that the pattern of investment is indeed explained well by factors that are used in the stylized literature to explain directional patterns of outward FDI. They also demonstrate that the (positive) relationship between Chinese ECI and the recipient countries natural resour
5、ce richness is not economically meaningful. Finally, while there is some support for the popular wisdom that Chinas willingness to do business with a country is not strongly affected by its level of corruption, there is much weaker support, if any, for the hypotheses that China favors doing business
6、 with countries where political rights are limited. Running title: Chinas economic cooperation related investments Keywords: China； Economic cooperation related investment； Foreign direct investment； Natural resources； Institutional quality Introduction 2011, Risks in Global Market The risks in the
7、global market have been changing rapidly. The theme of the world economy in 2010 is not so much “recovery” as “adjustment”. Shocked by the global financial crisis, economies began to question and reconstruct the game rules of the global business. This trend may continue and even deepen in 2011. Alth
8、ough the impact of the financial woes may clear away in this year, it is hard for the global economy to go steadily up. The side effects of the crisis are far from negligible and may lead to more uncertainties in some areas, such as Europe and Africa. This report provides a guide to cope with the ri
9、sks and manipulate the markets. Zhou Mi, an expert from the Ministry of Commerce of China makes an overview on the risks of investing and doing business in the global market and specifies those in major economies. He argues that the advanced economies will keep fighting for their frustrated financia
10、l systems in 2011 and their markets will revive unsteadily. Some developing economies may be the gold mines in the global market in 2011, but risks still exist, apparently or potentially. Exporters and investors will have to shun or tackle these risks so that they can benefit from these markets. A s
11、enior manager from Ernst & Young also clarified the changes of customs policies in 2010, especially the revision of the incoterms . Along with the policy environment analysis by an expert from the Chinese Economic Diplomacy, these will help Chinese investors and exporters to adapt to the shifting ru
12、les. Until recently, the behavior and strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) was viewed largely through the prism of the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1988). An MNE was believed to be an entity that has ownership of some special capability (e.g., technology) tha
13、t it can leverage by gaining access to a resource available in another country or to an overseas market. However, rather than import the resource or export to the overseas market, the MNE might choose to internalize the process of accessing this resource or market by setting up an operation in that
14、overseas location, because the expected profits from such internalization is higher. There is an extensive literature on both the determinants of the choice between actual market entry and alternatives like franchising, as well as the determinants of alternative entry modes like greenfield projects,
15、 cross-border acquisitions and joint ventures (JV) (see Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009, and the references therein) The recent surge of FDI from emerging markets,2 and the consequent rise in interest about the emerging market MNEs (EMNEs), suggests that these entities do not conform to the tr
16、aditional view of MNEs. Indeed, in most cases, these firms do not possess capabilities similar to developed country MNEs and that, indeed, overseas expansion is often a means to acquire such capabilities. The high profile acquisitions of IBM personal computer business by Lenovo of China and the Jagu
17、ar-Land Rover brands by Tata Motors of India are examples of this pursuit of capabilities. At the same time, these emerging market firms have certain characteristics that manifest their successful survival in contexts with missing institutions and markets, but those that might be detrimental for suc
18、cessful overseas expansion. For example, it is now well understood that family ownership and formation of business groups in emerging markets are an optimal response to an environment of weak contract enforcement and missing (or imperfect) capital markets, respectively (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2009).
19、 But, as recent research suggests, family control or business group affiliation discourages overseas investment on account of factors such as weak corporate governance in such firms and reluctance to bear the cost of altering the style of management in an alien environment about which the emerging m
20、arket firm has little information (see Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010, and the references therein). In this paper, we address this lacuna in the literature, by attempting to reconcile a states in this case Chinas projection of soft power with factors that usually determine the extent and direction
21、 of outward FDI from emerging markets. The choice of China as focus of our analysis is interesting on two counts. First, there is a conjecture that the Chinese state facilitates outward FDI of Chinese MNEs, by providing crucial linkages with destination countries (Buckley et al., 2008). Further, a n
22、oticeable proportion of the overseas ventures of Chinese firms has been in resource-rich developing countries where resources are de jure or de facto under government control and not easily accessible through market transactions. Our proxy for the projection of soft power is economic cooperation rel
23、ated investment by the Chinese state in other countries. We find that the amount and direction of this investment can be well explained by factors that are used in the stylized literature to explain overseas FDI of firms. We, therefore, conclude that there is prima facie evidence that the Chinese state uses economic cooperation as a tool to facilitate overseas FDI of the Chinese MNEs (CMNEs).
