1、 .外文翻译 外文翻译之一 The Eect of Auditors Internal Control Opinions on Loan Decisions（节选） Auditor： Arnold Schneider , Bryan K Nationality： The U.S. Derivation： Journal of Accounting and Public PolicyJ, 2008（ P.1 18） （ P.1 3） Abstract We examine the eect of internal control reports on lending ocers assessme
2、nts of a companys creditworthiness. We suggest that an adverse internal control opinion can undermine the assurance provided by an unqualied opinion on nancial statements taken as a whole and have a negative aect on lenders assessments. In addition, we investigate whether auditor size plays a role i
3、n determining the eect on lenders judgments. We gather data from 111 loan ocers and nd that their judgments are aected by the auditors report on the eectiveness of internal controls. The lenders assessment of the risk of extending a line of credit and the probability of extending the line of credit
4、are negatively aected when the company receives an adverse internal control opinion as compared to an unqualied one. We do not nd any evidence that the eect is lessened by the use of a Big Four auditor. Additional analyses suggest that an adverse internal control opinion weakens the importance assig
5、ned to the balance sheet and income statement in lending decisions and reduces lenders condence that nancial statements are presented fairly in conformance with generally accepted accounting principles. Introduction This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the eect of inte
6、rnal control reports on bank loan ocers assessments of a companys creditworthiness. According to Section 404 of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX), the auditor must attest to,and report on, managements assessment of the eectiveness of internal control over nancial reporting. If the system includes one or m
7、ore material weaknesses, management may not conclude that internal control is eective, and the auditor must express an adverse opinion (PCAOB, 2004). Notwithstanding the regulatory mandate, the need for reporting on internal control eectiveness, attested by the auditor, is debatable. Generally Accep
8、ted Auditing Standards require the auditor to obtain a sucient understanding of internal control as part of every engagement. Such an understanding is necessary to properly plan and conduct an audit (e.g., the mix of tests of controls and substantive tests). Furthermore, the auditor can issue an unq
9、ualied opinion on nancial statements even if a company has material weaknesses in internal control. The auditors report provides reasonable assurance, irrespective of the eectiveness of a companys internal control. Even when an auditor provides an unqualied opinion on nancial statements, users may v
10、iew an adverse opinion on internal controls as bad news. William McDonough, former Chairman of the PCAOB, suggests that it is unclear how the marketplace will react when the auditor expresses an adverse opinion on internal control and a clean opinion on nancial statements (CFO, 2004). A handful of a
11、rchival studies examine the eect of internal control disclosures on stock prices, with most of them nding negative market reactions to the reporting of material weaknesses (e.g., Whisenant et al., 2003； De Franco et al., 2005； Cheng et al., 2007； Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., forthcoming； Hammersley et al
12、.,forthcoming). The current study investigates bank loan ocers reaction to internal control reports. We study bank loan ocers because this group of users routinely analyzes nancial data and has an inherent interest in the reliability of such data. Moreover, the eect of credit decisions in the market
13、place is far reaching. Because bank loan ocers are knowledgeable users of nancial statements, the ndings of this study may generalize to other sophisticated user groups. We conduct an experimental study to investigate whether the disclosure of internal control weaknesses has a negative eect on bank
14、loan ocers assessments of risk and, in turn,the likelihood of granting a loan. The use of an experimental approach allows us to completely control the information that is available to participants. We are able to control for factors that can create challenges for archival researchers, including conc
15、urrent information disclosure, rm-specic characteristics, and self selection. Previous studies (e.g., Doyleet al., 2007a； Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007a) nd that most disclosures of material weaknesses are announced by weaker companies and are accompanied by restatements, restructuring, and other bad news. While these studies attempt to control for such problems with self-selection control
