1、中文 3330 字 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： CROP INSURANCE RECONSIDERED 出 处： Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 作 者： JOSEPH W. GLAUBER CROP INSURANCE RECONSIDERED JOSEPH W. GLAUBER During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was much debate over how to fix what were perceived as the failures of the Federal crop insurance program.
2、 The Federal Crop Insurance Improvement Act of 1980 made crop insurance the primary form of disaster protection for agricultural producers, replacing a standing disaster assistance program with subsidized crop insurance. To encourage sales, private companies were enlisted to deliver the product and
3、significantly share in the underwriting risks. Almost overnight, the crop insurance program was converted from a pilot program offering limited coverage to a limited number of crops nationwide, to a nationwide program covering most major field crops in most major growing regions. The perceived failu
4、res of crop insurance were many. At the time of passage of the 1980 Act, Congress envisioned a participation rate approaching 50% of eligible acres by the end of the decade. Despite premium subsidies and expanded coverage, crop insurance participation grew very slowly. When a major drought struck th
5、e Midwest in 1988, only 25% of eligible acreage was enrolled in the program nationwide and participation was even less in states such as Illinois and Indiana (Chite).Widespread crop losses and poor participation in the insurance program prompted Congress to pass supplemental disaster legislation thr
6、oughout the decade including almost $5 billion in disaster assistance to cover crop losses in 1988 and 1989 alone (Glauber and Collins). In addition to its failure to replace disaster assistance, the actuarial performance of the crop insurance program was dismal throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
7、 The aggregate loss ratio, that is, total indemnities divided by total premiums (including premium subsidies), exceeded 150% over 198193. Poor actuarial performance was blamed on expansion of coverage into new areas without having adequate data to rate risks which contributed to adverse selection pr
8、oblems and the difficulty in monitoring producer behavior which contributed to moral hazard issues (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). Finally, despite large actuarial losses, companies shared little of the underwriting risks. Over 198190, total indemnities exceeded total premiums (including prem
9、ium subsidies) by $2.3 billion. Over the same period, companies recorded net underwritings gains of $102 million (Glauber and Collins). This prompted repeated criticism from the U.S. General Accounting Office (1981, 1987, 1992) that companies were not adequately sharing in risks. Within ten years of
10、 the 1980 Act, poor performance of the crop insurance program prompted the Bush Administration to propose eliminating the crop insurance program and replacing it with a standing disaster program (Gardner 1994). The proposal received little interest in Congress, but the criticism of the crop insuranc
11、e program remained unabated. Widespread crop losses due to the 1993 floods in the Midwest prompted yet another disaster bill. This time, however, Congress and the Clinton Administration agreed on the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which authorized additional premium subsidies to increase partici
12、pation. Yet, despite increases in participation, Congress passed ad hoc disaster legislation covering losses in 1998, 1999, and 2000. In 2000, Congress passed the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, which provided further subsidies to encourage crop insurance purchases. Now, fifteen years and two refo
13、rm bills later, the crop insurance program boasts an 80% participation rate with over 215 million acres enrolled and a total liability estimated in excess of $46 billion for 2004 (Davidson). Over Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86 (Number 5, 2004): 11791195 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Associa
14、tion 1180 Number 5, 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 57% of participating acres are enrolled at coverage levels in excess of 65%. The loss performance of the crop insurance program has improved as well. Over 19942003, the aggregate loss ratio for the program was 98%, which prompted the Secretary of Agricult
15、ure to conclude, the program on a national scale is financially sound, properly rated, and effectively managed (Glickman). And, new reinsurance agreements negotiated between the private companies and the government have resulted in companies retaining more risk and facing larger possible underwritin
16、g losses in event of widespread crop losses. Yet, have the program reforms since 1994 really addressed the fundamental failures raised fifteen years ago? Despite large gains in participation, Congress continues to pass ad hoc disaster legislation； two years after passage of the Agricultural Risk Pro
17、tection Act, Congress passed supplemental disaster assistance to cover 2002 crop losses. The costs of the program have risen dramatically as well. Expected annual costs of the program are over $3 billioncompared with less than one-third of that cost fifteen years ago. Increased subsidies have, in tu
18、rn, raised concerns about the distorting effects of crop insurance on production. While the aggregate actuarial performance has improved, large regional disparities exist. Finally, as private companies have taken on more risks, they have come under increasing criticism for the large underwriting gai
19、ns they earn from the program. In the following sections, the paper reconsiders the crop insurance program and the problems of agricultural insurance more generally. It draws on the large literature that has emerged on crop insurance, particularly over the past ten years. Economic research on crop i
20、nsurance can be traced at least as far back as Valgrens 1922 study of private insurance markets.2 However, the amount of research on crop insurance has increased dramatically over the past ten years, paralleling the growth n the program itself. For example, over 1981 93, ten journal articles were pu
21、blished in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Since 1994, fifty-one articles have been published, including over twenty in 2003 and 2004 alone. The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the demand for crop insurance and why participation in the crop insur-ance program has depended on large subsidies. The following section examines the problems of rating agricultural production risks and how subsidies mask actuarial performance. The unintended effects of subsidized crop insurance on production are considered in section Effects
