1、 中文 4350 字 外文文献翻译 原文： Government Performance: Lesson and Challenges This article concentrates on attempts by OECD countries to introduce performance-based or results-based budgeting and management. The need to enhance public sector performance has become more urgent as governments face mounting dema
2、nds on public expenditure, calls for higher quality services and, in some countries, a public increasingly unwilling to pay higher taxes. Performance budgeting and performance management seek to move the focus of budgeting, management and accountability away from inputs towards results, i.e. better
3、value for money. Drawing on data from the OECD/World Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database, the article explores the trends and country approaches (different phases, various objectives), discusses accountability to the public (including external performance auditing), and recognises the impo
4、rtance of context and a whole-of-government approach, in particular for changing the behaviour of key actors and motivating politicians to use performance information. The limitations and tensions of performance budgeting and performance management are also discussed, as well as problems of measurem
5、ent and the efficient use of performance information. A great deal of rhetoric has surrounded the introduction of performance management and budgeting. Supporters claim that it has the capacity to transform governments. However, it is important that this reform should not be seen as a panacea and th
6、at governments have realistic expectations about what it can achieve and the time needed to reach these objectives. Even countries that have been using this approach for over 15 years continue to struggle with issues of measurement； this is especially the case for outcomes. A key challenge for all c
7、ountries is obtaining good quality information which is valid, reliable, and timely. Numerous challenges can be encountered including setting clear objectives, finding accurate measures of performance and having good systems of data collection. Setting objectives: For some agencies or programmes, ev
8、en setting clear objectives can be a problem when there is no agreement on what the mission is, or there are diverse missions, overlapping and fragmented programmes, and stakeholders with different interests. Finding accurate measures of performance: The design of measures is made difficult by findi
9、ng measures for specific activities, and by relating what an agency or programme actually contributes towards achieving specific outcomes. Output and outcome measures each present a different set of challenges (OECD, 2002b). Outcomes are technically more difficult to measure； they are complex and in
10、volve the interaction of many factors, planned and unplanned. Also, there are problems with time lag issues and in some cases the results are not within the control of the government. Outcomes, however, have a strong appeal for the public and politicians. Most countries appear to have adopted a comb
11、ination of outputs and outcomes. Establishing and maintaining systems of data collection: To ensure quality there needs to be a process by which data collected are verified and validated. However, setting up and maintaining these systems can be both complex and costly. As discussed in Section 6, the
12、 auditing of performance information can help to improve standards and provide some legitimacy for the reported results. It is especially challenging to assure the quality of the data when agencies are dependent on third parties to provide the information. This is particularly a problem in federalis
13、t systems (Curristine, 2002). Performance targets help to clarify performance expectations for an organisation for a given time period. Countries, however, continue to struggle with the issues of target level and numbers. There are problems with setting targets too low and/or too high. Setting targe
14、ts too low means that agencies are not challenged to improve performance. Setting them too high, while it can motivate organisations, also creates unrealistic expectations and situations in which agencies will fail (Perrin, 2002). It takes time to get the right level and to get the comparative data
15、to realise that targets are set at too high or too low a level. Too many targets: There is also an issue about how many targets to have. Too many targets create information overload and make it difficult to select priorities； too few targets create distortion effects. Again it takes time to get a re
16、alistic balance. Several countries have started out with a large number of targets and subsequently reduced them. For example, in the United Kingdom when performance agreements for departments were first introduced as part of the comprehensive spending review in 1998, there were in total 600 targets
17、 across government. By the time of the revised spending review in 2002, that number had been reduced to 130 targets (H.M. Treasury, 2004). Avoiding distorting behaviour: This is a challenge for all governments. Possible perverse effects include goal distortion that is, organisations and managers foc
18、using on a few specific indicators and targets, usually the most achievable or “saleable”, at the expense of the overall objectives or programme. In extreme cases of goal distortion, agencies or staff, under pressure to meet targets, may deliberately present misleading information. In many OECD coun
19、tries, the objective of introducing performance into the budget process is to improve budgetary decision making and to act as an incentive for agencies to improve performance. Most countries, however, continue to struggle with this approach. As discussed above, one of the key issues is obtaining goo
20、d quality and reliable performance data. Briefly, other challenges include establishing some link between financial information and performance information. This is particularly challenging for outcome measures. In many countries there are also problems with the structure of the budget and accountin
21、g issues. Budgets tend to be structured in accordance with institutional and functional boundaries and not according to results categories. Also if there is no system of cost recording, it is difficult to relate true costs to results. Getting the right mix of incentives: This is particularly important when countries use performance information in resource allocation. A fundamental question is whether financial rewards should be given for good performance and bad
