1、 译文一 ： 企业税收筹划的有效性：基于 对 报酬 的激励作用（上） 译文 二 ： 企业税收筹划的有效性：基于 对 报酬 的激励作用（ 下 ） 学生姓名 学 号 院 系 经济与管理学院 1 Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives ( ) John D. Phillips University of Connecticut ABSTRACT This study investigates whether compensating chief executive officers
2、 and business-unit managers using after-tax accounting-based performance measures leads to lower effective tax rates, the empirical surrogate used for tax-planning effectiveness. Utilizing proprietary compensation data obtained in a survey of corporate executives, the relation between effective tax
3、rates and after-tax performance measures is modeled and estimated using a two-step approach that corrects for the endogeneity bias associated with firms decisions to compensate managers on a pre- versus after-tax basis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating business-unit m
4、anagers, but not chief executive officers, on an after-tax basis leads to lower effective tax rates. KEYWORDS tax planning； performance measures； endogenous treatment effects. I. INTRODUCTION Effective tax planning, defined by Scholes et al. (2002) as tax planning that maximizes the firms expected d
5、iscounted after-tax cash flows, requires managers to consider their decisions after-tax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning effectiveness.1 The ETR, an inco
6、me-statement-based outcome measure calculated as the ratio of total income tax expense to pre-tax income, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher after-tax income. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy for tax savings and does not always imply that after-t
7、ax income and/or cash flows have been maximized.2 Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on the tax function (Mills et al. 1998) and corporate tax department performance (Douglas et al. 1996). Also, lowering the ETR is frequently cited as a way to inc
8、rease earnings 2 (e.g., Ziegler 1997) and increase share price (e.g., Mintz 1999； Swenson 1999). Accounting research has addressed the relation between accounting-based compensation and managers actions (e.g., Larcker 1983； Healy 1985； Wallace 1997). This paper is the first to address whether after-
9、tax accounting-based performance measures motivate managers to take actions that help lower their firms ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and business-unit (SBU) manager levels. Prior after-tax performance measure research has focused only on the determinants of compensation
10、CEOs using pre- versus after-tax earnings (e.g., Newman 1989； Carnes and Guffey 2000； Atwood et al. 1998； Dhaliwal et al. 2000) and provides no evidence concerning after-tax compensations effectiveness in lowering a firms tax liability. Extending this investigation to the SBU level is motivated out
11、of the apparent conflict between arguments that taxes should be allocated to SBU for incentive compensation purposes (e.g., McLemore 1997) with empirical observations that a majority of firms do not do so (e.g., Douglas et al. 1996).4 The current investigation provides evidence concerning the increm
12、ental effectiveness of explicitly motivating CEOs and SBU managers to incorporate tax consequences into their operating and investment decisions. A common issue in cross-sectional studies that attempt to link a particular management accounting choice to an outcome measure is that all sample firms ma
13、y be optimizing with respect to the choice being investigated (Ittner and Larcker 2001). Without addressing the endogeneity of a firms choice, it is difficult to provide evidence consistent with this choice leading to an improved outcome. To address this issue, the relation between ETR and CEO and S
14、BU-manager after-tax performance measures is estimated using a two-step approach that helps correct for the potential endogeneity bias associated with these two choice variables. As a first step in implementing this approach, the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle is used to model a f
15、irms decisions to adopt after-tax CEO and SBU-manager performance measures. To include a particular measure in a managers compensation contract, this principle requires that the expected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measure must be greater than the additional wage that must be p
16、aid to compensate the manager for the resulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after- tax performance measure should be used as a contracting variable in a managers incentive compensation contract only if the managers involvement in tax-planning efforts leads to a difference between pre
17、-tax and after-tax accounting results, which is generally reflected in the ETR. Consistent with prior research, the pre- versus after-tax CEO and SBU-manager selection models include variables that control for a firms tax-planning opportunities because the presence of such opportunities reflect the extent to which a managers actions can be expected to lower the ETR.
