1、外文文献翻译译文 一、外文原文 原文： The influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value Capital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streams When looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, a
2、s illustrated in Figure 1, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones. Modigliani and Miller (1958), who had originally asserted that there was no relationship between capital structure and value ； in 1963, instead, reach
3、ed the paradoxical and provocative conclusion that a maximum level of debt would mean a maximum level of firm value, due to the fact that interest is tax deductible . Many later contributions pointed out that this effect is compensated when considering personal taxes (Miller, 1977),an eventual lack
4、of tax capacity, due to the presence of economic loss, the effect of other types of tax shields (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980), as well as the introduction of the costs(direct and indirect) of financial distress； all these situations end up creating a trade-off between debt costs and benefits. Point
5、L in Figure 1c indicates an optimal level of debt,beyond which any rise in leverage would cause an increase in the benefits of debt that would be less than proportional with respect to the costs of financial distress. Furthermore, this non monotonic relation would be modified even more when consider
6、ing agency costs as well as the costs of financial distress . Finally, one last stream of research (Myers, 1984,Myers 1984) points out managerial preferences when choosing financing resources . In this case no optimal level of debt becomes objectively evident, but this is due to the various situatio
7、ns the manager had to deal with over time. The function of managerial preference has particular relevance due to information asymmetries, therefore the level of firm indebtedness will be determined by the tangent between the firm value function and the curve of manager indifference. Furthermore, it
8、can be observed that debt increases in correspondence with the better the firms reputation is on the market (Chevalier, 1995). Research has shown similarities between firms that belong to the same sector (Titman and Wessels, 1988)； in other words, capital structure tends to be industry-specific. The
9、 empirical comparison between the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory seems to be controversial. On one hand, empirical evidence shows moderate coherence with the trade-off theory, when revenue and agency problems are taken into consideration contextually； on the other hand, the negative r
10、elation between leverage and firm profit does not seem to support the trade-off theory, as it confirms a hierarchical order in financial decision making. It is, thus, clear that the topic of capital structure is anything but defined and that there are still many open problems regarding it. As many a
11、uthors have noted (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) capital structure is a hot topic in finance. By analyzing international literature the main research priorities and new analytical approaches are related to:the important comparison between rational and behavioural finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2002)；a li
12、vely comparison made between the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999)；the attempt to apply these theories to small firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Fluck, 2001)；the role of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value(Heinrich, 2000, B
13、hagat and Jefferis, 2002, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005). The behavioural approach, that considers the pecking order of financial resources in terms of irrational preferences, caused an immediate reaction from Stewart Myers in 2000 and 2001 and jointly with Shyam-Sunder in 1999 (Myers,
14、2000； 2001； Shyam-Sunder and Myers,1999). Stewart Myers is the founder of the pecking order theory7. Problems of information asymmetry, together with transaction costs, would be able to offer a rational explanation to managerial behaviour when financial choices are made following a hierarchical orde
15、r (Fama and French, 2002). In other words, according to Myers and Fama, there should be arational explanation to the phenomenon observed by Stein, Baker, Wrugler, Barberis and Thaler. Moreover, studies on capital structure have also been done looking at small and medium size firms (Berger and Udell,
16、 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Romano et al., 2000, Fluck, 2001),due to the relevant economic role of these firms (in Europe they are 95 percent of the total firms operating). Zingales (2000) as well has emphasized the fact that today . . . the attention shown towards large firms tends to partially
17、obscure firms that do not have access to the financial markets . . . . In one of the most interesting studies done on this topic, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that firm financial behaviour depends on what phase of their life cycle they are in. In fact, there should be an optimal pro-tempore capi
18、tal structure, related to the phase of the life cycle that the firm is in. Finally, the observations of Michael Jensen (1986), made throughout his many contributions on corporate governance, as well as those of Williamson (1988), have encouraged a line of research that, revitalized in the second par
19、t of the nineties, seems to be quite promising as a means to analyze how corporate governance directly or indirectly influences the relation between capital structure and value (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Myers, 2000, De Jong, 2002,Berger and Patti, 2003, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005).
20、In synthesis, it is possible to affirm, as it follows, that a joined analysis of capital structure and corporate governance is necessary when describing and interpreting the firms ability to create value (Zingales, 2000, Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). This type of consideration could he
21、lp overcome the controversy found when studying the relation between capital structure and value, on both a theoretical and empirical level. Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value. Capital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firms assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity, governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial
