1、 中文 2880 字 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： Catching-up, crisis and industrial upgrading: Evolutionary aspects of technological learning In Koreas electronics industry 出 处： Asia Pacific Journal of Management 作 者： Dieter Ernst A SIMPLIFIED MODEL A distinguishing feature of the Korean model has been a symbiotic relat
2、ionship between governments and large business groups (the chaebols). This has given rise to the following vicious circle of truncated industrial upgrading a heavy reliance on credit and an extremely unbalanced industry structure has led to a narrow knowledge base, and a sticky pattern of specializa
3、tion. The development of Koreas electronics industry fits the pattern of large-scale, capital-intensive latecomer industrialization described by Gerschenkron (1962): easy access to large amounts of patient debt capital has been a critical source of competitive strength for the Korean chaebols. This
4、has shaped key features of corporate strategy in terms of product specialization, type of production, size of commitment and entry strategy, vertical integration, competition focus and technology management. Koreas successful entry into the electronics industry has been a forced march to develop a m
5、ass production capacity that can serve high-growth export markets for homogeneous products； very little upgrading has occurred into higher-end and rapidly growing market segments for differentiated products and services. Once a decision has been made to enter a sector, the chaebols normally move in
6、on a massive scale and in a highly integrated manner. By channeling funds at concessionary terms to a handful of chaebols, the state has created powerful domestic oligopolies. Koreas extremely unbalanced industry structure has given rise to a peculiar form of competition strategy: firm growth has oc
7、curred through octopus-like diversification into many different and unrelated industries rather than through an accumulation of knowledge through industrial upgrading. The result has been a narrow domestic knowledge base, which in turn has made it difficult to move up the ladder of specialization. T
8、his development model worked well, as long as major export markets kept growing rapidly. As we will see in the following sections, this is no longer the case today. The result is over-capacity and price wars, as well as a dramatic increase in the countrys exposure to debt. After three decades of rap
9、id growth, Korea is now facing a major crisis. External factors, caused by the volatility of international financial markets, have acted as a catalyst； their impact however has been magnified by important domestic factors. A failure to upgrade is one important reason for Koreas vulnerability to the
10、current crisis in the financial and currency markets: it has reduced the capacity of Korean firms to generate a sufficiently large amount of foreign exchange that is necessary to service their huge debt. A NARROW DOMESTIC KNOWLEDGE BASE A narrow domestic knowledge base is another indicator of Koreas
11、 truncated industrial upgrading. Catching-up required a limited set of capabilities: a capacity to absorb and upgrade imported foreign technology and to develop operational capabilities in production, investment and minor adaptations. This is no longer sufficient today. In 1995, an OECD review of Ko
12、reas NSI concluded: The country can no longer afford simply to import technology - which foreigners are in fact more and more reticent to introduce on concessional terms - and will have to raise the value-added and technological intensity of what it produces. (OECD 1995b, p.5) Today, there is an eve
13、n more powerful reason for such a shift in Koreas development paradigm: the country simply does not have the foreign exchange required to buy in foreign technology. Korea thus needs to create a broad-based and diversified knowledge base, especially with regard to product design, market development,
14、the production of key components and the provision of high-end knowledge intensive support services. So far however, Koreas knowledge base is constrained by three main weaknesses: an insufficient critical mass of R&D； gross inefficiencies of corporate technology management； and equally important ine
15、fficiencies of its public innovation system. An insufficient critical mass Until around the mid-1980s, Korean electronics firms had little motivation co- invest in R&D, for the following reasons: First, rapid capacity and market share expansion was much easier, if production was based on imported ma
16、chines and technology. Second, price competition depended primarily on a combination of low labor costs and selective government support and protection: competing for government resources and contracts has been the essence of competition. Third, continuously high rates of inflation and high interest
17、 rates have acted as powerful disincentives to R&D expenditures: they have driven investment into real estate speculation rather than into high-risk R&D. Fourth, industrial promotion policies were biased towards quantitative goals and neglected industrial upgrading: firms received support on the bas
18、is of their export volumes irrespective of their achievements in capital and labor productivities, value-added, and technologies (Sun G. Kim 1995, p.103). In the 1980s Koreas comparative labor cost advantages eroded, product life cycles shortened and competition intensified in the electronics indust
19、ry. This has forced the Korean electronics industry to develop its own R&D capacity (Kim 1997a, chapters 6 and 7). In 1985, for example, there were 5,249 persons engaged in R&D in the electronics industry, and this accounted for 32% of the researchers in the entire Korean industry. By 1990 this numb
20、er had risen to 12,865 and accounted for 37% of total R&D personnel in Korean industry. Koreas R&D spending as a ratio of total sales increased from 0.36% in 1976 to 1.96% in 1990. While this is an impressive achievement, it is still less than half of the current R&D/sales ratios of U.S. and Japanes
21、e manufacturing companies. And Koreas pet capita R&D expenditures of US$176.2 (in 1993) lag well behind those of Japan (USs762.9 in 1992) and the U.S. (US$540.9 ) (Lall 1997, Table 8). In order to reach a critical mass for industrial upgrading, R&D investments in Korea will have to grow much further. The most vivid illustration is that, in comparison to GMs R&D
