1、外文题目： The new student loan system in Chiles higher education 出 处： Higher Education 作 者： Christian Larraln , Salvador Zurita 原 文： The new student loan system in Chiles higher education Abstract Chiles higher education system stands out as being one of the most privatized and open to the market in the
2、 world. Recently, the Chilean Congress passed Law # 20.027 of 2005, which provides the legal framework for the creation of a student loan system guaranteed both by the State and by higher education institutions (HEIs), nanced by the private capital market through the securitization of the loans. The
3、 system operated for the rst time in 2006, where approximately 21,000 students were able to access nancing of their higher education for the remainder of their careers. It is expected that as the system matures, more and better information will be available, which will benet the students and the HEI
4、s； and it is highly likely that the current number of nanced students could grow signicantly in the next few years. The purpose of this article is to describe the outstanding characteristics of this system, explain its conceptual basis and analyze the public policy choices available in its design. K
5、eywords： Securitization, Higher education loans, State guarantees, Financial design There is consensus among analysts that education has similar dynamics in most countries, with the possible exception of those with the lowest income. Among seven international tendencies identied by Brunner et al. (2
6、005), there is massication of educational systems due to ever increasing access opportunities, diversication and rationalization of sources for nancing higher education in response to the growing costs brought about by massication, and displacement of the center of gravity of higher education from t
7、he sphere of the State and corporation to the sphere of market and competition. Boer et al. (2002) coincide with this analysis and identify a pervasive tendency toward commercialization due to massication of higher education, among other causes. In effect, in the last few decades the higher educatio
8、n systems are becoming more market oriented, institutions compete amongst themselves in the market for students, teachers, resources and reputation, and the State participates in regulating these markets with pro-market and pro-competition policies. As Barr (2003), among others, recognizes, educatio
9、n and in particular the tendency toward its massication, is currently more important than ever in history；and technological progress brings about the need for additional training at various stages of an individuals working life. Chile is at an intermediate massication phase (3450%), as are Argentina
10、, Uruguay and Bolivia. Developed countries are generally at an advanced phase (5174%), with only two countries at a universalization phase (75% or over), Korea and Finland, although four are close to that stage, New Zealand, United States, Norway and Sweden. Brunner et al. (2005) conclude that the C
11、hilean higher education system is of an intermediate size, with 650,000 registered students and 222 institutions in the sector, of which 90% are private. The same authors conclude, however, that Chile is unique in the strength with which the forces of supply and demand operate, and in its high depen
12、dence on private nancing. In effect, these authors compare the Chilean higher education system with a sample of countries, which include the three main economies of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), three medium high income countries in the Asian southeast (Malaysia) and Central Europe (
13、Hungary and the Czech Republic), and a group of high income countries from different regions of the world, characterized by a small or medium population size and a highly developed tertiary education system (Canada and Finland) or that are developing quickly (Ireland, Israel, New Zealand and Portuga
14、l). The authors conclude that the Chilean system stands out for being the most privatized and open to the market within the sample of countries, as can be deduced from its institutional structure and level of participation of private registration, in addition to the relative importance of the State
15、and family. The article is organized as follows: In the section Participation of the State in education we briey present the case for participation of the State in nancing education； in the section The Solidary System of University Loans (SSUL) we provide a summary of the previous student loan syste
16、m (the so-called solidary loan), and its weaknesses. Finally, in the section The student loan system of Law No. 20,027 of 2005 we address the new model, and discuss its foundations and possible variations. Participation of the State in education Education can be seen as an investment in human capita
17、l, understood as the stock of productive skills and knowledge developed in individuals. The decision to pursue a study program is similar to a decision to invest in physical capital； the individual that studies incurs in direct costs (registration, etc.), but mainly in opportunity costs (the income
18、sacriced by not working), and hence in order to have economic incentives to study, he or she must be compensated for this sacrice by way of greater income once their education is complete. The main idea of the human capital theory is precisely that the greater subsequent income represents compensati
19、on for the investment made. In both the human capital and the screening model focus on the private benets of education, but education has also social benets, for example, greater social cohesion, higher future taxes (due to higher income), and increased productivity of others (economies of scope). O
20、n this last aspect, Moretti (2002) nds that, after controlling through other factors, if the number of university students rises by 1% in a city, this is related to increases in the salaries of employees with incomplete university studies (1.9%), high school studies (1.6%) and other university stude
21、nts (0.4%). The analogy between education and any investment in physical capital has an important limitation, however, because of the different nature of the property rights between the two forms of capital. In effect, while physical capital property rights can be freely transferred in a market econ
22、omy, in a free society slavery is not allowed and hence human capital property rights are indissolubly connected to the person in which that human capital is embodied, the sale of human capital is not permitted. Salary payments and work income are seen as equivalent to renting human capital； and eve
23、n long-term commitments in permanent labor relations are better conceptualized as a sequence of short-term rental contracts. Furthermore, the lack of relevant public information, as well as the existence of information asymmetries, makes it difcult for potential lenders to evaluate the expected protability of different careers. In effect, if a mortgage loan is compared to
