1、中文 4075 字 本科毕业 论文 （ 设计 ） 外 文 翻 译 外文题目 Current Trends in Fraud and its Detection 外文出处 Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective 外文 作者 Albrecht W.Steve， Albrecht Chad， Albrecht Conan C1 原文 ： Current Trends in Fraud and its Detection INTRODUCTION Executives and employees of most organizations
2、conduct business with integrity. Their financial statements are transparent and represent the financial state of the organization. However, some succumb to pressures and opportunities to make their companies look better than they really are. These individuals often seek to unduly enrich themselves i
3、n their stewardship roles, increase their financial status, or gain the respect of others through a dishonest image. While it may seem that fraud is centered in certain industries, this small minority of dishonest people exists in every profession and industry. Society has long held that the protect
4、orthe “public watchdog (United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 1984)”against this dishonest minority in public companies is the financial statement auditor. In the United States, Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), explained an auditors role this way: “Ameri
5、cas auditors were given a franchise by the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 to provide the public with accurate audited statements of companies . . . And their mission, the reason for all of that, was to protect the public investor from financial fraud (PBS, 2002).” Over the last decade, there have
6、been numerous frauds discovered in companies throughout the world. These frauds include Enron, WorldCom, Cendant, Adelphia, Parmalat, Royal Ahold, Vivendi, and SK Global. In most cases, it was alleged that the auditors should have detected the frauds and, as a result, they were sued for performing n
7、egligent audits. In order to determine whether auditors should be held liable for fraud, it is important to review why these large scale frauds occurred and the legislation and rules that have been instituted since their occurrence. In this article, we discuss the role of a financial statement audit
8、 and whether or not auditors should be held responsible for financial statement fraud. We describe why fraud occurs and the “perfect storm” that led to the large-scale accounting scandals of the past decade. We 2 review U.S. fraud standards and regulations, new exchange rules by both the NYSE and NA
9、SDAQ, and new regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation. Finally, we evaluate whether these new standards, rules, and acts are sufficient to reduce fraud in the future. WHY FRAUD OCCURS Fraud researchers have found three elements common to all frauds. These three elements of the fraud triangle
10、 are (1) perceived pressure, (2) perceived opportunity, and (3) some way to rationalize the fraud as acceptable and consistent with ones personal code of ethics (Albrecht et al., 2006a). Whether the dishonest act involves fraud against a company, such as employee embezzlement, or fraud on behalf of
11、a company, such as management fraud, these three elements are always present. Figure 1 illustrates the fraud triangle. Every fraud perpetrator faces some kind of perceived pressure. Most pressures involve a financial need, although nonfinancial pressures such as the need to report results better tha
12、n actual performance, frustration with work, or even a challenge to beat the system, can also motivate fraud. Note that this element is perceived pressure, not necessarily real pressure. Pressures perceived by one individual, such as a gambling addiction, may not be pressures to another individual.
13、Examples of perceived financial pressures that can motivate fraud on behalf of a company (i.e., financial statement fraud) are financial losses, falling sales, failure to meet Wall Streets earnings expectations, or the inability to compete with other companies. Fraud perpetrators must also have a pe
14、rceived opportunity that allows the fraud act. Even with intense perceived pressures, executives who believe they will be caught and punished rarely commit fraud (Albrecht et al., 2006b). Executives who believe they have an opportunity to commit and/or conceal fraud often give in to their perceived
15、pressures. Perceived opportunities to commit management fraud include factors such as a weak board of directors or inadequate internal controls. Finally, fraud perpetrators must have some way to rationalize their actions as acceptable. For corporate executives, rationalizations to commit fraud might include thoughts such as “we need to keep the stock price high,” “all companies use aggressive accounting
