1、本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 原文： Dividend policy and the organization of capital markets How firms determine their dividend policy has been a puzzle to financial economists for many years. Miller and Modigliani (1961) (M&M), showed that under certain assumptions the payment of a cash dividend should have no i
2、mpact on a firms share price. M&M assumed that the firms investment is fixed, since all positive net present value projects will be financed regardless of the firms dividend policy. Consequently, the firms future free cash flow is independent of the firms financial policies, so that the dividend is
3、the firms residual free cash flow. The fact that this result flies in the face of casual empiricism, not to mention most empirical studies,1 was called the dividend puzzle by Fischer Black (1976). Several strands of research have developed to explain actual dividend policies,focusing on relaxing som
4、e of the M&M assumptions. Brennan (1970), for example,relaxed the equal tax assumption. However, in Brennans model the higher thedividend the higher the tax penalty. Consequently, a tax wedge drives up the pre-tax investor required rate of return for high payout firms. Despite extensive empirical in
5、vestigation this hypothesis does not seem to be borne out by the data.Moreover,Poterba (1987) has documented the remarkable stability of dividend payouts throughout periods of extensive tax changes in the USA. While the impact of taxes remains inconclusive, increasing attention has been given to the
6、 problem of information asymmetries. Miller and Modigliani explicitly suggested that dividend changes could have an informational impact.Subsequent research by Watts (1973) and others have documented that initiating a dividend increases the share price and cutting a dividend generally leads to a pri
7、ce decline. Information asymmetries have also given rise to agency cost explanations for paying dividends. With the increased separation of ownership from control, managers frequently face very little supervision. In this context, a commitment to a high dividend policy attenuates managerial opportun
8、ism and forces the firm to frequently interact with the capital market. A central message of asymmetric information models is that dividend payments are important both as a pre-commitment device to reduce agency costs and as a signal of managements expectations of future earnings. Both models have b
9、een used to justify Lintners observation (1956) that actual dividend policies tend to follow a slowly adaptive process. However, the viability of both of these mechanisms depends on other aspects of the institutional and contracting environment. For example, if the firm is closely held there might b
10、e easier and less costly ways of communicating information than by paying a dividend. Similarly, managerial control issues may be less severe in a bank centric market characterized by constant monitoring of corporate activities by lending officers. There are a variety of ways of characterizing insti
11、tutional differences, but Mayer(1990) hit on one key difference: the Anglo-Saxon capital markets model compared to the Continental-German-Japanese banking model. The critical difference as Rajan (1992) pointed out is that the capital markets perspective relies on arms length contracting by uninforme
12、d investors, whereas bank debt is a contract between an informed investor frequently privy to confidential information not available in the capital market. We would expect these marked differences in the organization of the financial system to impact corporate financial policy, particularly the use
13、of dividends as both a signaling and pre-commitment device. In this paper, we take advantage of the recent development of an international database by the World Bank that allows for cross-country comparisons of dividend policy. Financial data is available for the largest firms from eight emerging ma
14、rket countries: Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1990. We analyze the dividend policies of firms from these countries, as well as the key institutional features of each country, and compare them with a control sample of US firms. Dividend signaling mod
15、els offer valuable insights about the role of dividends. In particular they explain why dividends are more stable than earnings and why firms are reluctant to cut dividends. In the former case, as long as underlying permanent earnings are more stable than actual earnings, the dividend will also be m
16、ore stable, since management is signaling its view as to the underlying permanent earnings. In the later case, a dividend cut indicates that the corresponding earnings decline is permanent, not temporary and cyclical. Informational asymmetries and contracting costs can also generate agency costs. Co
17、nsider, for example, a firm that is financed with 100% equity with insiders or management as a control group and a widely dispersed group of outside stockholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrate that with little external control, managers and insiders will indulge in excessive perquisite consu
18、mption either through outright consumption of corporate resources or through inefficient management and inappropriate investment policies. In such a framework outsiders may prefer a high dividend policy: better a dividend today than a highly uncertain capital gain from questionable future investment
19、. In the absence of a strong contractual and legal framework to discipline insiders, for example by elections of outside directors, a pre-commitment to pay significant dividends may be the only way that insiders can raise capital. In the extreme case, a 100% dividend payout forces the firm to bid ba
20、ck the lost equity capital on the open market.5 Consequently, a high dividend payout helps in minimizing agency costs. The implication of both these arguments is that dividend payments will be higher where there are dispersed outsider investors, as long as the firm is in continuous need of equity ca
21、pital and thus forced to interact with the capital market.The role of the institutional structure through which the firms raises capital is thus important for dividend policy. Rajan (1992) showed the difference between bonds and bank debt is in the information acquisition process and the potential for renegotiating the contract. The key is that bank debt is a contract between an informed provider of debt capital who has access to current corporate information, much of it confidential. The banking
