1、 -1 外文翻译之一 Determining the External Social Costs of Public Space Crowding Author(s): Roberts, Russell D Nationality: US Source: Political Economy Working Papers, no. 137 Abstract： This paper uses simple models of private and public behavior to model the relationship between public and private spendi
2、ng on public goods. The standard discussion of the relationship between public and private spending assumes that public spending is exogenous. When public spending is exogenous, each dollar of public spending reduces private spending by a dollar, unless public spending is large enough to drive donor
3、s to a corner solution. When government decision-making is endogenous, responding to the preferences of citizens, the observed relationship between public and private spending is never dollar-for-dollar, nor does government have to push citizens to a corner solution in order to have real effects. Th
4、e relationship between public and private spending depends in predictable ways on the structure of preferences, the degree of heterogeneity among citizens, the flexibility of taxation, and the motivation for the increase in government spending. I. INTRODUCTION The effect of an increase in government
5、 spending on private spending is a central theoretical and empirical question in macroeconomics and public finance. What is the effect of public borrowing on private investment? What is the effect of government housing on private housing ?What is the effect of food stamp expenditure on private food
6、consumption? What is the effect of social security spending on private saving? What is the effect of government welfare programs on private charity? The standard theoretical answer to these questions is that government will either reduce private spending or leave it unchangedthe case of neutrality.
7、These analyses almost always assume the increase in government spending is random or exogenous. -2 This paper studies the interaction between public and private spending on public goods when government is endogenous, responding to the preferences of citizens. The paper begins with what I call the si
8、mple model of the private provision of public goods followed by a brief literature review. The succeeding sections look at the relationship between public and private spending on the poor and the elderly, under different assumptions about how government responds to the preferences of citizens. The m
9、ain results of the analysis are: 1. Public spending is never neutral in equilibrium. 2. When public spending is exogenous, an increase in public spending must drive some donors to a comer solution in order to be non-neutral. But when public spending is endogenous, corner solutions are no longer nece
10、ssary for non-neutrality. The relationship between public and private spending can be positive in equilibrium. 3. When public spending is endogenous, the relationship between public and private spending depends on the source of the change in public spending as well as the structure of preferences, t
11、he heterogeneity of citizens, the flexibility of taxation and the distribution of benefits. 4. Efficiency considerations push public spending towards a level large enough to crowd out all private spending. Whether public and private spending coexist depends on the structure of preferences, the heter
12、ogeneity of citizens, the flexibility of taxation and the distribution of benefits. -3 决定公共空间拥挤的外部社会成本 作者：罗伯特 .罗素 .D 国籍：美国 来源：政治经济学文稿第 137 页 一、引言 政府开支的增加对私人投资的影响是关于宏观经济和公共财政的理论和实践问题。公共借贷对私人投资有什么影响吗？政府投资房地产对私人住房有什么影响？食物券支出对私人餐饮消费有什么影响吗？社会保障支出在私人储蓄有什么的影响吗？政府福利计划对私人慈善机构捐款有什么影响吗？ 标准的理论 对这些问题的回答是，政府将要么减少
13、私人开支的情况下或者离开并保持中立。这些分析几乎总是承担增加政府支出的随机性或外源性。 本文研究了公共支出和私人支出之间的交互作用当把政府支出作为内生变量时，满足公民的特殊偏好。本文构建了所谓的 “简单的模型 ”，私人提供公共物品，紧随其后的是一个简短的文献回顾。接下来的部分之间的关系看起来是在公共和私人消费，穷人和老年人的不同假设条件下，政府如何回应有特殊偏好的公民。主要分析的结果是： 1、公共支出从来就不是中性的平衡。 2、当公共开支是外生的，增加公共支出必须促使一些捐助者 采取能够提出解决的方法为了使其不保持中立的情况。但当公共开支是内生对的 ,转角的解决方案将不在是中性的，也没有存在的必要了。公共和私人之间的关系平衡的支出可以是积极的。 3、当公共开支是内生的关系，公共和私人消费取决于变化的公共支出的结构参数，对公民的税收的灵活性和税收利益分配。 4、考虑到效率推动公共支出在水平方向足够大时排挤了所有私人消费。公共和私人支出是否共存的结构取决于偏好、公民的异质性、灵活性和税收利益分配。
