1、原文 ： Dividend policy: The Issues 1. Introduction The determinants of dividend policy are a continuing puzzle, as noted by Black (1976). In this paper we review the major issues in dividend policy and relate them to some of the themes explored in companion papers in this volume. The paper is d ivided
2、 into five sections. Section 2 surveys the literature on the information signalling properties of dividends. Section 3 discusses some tax issues related to dividend policy and section 4 draws on some agency costs explanations for dividend payments. The conclusion draws together the arguments and hig
3、hlights some of the unresolved issues. 2. Dividend policy and information signalling In their classic paper, Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a cogent argument for the claim that dividend policy does not affect the value of the firm. They assume a world without transactions costs and taxes, a gi
4、ven investment policy and fully informed investors. In these circumstances it follows that the irrelevance of dividend policy, given investment policy, is obvious, once you think of it(p.414). With a given level of investment, if a firm chooses to pay a dollar more of dividend now, it will have to r
5、aise an extra dollar of external finance to support its investment: The higher current dividend to existing shareholders will be exactly offset by a decrease in future dividends as the firm must now pay dividends to its new shareholders. In the absence of tax effects and transactions costs and given
6、 full information, the value of the firm to existing shareholders will not be affected by its dividend policy. Dividend policy is therefore irrelevant. Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that the informational content of dividends is assumed absent from their model. They note, however, that in practi
7、ce where a firm has adopted a policy of dividend stabilization with a long-established and generally appreciated target payout ratio, investors are likely to (and have a good reason to) interpret a change in dividend rate as a change in managements views of future profit prospects for the firm. This
8、 echoed the stance recorded by Lintner (1956) in his survey of U.S. company practices which led him to develop the partial adjustment model of dividend beha-viour. Lintner suggests that the primary determinant of dividend payments is the relationship between the existing dividend rate and that rate
9、which would constitute a target pay-out of current and reasonably forseeable profits. A number of different interpretations of Lintners behavioural model are possible. One interpretation is that management signals changes in their perception of the companys long-term profitability by changes in divi
10、dend payments. A paper by Allen, in this volume, assesses the use of target payout ratios by a sample of British companies, drawing on evidence obtained in a questionnaire survey. The results are consistent with the implications of the Lintner model. Respondents report that a desire to maintain stab
11、le dividends and the companys recent dividend history are the main factors influencing target payouts. The importance of the use of payout levels to signal changes in expectations of future earnings is also emphasized. The role of information signalling has been emphasized in recent theoretical work
12、 on dividend policy. Miller and Rock (1985) provide a formal model of the role of dividend policy under asymmetric information. They assume that firms managers know more than outside investors about the true state of the firms current earnings； both dividend payments and external financing will cons
13、equently have announcement effects as they provide information about the firms sources and uses of funds that will enable the market to deduce the firms current earnings. This estimate of current earnings can then be used to estimate expected future earnings and firm value. Unfortunately, this leads
14、 to the possibility that management may try to push up the share price in the short-run by over-generous dividend payments. Ultimately, the truth will be revealed but not before some investors have reaped an excess return by selling before the true information is revealed. Miller and Rock suggest a
15、potential solution to this problem but at the expense of Fishers criterion for optimal invest-ment. They provide a signalling equilibrium in which the dividend payout ratio is higher and real investment is lower than in the full information case. The above approach is consistent with the well-docume
16、nted dividend an-nouncement effects as reported by Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), and Brickley (1983). Ball and Brown (1968) provide the first evidence of the linkage between unexpected changes in earnings and share prices. 3.Taxation and dividend policy There are a number of
17、potential linkages between corporate dividend policies and the tax system. Farrar and Selwyn (1967) and Brennan (1970) point out, that in tax regimes where dividend income is taxed at a higher marginal personal tax rate than capital gains, shareholders in different tax brackets will prefer different
18、 payout policies. It makes sense for higher personal tax rate investors to invest in lower dividend payout stocks so that they can take most of their gains in the form of capital gains. Indeed, pushed to the limit, this argument suggests that it is tax inefficient, from a highly taxed investors poin
19、t of view, for a company in this type of tax regime to pay any dividends. If equilibrium conditions are assumed, the argument also suggests that rational investors should demand a higher risk-adjusted return, on a pre-tax basis, from high dividend yield stocks. This will compensate for their relativ
20、ely unfavourable personal tax treatment. Trueman (1986) model the interaction of dividend policy, invest-ment decisions and financing decisions in the context of a corporate tax regime with varying investor personal tax rates. Their model implies that shareholders in different personal tax brackets
21、will not agree on what constitutes the optimal investment/divi-dend policy. Investors in high personal tax brackets would prefer the firm to invest more whilst those in lower tax brackets will prefer higher payouts and lower invest-ment. This problem will be reduced if clienteles of investors cluste
22、r around firms with different dividend payout policies. The possibility of a dividend clientele effect was first suggested by Miller and Modigliani (1961). It provides one potential explanation of companies observed reluctance to alter their dividend payout ratios. The result would be that shareholders would incur transactions costs in rearranging their portfolios to achieve desired income streams. Elton and Gruber (1970) examine the drop-off ratio, defined as the difference between the ex-dividend
