1、中文 1737 字 Fatal Remedies The Sources of Ineffectiveness in Planning That we learn by our mistakes is an axiom of the rational model of urban and regional planning Feedback procedures should , in theory ,result in the prompt amendment or abandonment of policies that prove to be ineffective .In the lo
2、nger term ,at the national level ,widespread and rigorous appraisal should permit the codification of sources of planning failure and generate a more sensitive and informed understanding ,by professionals ,governments and the community at large ,of the possibilities of planning and the limits of gov
3、ernment Both individual plans and planning systems can be subject to this kind of monitoring .In neither case does practice live up to theory . As far as individual plans ae concerned , the review process is usually moe casual than formal , if it occurs at all . Planning agencies tend to review and
4、revise their work irregularly , in accordance with political priorities, or in response to a cacophony of complaints by vested interests including other government instrumentalities . The latter occasions often represent a kind of planning epilogue which has the merit of resolving politically conten
5、tious questions avoided earlier in plan preparation . Few planning organisations have the resources, time , or inclination for systematic or continuous performance evaluation . Whether by intention or by default ,planning is typically carried on as a disjointed incremental； process . Third party app
6、raisal , often comprising academic analyses of policy effectiveness , is sometimes more wide ranging ,though ,and impartial . However , few local plans are subject to detailed independent appraisal Even where policy appraisal is conducted with considerable analytical rigour , as was the case with Mo
7、ore and Rhodes 1977 evaluation of British regional policy ,the outcome is moe ingenious than convincing .In the case cited , difficulties in defining policy ,policy conflicts and shifts ,the openness of the economic system ,questionable indicators, heroic assumptions ,and doubtful statistical techni
8、ques all tend to vitiate the findings. Performance evaluation ,then ,is a difficult task . To start with , it is not often easy to identify what is being evaluated . Policy , strategy and individual measures may be covert , implied or specific and there is the problem of null policy . Moreover , if
9、particular objectives are the subject of overlapping measures implemented by several agencies , it may be difficult to isllate the set of policies concerned with a given problem, . For that matter , even within a single planning document , a single objective may be addressed by several policies . Se
10、condly , the necessary data are rarely available and , at best , unsatisfactory surrogate indicators must be used . Finally , the measurement of cause and effect can pose insurmountable difficulties in open and complex societies especially where various policy measures are mutually reinforcing or an
11、tithetical , or where lagged responses are marked . Performance monitoring of planning systems , or of planning as such , appears to have attracted more consistent attention .Business , community groups , governments , bureaucracies and academics all have an abiding interest in criticising the proce
12、dures by which plans are prepared and planning decisions are made , and in making suggestions for improvement . A modest , and reasonably practical approach to system evaluation is commonly adopted by governments . The emphasis is on collecting data about such matters as the time taken to approve de
13、velopment applications , and the aim is to make gradual improvements to existing mechanisms. Occasionally , a more dramatic overhaul is attempted . At a deeper level , there are many serious thinkers who doubt whether planning systems can ever achieve what they are purportedly designed to achieve no
14、t that this has discouraged planners from plugging bravely on . It has been argued that urban policy is fundamentally too complicated to be successful ,Analysts have not been slow to identify factors which fundamentally preclude successful planning in capitalist societies . Written in a so-called cr
15、itical idiom , much of this literature starts from an idee fixe of the just society and its correlates in urban form , but offers little practical assistance towards the improvement of planning systems in liberal democratic mixed economies . David Harvey concludes that the planner seems doomed to a
16、life of perpetual frustration ,while Michael Dear and Allen Scott comment： the reactive and palliative nature of urban planning is not simply the result of some technical ,analytical or human failure . It is , instead , the inevitable concomitant of a social logic that sets definite barriers around
17、the range and effectiveness of all political action . Part of the problem with any assessment of planning systems is that urban and regional planning is concerned with only one of the many sets of concerns which fall within the jurisdiction of sovereign governments . Other desiderata may include inc
18、reasing the production of goods and services and national income , the maximisation of comparative advantage in international trade , ensuring a high level of social and economic adaptability or the protection of individual freedom of choice and responsibility . These ends may conflict , and , to th
19、e extent that they do , trade-offs are necessary . Any evaluation which does not confront these trade -offs tells only part of the story and is unlikely to be much of a guide to system improvement . Moreover,a thoroughly rational critique of a planning system should also encompass the behavioural ,
20、analytical and information limitations of the community being planned , those doing the planning and the politicians taking the final decisions . In reality , narrower forms of analysis are likely to be the only practical option , and may well offer sharper insights than studier designed to grasp th
21、e complete picture . A variety of evaluative approaches , individually incomplete as they may be , but originating in a range of disciplines and contributing in their own way to a greater understanding , is thus to be welcomed . Planners can learn much , for example , from the literature on such mat
22、ters as conflict management ,bureaucratic and political decision-making , or the imperatives of private property development . 决定性的补救办法 城市规划无效现象探源 从错误中学习是城市区域规划的一条准则。从理论上讲，反馈过程应该能促使人们对业已证明无效的政策立即进行纠正或摒弃。从长远角度看，国家级的、广泛而严格的评估之后理当归纳整理规划失败的各种原因，使政府、专业人员，甚至广大居民都能更好地了解规划活动的各种可能及政府的局限。无论是单个的规划，还是整个规划体系都需要这
23、种监控，在每种情况下，实践都不可 能与理论完全一致。 就单个规划而言，复审过程即使有也都随意性大，不那么正规化。规划机构的复审和修正工作也不正规，而是按照政治上的优先考虑来进行，或对既得利益集团（包括其他政府机构）的大声抱怨作出反应。后一种情况往往代表规划活动的结局，其优点为：可以接君早先在规划准备金段避而不谈而在政治上有正义的问题。多数规划组织都没有财力和时间，也不愿意对规划绩效进行系统的、连续的评估。不论是处于有意还是疏忽，总之，规划活动成了典型的“杂乱无章”的增量过程。有第三方做成的评估，通常包含对政策的有效性作专业分析，有时范围 更加广泛、更加仔细周到、更加公正。遗憾的是，地方规划很少
24、能得到详细的、独立的评估。即使在对规划政策进行相当严格的分析的地方，正如摩尔和罗德 1977 年对英国区域规划政策的评估中，整成难以界定，相互矛盾，有不断地变化翻新，加之经济体制的开放性，程问题的指标，冒昧的假设，以及令人怀疑的统计方法，所有这一切加在一起使得评估结果难以令人信服。 由此可见，规划绩效评估并非易事。首先，弄清评估项目就不容易。政策、策略及某些具体的规划发放或隐蔽或间接，或特别，各不相同，还存在无效政策的难题。而且，当某些特定的目标成为数家机构争相采纳的测评方法的对象时，要把相关的一套政策与特定问题区分开来也不容易。正因为如此，即使在一个具体的规划文件中，同一个目的也可能涉及几个
25、政策。其次，必要的资料也难以得到，最好的时候也可能用不能令人满意的代用指标。最后，因果关系的衡量还会在开放的复杂的社会中造成无法克服的困难，在各种政策相互强化或相互对立的地方，或在反应明显滞 后的地方，情况尤其如此。 规划体系或规划本身的绩效监控视乎引起了更多的注意。商业部门、社团组织、政府部门、官僚部门，以及学术界都不厌其烦地对规划的准备过程及决策程序提出批评，并热衷于提出改进意见。政府通常采用谨慎使用的系统评估方法，强调收集有关资料，比如审批规划申请所需的时间等，其目的是改进现有规划体制，偶尔也有更激进的大修大补。 在更深层次上，许多勤于认真思考的人怀疑规划体系是否能达到其特定目标 虽然这
26、并没有妨碍规划人员奋力工作，而是因为城市政策本来就太复杂，很难获得成功。分析家们很快找到了资本 注意国家妨碍规划成功的原因。这方面的文献大多使用了所谓的批评的东西来帮助改进自由民主混合经济体制中的规划体系。大卫哈维认为“规划人云视乎注定要永远遭受挫折”；麦克迪尔和艾伦斯科特则认为策划功能是规划的反应性和姑息性本质并不仅仅是技术、分析或认为失误的结果，而是一宗社会逻辑的必然产物。这种逻辑给一切政治行为的规范和有效性设置障碍。 平桂规划体系的部分问题表现为：都市和区域规划只涉及政府权限范围要关心的诸多问题之一。其他需要关心的问题包括增加商品生产、服务项目、国民收入以及在国际贸易中最大限度地增加 相对优势，从而确保社会和经济的高度适应能力，保护个人选着自由和责任感。这些目标可能会相互冲突，但必须在和经济的高度适应能力，保护个人选择自由和责任感。这些目标可能会相互冲突，但必须在其中途范围内寻求妥协。任何不面对这些冲突的评估只能反映部分问题，对体系改进工作不会有多大知道作用。而且，对一个规划体系完全合理的评估只能反映部分问题，对体系改进工作不会有多大指导作用。而且，对一个规划体系完全合理的苹果还应考虑到被规划社区店行为、分析和信息的诸多局限性以及规划人员和决策官
